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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Constitution Seen as Source of Government 'Paralysis'

934C0040C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Mikhail Mityukov, Chairman of the Legislation Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet: "Crowded Conditions on the Legal Field"]

[Text] "The paralysis of authority in the Russian leadership since the putsch was suppressed has never been overcome." This reality, which was admitted by the President of Russia about a year after the victory of the democratic forces, is forcing the politicians to seek a way out of the crisis of authority.

Mikhail Mityukov, Chairman of the Committee on Legislation of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, analyzes the situation:

"The causes of the crisis, unfortunately, are embedded in the existing Russian Federation Constitution. It states, on the one hand, the principle of the division of the executive and the legislative powers and, on the other, it declares the absolute supremacy of power of the soviets. This circumstance gives the Congress of People's Deputies and Parliament the basis for comprehensive leadership over all state bodies.

"Therefore, today's most important task is constitutional reinforcement of the place of each branch of authority.

"The second task is to define legislatively the principles of the mutual action of the authorities. In my view, Parliament should exert an influence on other branches of power by its participation in the formation of executive structures and judicial bodies; by exerting control in defined ways over executive bodies with authority; and third, by formulation of the budget.

"For the purpose of strengthening authority with legislation, Parliament plans to examine the draft of and adopt the Law on the RF [Russian Federation] Council of Ministers; the Law on State Control; the Law on the State Service; the Law on Providing for Execution of the Constitutional Court's Decisions; and the Law on the Constitutional Protection of Organs of Power (the President returned the last one to the Supreme Soviet for finishing touches).

"Legislation about the 'fourth estate' also needs improvement, for today the 'Responsibility' chapter in the Law on the Press and Mass Media has been turned into a simple declaration. This chapter says that criminal, administrative, and civil responsibility is established for restricting freedom of speech and for abusing freedom of speech. But the appropriate measures for responsibility were not introduced into either the criminal-procedure or administrative codes. The thought

itself is invited that both those who restrict freedom of speech and those who abuse it are equally interested in the absence of responsibility.

"But there is still another reason for the crisis. Its sources are in the so-called delegation of powers: The Congress of People's Deputies entrusts the Supreme Soviet with adopting one law or another; and in its turn the Supreme Soviet charges the Presidium with something.... But if the Constitution stipulates a delegation of powers from the Congress to Parliament, then this problem is not solved with respect to the Presidium. Yes, the VS [Supreme Soviet] Presidium is a constitutional organ, it coordinates the activity of Parliament's standing committees and commissions, and it organizes the session's work. But the Presidium does not have the right to substitute for the Supreme Soviet and adopt enactments that are within Parliament's jurisdiction.

"What is happening in practice? As we recall, the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia gave the President a number of additional powers. But the President has gone farther: he has practically usurped functions on matters of so-called temporary legislation, and he has begun to adopt enactments and ukases in which he writes: 'Pending the adoption of a law to regulate this matter.'

"In the President's pursuit of the prerogative of temporary legal regulation he has to some extent appropriated for himself even the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Presidium thereby gets interfered with at times in the area of jurisdiction of executive bodies of authority, and the President is injected into legislative and judicial power, a road which, as they say, he is forbidden to travel. An example is the President's regulation on raising the pay of members of the Constitutional Court.

"This unsound practice has led to a triple system of legislation, in which the Congress and Parliament, the President, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet regulate one and the same legal field. This practice undoubtedly undermines the stability of authority, reduces its prestige, and creates incredible difficulties for the doers. If it suits them they cite a law of the Russian Federation, if it does not suit them they cite the President's ukases, and in other cases they act any old way."

Parliamentary Faction Critiques Government Actions in Georgia Conflict

924C2409A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Sep 92 p 1

[Commentary by Vladimir Kuznechevskiy: "The Danger Has Not Yet Passed, but the Federative Agreement Has Held"]

[Text] But the danger that the Federative Agreement would collapse was there. This is pointed out in a statement signed by Umar Temirov, a parliamentary deputy of the Sovereignty and Equality Faction. People's Deputy of the Russian Federation Mukhamadin Tumov

brought the text of the statement, with its demand for immediately convening an emergency session of parliament, to the editorial office. The statement declares that "the passive behavior of the Supreme Soviet, the President and the Government in evaluating the gross violation of human rights in Georgia and the right of the nations to self-determination raises doubts as to the sincerity of the intentions of the federal authorities of Russia to strictly observe the provisions of the Federative Agreement concluded on 31 March 1992.

The faction believes that the final documents of the Moscow meeting do not contain such principal provisions as the total withdrawal of all Georgian troops from the territory of Abkhazia, a definition of the state status of Abkhazia, or political guarantees of nonresumption of the bloody conflict. Nor does it point out the necessity of Georgia's making restitution for damages inflicted by its troops on the resort zone and the cities of Abkhazia...

In fact, the statement of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, which contains many of the aforementioned provisions, was not published until 7 September. At first glance it may appear that the document was late in being adopted. However, this "belatedness" has an entirely reasonable explanation: the legislative authorities did not believe it expedient in a critical situation to interfere with the executive authority's search for a way out of the crisis.

As far as one can tell, the parliamentary leadership's conduct during the crisis situation had been coordinated with the head of state. The country's leaders were hardly acting out of passivity when they presented their carefully-considered positions and opposed the immediate convocation of an emergency session of parliament; for they were convinced that this would more likely make the situation in the region worse, than bring about its improvement.

Events in Abkhazia indeed posed a threat to the Federative Agreement, since the conflict might have extended to virtually the entire South of Russia (the North Caucasus in any event). Events might have transpired according to the Dudayev variant as well: revolutionary fighting groups, political meetings, and immediately thereafter—seizure of power and overthrow of the lawful organs in the Russian republics of the North Caucasus. There is no lack of opposition to the Federative Agreement. And in a critical situation it does not require great effort to start up the process of dissolution into national quarters and territories.

In addition, purely Russian interests were touched upon in the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict as well: 100,000 Russians dwell on this territory.

A critical situation was taking shape. But the President understood the danger and began to act decisively. Was it indeed urgent for the Supreme Soviet, without even having analyzed the situation in sufficient depth and without developing variants, to convene an emergency session and thereby in fact prevent the head of state from defusing the conflict immediately, and from bringing

about a long-term peaceful resolution? I believe that this would have been a political mistake with far-reaching consequences.

The high point of the Moscow agreement was the agreement by the parties to the conflict to a cease-fire and to the withdrawal of military formations and combat equipment. It goes without saying that it was unrealistic to expect immediate fulfillment of these conditions. A certain amount of time is needed. And attendant circumstances played a role too. After all, the signature of Eduard Shevardnadze stands beneath the agreement, and the troops of the State Council of Georgia [Gossovet Gruzii] are commanded by Tengiz Kitovani. There are reports that he is trying to bypass certain positions of the agreement, that he is trying to leave his own battle-worthy formations in Abkhazia, and withdraw only the damaged equipment.

But there are points in the text of the agreement that would be hard even for him to "overplay." For example, Article 10 of this document states: "The parties will support the resumption by 15 September 1992 of the normal activities of the lawful authorities in Abkhazia." Even if one were to display wonders of inventiveness, it is very hard to bypass this point: the Abkhazian side is supported not only by the public in the CIS states, but also abroad.

The first results of the Moscow agreement can already be seen. Military operations on a broad scale have ceased on the territory of Abkhazia, and troop withdrawal has begun. On 9 September, a trilateral (Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia) control committee for peaceful settlement of the conflict began to operate in a suburb of Sukhumi. Thus, the mechanism for carrying out the Moscow agreement has begun to operate.

In all this, it seems to me that the most important thing was the fact that in such an extremely complex situation the executive and legislative powers operated in close interaction, in the only sensible manner and from unified positions. As the saying goes, may God grant that they do not lose the mutual understanding they have acquired.

Decree on Government Control-Supervisory Council

935D0011D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 5

[“Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 18 September 1992, No. 732, Moscow: On the Control-Supervisory Council Under the Government of the Russian Federation”]

[Text] In order to provide for implementation of government decisions, the government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To create under the government of the Russian Federation a control-supervisory council consisting of

the chairman of the council, the deputy chairman, and nine members of the council.

2. To consider the basic tasks of the control-supervisory council to be to control and prepare proposals aimed at providing for implementation of the decisions of the government of the Russian Federation, the development of recommendations for improving the quality of decisions that are made as well as their coordination, and the disclosure and consideration of cases of failure to carry out decisions of the government of the Russian Federation by officials of organs of executive power.

3. The chairman of the control-supervisory council is the first deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation.

The deputy chairman of the control-supervisory council is appointed by the government of the Russian Federation and in terms of conditions of material support, living, transportation, and medical service is equal to the deputy chief of staff of the government of the Russian Federation.

The personnel of the control-supervisory council are approved by the government of the Russian Federation.

4. Within one month V.F. Shumeyko is to submit for approval a draft of the statute on the control-supervisory council under the government of the Russian Federation.

5. To appoint Mikhail Kuzmich Yukov deputy chairman of the control-supervisory council under the government of the Russian Federation.

6. To form as a part of the apparatus of the government of the Russian Federation an independent structural subdivision, assigning it the functions of the working apparatus of the control-supervisory council.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin

Ukase on Abolishment of Experts Council

935D0012B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Oct 92 p 6

[Russian Federation Presidential Ukase No. 1136: "On Abolishment of the Council of Experts Under the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] In connection with Russian Federation Presidential Ukase No. 1044 "On the Council of Experts Under the President of the Russian Federation," issued on 2 September 1992, I hereby decree the abolishment of the Council of Experts under the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, The Kremlin
26 September 1992, No. 1136

Directive on Advisers to President

935D0011A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Oct 92 p 7

["Directive of the president of the Russian Federation: On Approval of the Statute on the Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] 1. To approve the appended Statute on the Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation.

2. The secretary of state under the president of the Russian Federation, G.E. Burbulis, is to be instructed to coordinate the activity of the advisers of the president of the Russian Federation for performing the functions assigned to them.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
25 September 1992
No. 542-rp

Statute on Advisers to President

935D0011B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Oct 92 p 7

["Statute: On the Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation"]

[Text]

I. General provisions

The adviser to the president of the Russian Federation (henceforth called Adviser) is an individual authorized by the president of the Russian Federation to render him permanent assistance in the formation and implementation of the strategy for nationwide development and state policy in the corresponding sphere of activity.

The Adviser is appointed and discharged from the position by the president of the Russian Federation.

The Adviser is under the direct jurisdiction of the president of the Russian Federation.

The Adviser has the rank of a minister of the Russian Federation.

The Adviser is guided in his activity by the Constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation, the decrees of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and the ukases, directives, and instructions of the president of the Russian Federation and also the present statute.

In order to perform his functions the Adviser works in close contact with the leadership of the administration of the president of the Russian Federation and interacts with organs of state administration and nongovernment organizations.

The Adviser engages in scientific, teaching, and creative activity with the permission of the president of the Russian Federation.

II. Functions of the Adviser

The Adviser in keeping with the tasks entrusted to him: develops and submits for the consideration of the president of the Russian Federation recommendations and proposals concerning crucial areas of state policy;

systematically informs and consults with the president of the Russian Federation on questions of his particular sphere of activity and submits the appropriate monthly informational and analytical materials;

supervises the course of the implementation of ukases and orders of the president of the Russian Federation in areas within his competence;

participates in the preparation of the annual report of the president of the Russian Federation to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation;

submits proposals to the president of the Russian Federation concerning the need to develop laws of the Russian Federation and other normative acts;

on instructions from the president of the Russian Federation, participates in the preparation and approves drafts of ukases and orders of the president of the Russian Federation;

participates in the preparation of reports and also other materials for the president of the Russian Federation in connection with official speeches and statements;

on instructions from the president of the Russian Federation, participates in preparations for trips of the president of the Russian Federation through the country and visits to foreign countries and also diplomatic and protocol measures of the president of the Russian Federation;

carries out other instructions of the president of the Russian Federation.

III. The authority of the Adviser

In order to perform his functions, the Adviser has the right:

to participate with an advisory vote in meetings of the government of the Russian Federation, the boards of the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, and other organs of state administration;

to request and receive from the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation and other organs of state administration and also from enterprises, institutions, and organizations (regardless of the forms of ownership) necessary information, for whose reliability and promptness officials are responsible;

to head up social and consultative organs formed by the president of the Russian Federation and functioning in keeping with provisions concerning them approved by the president of the Russian Federation.

IV. Organization of the work of the Adviser

In order for the Adviser to successfully perform the functions assigned to him and also to support the activity of the work groups formed by him, the adviser has a staff of six people.

The structure and the salaries of the workers of the Adviser's staff are approved by the leader of the administration of the president of the Russian Federation at the suggestion of the Adviser.

The hiring and firing of workers of the Adviser's staff are done by the head of the administration of the president of the Russian Federation at the suggestion of the Adviser.

Material-technical, information, consumer, and medical service for the Adviser and workers of his staff is provided by the corresponding subdivisions of the administration of the president of the Russian Federation.

Election Moratorium Effect on Party Movement Viewed

934C0029B Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian No 39, 24-30 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Vyunitskiy: "Will The Parties Catch a Second Wind: Or Will It Be Their Last?"]

[Text] Political scientist V. Vyunitskiy's article "Will Russia's Multiparty System Survive in 1992," which was published in *FEDERATSIYA* at the beginning of the year, drew concerned comments from readers and a good many questions. Parties are, above all, the most effective election machines.

Today, however, following the conference in Cheboksary where the decision was made to freeze elections for two and a half years, the situation has become even more complex. What ways out are seen for parties? And how realistic are they?

Parties in both Russia and other CIS states really are experiencing hard times. On the one hand, the fact that they have still not paid back voters on their election promises, which were generously distributed by their candidates (who, to be sure, were by no means all party candidates at that time) during the 1990 election campaign, has aroused obvious and unquestionable disappointment among the people. And on the other hand, they are finding fewer and fewer occasions to remind people of their existence: their main holiday—multiparty elections—will not come soon.

The parties' hopes for millions of supporters ready to join their ranks have proved vain: the most powerful parties are barely reaching the hundreds of thousands. For most members of the former CPSU have simply dropped their party affiliation without joining any of the new organizations, and the bulk of party nonmembers (with the exception of the politically active ones who

were not recruited by or were expelled from the CPSU) have simply remained nonmembers.

The decision to freeze elections for another two and a half years that was announced in Cheboksary means a real blow to most of the parties and to the multiparty system as a whole. For without such a reminder of themselves as election rivalry provides, the parties will not escape a state of slumber and stagnation. But one can understand the logic of that decision: in a situation of economic crisis, and given the increasingly deep polarization of society and the shaky balance of forces, it would be risky to allow the parties to once again rock the common boat in which we are all sitting and which is taking on water, from side to side.

It is clear that the Cheboksary decision represented a compromise among forces of various orientations, from the radical democrats to the orthodox communists, that have a stake in stabilization. However, let us clarify that point: it was a compromise among forces that have representation on bodies of authority. And here one finds the first watershed among the parties: those that have governmental representation are preserving their chance to survive, if only in the form of factions in soviets at various levels.

The second watershed is the social base. Today many parties simply do not have one, or they are forced to compete with others for one. For example, the communist- and socialist-oriented parties are fighting for influence with the working class; the liberal and social democratic organizations are competing for acceptance by the emerging middle class, and so forth. Without the effective mechanism for actually testing attachments that elections provide, these disputes may go on for a long time. And here a third selection factor comes into play: those political organizations that are backed by powerful economic forces capable of "feeding" them during a period when they are unneeded, until the need for them as election machines arises, have better chances for survival.

In light of what has been said, one may assert that, of the many dozens of political organizations that have declared and are declaring their right to political existence, relatively few will survive until the longed-for elections.

One cannot say that this problem and this prospect do not concern legislators. The draft Russian Federation Law on Parties, which was drawn up at the initiative of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Committee on the Mass Media, Relations With Public Organizations and Mass Citizens' Movements, and the Study of Public Opinion, represents one of the most resolute attempts to preserve the multiparty system and help parties survive a period that is difficult for them. Specialists have already managed to assess the draft as a sound basis for discussion that generalizes world experience in regulating relations between parties and society. On the whole, one can agree with this. But right now, when work

on the draft is still continuing, it would be useful to call attention to those of its provisions that are fundamentally unacceptable.

This pertains most of all to Article 27 of the draft law, which deals with the procedures for financing party activities. For this purpose, the authors propose allocating money from the Russian Federation state budget that is specially earmarked for the activities of political parties. It is proposed that the right to receive subsidies be granted to parties that have gained at least 1 percent of the validated votes in elections to supreme and local bodies of authority. According to the law, they are to get the lion's share of the subsidies. Parties that have gleaned 0.5 percent of the vote each can also count on a certain part of the pie.

Well, the practice of granting state subsidies to parties on the basis of their real weight in public life, the criterion of which is the number of votes that they receive in regular elections, is followed throughout the world. The introduction of such a practice would be a good idea in our country, too. Not, however, in the form that it is given by the draft law's authors, for they have turned state subsidies into virtually the main form of parties' financial receipts.

However, there are a good many supporters of the idea of financing parties. And these are chiefly parties' representatives on bodies of authority. Sensing their material stake in such a law, they may, forgetting their disagreements, use their common weight and influence to "push it through." Granted, the draft resolution on implementation of the law provides for putting Article 27 (on state subsidies) into effect only after the general elections. And that means that all parties get an incentive to more actively swing the political pendulum in an effort to force the arrival of the election tourneys.

But even after pushing the law through the Supreme Soviet the parties will hardly be able to revoke the moratorium. But who, then, will be the loser as a result of the law's adoption?

The answer is provided by Chapter V of the draft law, which deals with questions of parties' participation in the activities of representative bodies. Article 24 of that chapter emphasizes that financial support for the activities of party factions is intended with adoption of the law. So the Supreme Soviet committee has looked out, first and foremost, for its own members and their colleagues—the representatives of parliamentary factions. And the law, if it is passed in its present version, will assist (at the public's and state's expense) only the parties that have parliamentary representation and factions in supreme and local bodies of authority.

Of course, the multiparty system is an important democratic mechanism and a high political value. However, it must survive, first and foremost, through the efforts of the parties themselves. More and more disadvantaged people are appearing in society, and more and more state

money is being required for aid. And the parties must not become competition for those who have sunk below the poverty line.

Communists Propose Measures for Restoring Party

93UN0037A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Sep 92
p 1

[Article by V. Zorkaltsev, V. Kuptsov, N. Ryvkin, N. Osadchin, G. Zyuganov, A. Sokolov, Yu. Belov: "We Will Restore a Renewed Party of Communists"]

[Text] We, the communists, who are asserting the constitutional right of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party to legal activity, and demanding that the anti-democratic prohibitive orders issued by the Russian president be repealed, have decided to turn to you, the communists of Russia in setting forth our vision of the ways to restore the activity of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR.

During those dim days in August 1991, under conditions of a heightened political and socioeconomic national crisis, which had been caused by substantial mistakes in the implementation of social transformations being pursued then, and by a change in the social and political orientation of those transformations, the Russian president suspended and later disbanded the organizational structures of the CPSU (within Russia's territory) and the CP RSFSR, and confiscated their property.

The orders of that president who calls himself a democrat, have stripped the country's most massive parties of their constitutional rights, of the opportunity to legally set forth and assert their own views and objectives, and to speak out in an organized fashion in defense of the trampled interests of the working people.

Most likely the most important role, although not the last, played in the dramatic fate of the USSR and the CPSU was that of the inconsistent and contradictory policy of the former general secretary of the communist party, and president of the Soviet Union, M. Gorbachev; a policy which brought about his renunciation of not only the post of general secretary, but the office of the head of the government as well. Many former members of the party's leadership, and party apparatchiks showed tendencies of political desertion.

We expressed our own view of the events at the Constitutional Court sittings, and outside its doors at press conferences, in statements to the mass media. Our statements have been kept silent, however. In open letters addressed to the RF [Russian Federation] president and the Constitutional Court, we set forth our own understanding of the situation that has taken shape and our vision of ways to restore the activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party. Our appeals were kept closed to millions of communists, however.

What do we see as the way to restore the activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party?

We think that until the prohibitive orders issued by the Russian president have been repealed, their action should be suspended until a lawful judicial decision has been made concerning the question of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist party. Such a decision, to be adopted by either the president himself or the Constitutional Court, would, in a legitimate and legal fashion, allow for: Conducting a Central Committee plenum of the RSFSR Communist Party; organizing the re-registration of Russian communists; convening a congress; adopting a set of bylaws and a program document, and registering the latter with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. In other words, such a decision would allow for concluding the process of creating a Communist Party of Russia, a process that was forcibly interrupted by the orders of the Russian president. A painless and fair solution to the question of property may also be found. Communists have already said more than once that they are ready to make a significant portion of what was party property into national property.

Restoring the activity of republic communist parties is the only possible way to restore the activity of the CPSU. Only the communists themselves, and their higher bodies - the party congresses - can resolve the problem concerning the fate of the RSFSR Communists Party and the CPSU.

We are asked, why is there talk of restoring the activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party if the Russian Communist Workers' Party, the Socialist Party of Laborers, the Russian Party of Communists, and a number of other regional communist organizations have already been created, and if the process of forming (registering) a Union of Communists is underway?

All this is indeed true. First of all, however, all new parties with communist and socialist orientations have a dual membership. They are all united by the CPSU party ticket. They have not lost hope for a constitutional resolution to the fate of the RSFSR Communist Party and CPSU.

Secondly, only a small number of communists have united in the series of new communist-oriented parties. The rest, while believing in justice, are awaiting the certain restoration of the activity of their own party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Thirdly, those representatives vested with power in parties of communist and socialist orientation should be invited to participate in the work of the Central Committee of the CP RSFSR plenum, and together with members of the CPSU Central Committee from the

Russian Federation and the deputy faction "Communists of Russia" they can work on forming an organizational committee to prepare for the congress (conference) of communists of Russia, and can take an equal part in restoring the activity of the RSFSR Communist Party.

This also explains why our names have been absent from among the various groups and committees taking the initiative to conduct party congresses, conferences, and plenums. We are acting in accordance with the bylaws of the party and with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. We are for a unified organization, and unity of action on the part of the communists of Russia.

The restoration of the activity of the Communist Party of Russia is not an end in itself, for without repealing the ban on activity of the communist party, one cannot speak of the creation of a democratic, law-governed state.

V. Zorkaltsev is the leader of a group of representatives of RF People's Deputies that is intervening in the Constitutional Court's examination of the constitutionality of the RF president's orders; orders which suspended the activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party and transferred their property to the government. He is an RSFSR CP Central Committee member;

V. Kuptsov is the leader of a group of CPSU and CP RSFSR representatives asserting the constitutionality of the CPSU and CP RSFSR at the Constitutional Court. He is a first secretary of the CP RSFSR Central Committee, and a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee;

N. Ryvkin is the coordinator of the deputy faction "Communists of Russia" in the RF Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Peoples Deputies. He is a representative of the group of peoples deputies at the Constitutional Court;

N. Osadchin is the head of a group of experts and consultants from the deputy faction "Communists of Russia," and is a coordinator of the social organization "In Defense of the Rights of Communists." He is a CP RSFSR Central Committee member, a Doctor of Historical Sciences, and a professor;

G. Zyuganov is a representative of the CPSU and CP RSFSR at the Constitutional Court, and is a secretary of the CP RSFSR Central Committee;

A. Sokolov is an RF peoples deputy, a representative of the group of peoples deputies at the Constitutional Court, and a CP RSFSR Central Committee secretary;

Yu. Belov is a member of the RSFSR Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Communist, Workers' Organizations Local Activities

Moscow CPSU Party Aktiv Meets

934C0042A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by V. Markov: "Delegates Elected"]

[Text] The communist movement is faced with two important tasks for renewing its influence over the political life of the country: first, to restore the primary party organizations and return to active work all communists who have retained their ideological convictions; and second, to unite them in a single powerful party.

The 4 October conference of the city party aktiv together with representatives of the party organizations of 27 rayons in the capital will help resolve these tasks.

Delegates were chosen for the 20th CPSU Party Conference, which is to be held on 10 October.

Workers', Peasants' Congress Meets in Nizhniy Novgorod

934C0042B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by P. Orlov: "Workers, Unite!"]

[Text] An oblast congress of representatives of workers and peasants in Nizhniy Novgorod called upon all workers to unite the working collectives of the cities and villages for struggle against rapacious privatization and sale of the land. Delegates were chosen for the Russian Congress of Workers' Soviets, which is to open here on 17 October at the Sorkovskiy Plant palace of culture.

United Workers' Front Preparing for General Strike

934C0042C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by V. Stradymov: "For a General Strike"]

[Text] Nearly 60 delegates and guests from 29 cities in the country took part in the work of the 4th Extraordinary Congress of the United Workers' Front, held on 3 and 4 October in Moscow.

The principal task for the immediate future was defined as the struggle for changing the anti-popular reform policy. Resolutions were adopted on critical questions of the present moment, including questions on the attitude toward privatization, and on interaction with other political forces. The congress produced an initiative to convene as soon as possible a congress of the "Trudovaya Rossiya" [Working Russia] Movement, and defined measures for preparing for a general political strike.

Ministry of Security Denies Tailing Khasbulatov

934C0040B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 92 p 2

[Article: "They Did Not Follow Khasbulatov"]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Security has denied the declaration of former KGB [Committee for State Security] General Aleksandr Sterligov that it was conducting sanctioned tailing of Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. The MB RF [Russian Federation Ministry of Security] in an official paper called these accusations "devoid of any basis and absolutely absurd." "Sterligov has more than once tried to discredit the MB RF leadership, not once has he presented to the appropriate inspecting organs any documents that confirm the content of his expose-type declaration."

Comments on Ryzhkov Testimony at Constitutional Court

934C0040A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Oct 92
p 2

[Article by Otto Latsis: "The Constitutional Court: Nikolay Ivanovich Will Help the Opponents"]

[Text] The President's representatives successfully caught N. I. Ryzhkov—this could describe the course of events at the 1 October session of the court. So many people have commented: Nikolay Ivanovich "started to swim" on the questions. But such an assessment seems superficial to me.

First, it was not especially needed that Nikolay Ivanovich be trapped: he clearly came with the intention to speak honestly. Some of the time he played the artless game suggested by CPSU spokesmen in prompting questions ("Do you know of cases of the Uralmash Party Committee's kindling of nationality dissension?"—"No, I do not know of such cases."), but finally this bothered him, even on a routine question put in this style, which called upon him to rebut a case of the CPSU's commanding the government, when he answered sharply: "Well, why must we go along this edge? The Politburo was the highest organ, and I was subordinate to it." The fact that the witness acknowledged his personal responsibility in a number of cases (for example, in the decision on Chernobyl) and recognized the evolution of his own views, does honor to him: three years ago he thought otherwise, and right now he has changed his mind.

We shall not guess at why this out-of-the-ordinary witness firmly defended the CPSU's business and did so in his own way. It was apparent to all that he had labored on the CPSU Central Committee staff for a short time, and he did not sense and did not recognize himself as a party functionary; on the contrary he had not forgotten a factory director's annoyance at obkom officials who had tried to order him about.

There were, however, deeper causes, for which there was no need to trap him: he let the cat out of the bag easily, without his opponent's efforts. The fact is that Nikolay Ivanovich came not to the Constitutional Court but to the court of history—thus he understood what had occurred and his place in it. He spoke about the court of history himself and right away in his own opening words. The court was concerned about testing the constitutionality of the party, but the witness was concerned about proof of his own historical correctness. This is why, in answering M. Fedotov's question—Why, even after repeal of the 6th Article of the Constitution, did he, the chief of the government, in examining a problem that touched on relations with the GDR, turn in a memorandum to the Politburo?—N. Ryzhkov, without pondering carefully, answered with great annoyance: "The MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was only formally part of the Sovmin [Council of Ministers]. Shevardnadze always went directly to Gorbachev." The witness could not have thought of a brighter confirmation of what M. Fedotov needed.

What made him still more vulnerable was the fact that he still accepted and stood up for the CPSU's basic thesis. Yes, the party sometimes did not act very well, but at the time it was banned it had successfully revamped itself. Thus, this stand in defense of the indefensible hindered him most of all. The repeated statement that the main evidence of and model for renewal was the Polozkovskaya RKP [Russian Communist Party]: "It," he said, "did not bear the burden of the former CPSU, from the very start it had no branch sections, and it occupied itself exclusively with developing policy," deserve special admiration.

Readers have scarcely forgotten that which occurred not so very long ago in plain view of everyone, but it must be remembered that the policy that the RKP developed and pursued was also aimed precisely at decided opposition to revamping and at a quick return to that past, the burden of which it supposedly did not bear. The RKP Central Committee staff broke loose from Gorbachev's control and, unlike the CPSU Central Committee staff, it acted decisively and energetically. In a short time it developed a basic model of a plot, through "rescue committees," a model that was tested experimentally in Vilnius and Riga, and in August it was embodied in the form of the GKChP [State Committee for the Extraordinary Situation].

The plan for eliminating Gorbachev as party leader, since he hampered implementation of the ideas of the proponents of the extraordinary situation, matured within the depths of the RKP. The execution of this plan was successfully started at the July Central Committee Plenum, the last in the CPSU's history. The plenum rejected Gorbachev's proposal to convene a regular Party Congress, and it insisted on a decision to convene an extraordinary congress. According to the regulations, the composition of the Central Committee was not reelected at an extraordinary congress, but the general secretary could be reelected. The July plenum did not

permit Gorbachev to carry out another decision of his: to elect delegates to a future congress, as the charter stipulated, by party district and by the general voting of all communists. They demanded that staff elections be conducted, "in an exceptional procedure," at obkom plenums, and Gorbachev was able only to postpone the decision. Those who right now swear in the name of "18 million ordinary party members" call this revamping? It was precisely the party that tried to convince rank-and-file RKP members that reforming the party would not succeed. Ordinary RKP members left by the thousands, and anyone who did not fall down from the Moon knows that the post-August orders of Boris Yeltsin stopped the activity of that part of the CPSU which, not for nothing, did not want to part with the old and not at all to revamp the party—which by that time had not been revamped—and those who had reformed had left by that time.

This is why, for all N. Ryzhkov's bravery, his proposal was hopeless: he had chosen a false thesis for his defense. And his attempts to compare the current crisis to those "achievements" that occurred when he was a government leader produced a quite comic (more likely tragic) effect. He considered that the current government indisputably is responsible for the existing situation—indeed, they have been in power a year and the communists have been under a ban for a year. And yet he recalled, with epic calm: "in the years 1986, 1987, and 1988 we did research, we worked out theoretical principles, and we conducted experiments." This means it spent three years just on "working out principles," although this theory—the bankruptcy of nonmarket economics—had long been known not only abroad but to the best Soviet economists—and to, for example, the authors of "the 500 days," which the witness had not forgotten to call insultingly a "bluff." The CPSU had three years for reflection plus three years for action on the 1985 model, not to mention the preceding decades—but Nikolay Ivanovich considers its successors responsible for everything after a year. It was under precisely this leadership that the best possibilities for averting the crisis had been allowed to slip by. He also called the foreign-economic sphere bankrupt back in 1990, when he himself was premier, and production began to drop that year. But now he, it seems, is not guilty, the separatists who led to the downfall of the USSR are guilty. It goes without saying that N. Ryzhkov does not blame the ruling party for either this downfall or the separatism.

This witness's testimony could not help but develop into a talk about all the basic problems of our history of recent years, into a talk that was political in the highest degree despite the heroic efforts of the court's chairman, V. Zorkin, who tried, as always, to keep the hearing in a purely legal channel. In so doing, both N. Ryzhkov and the CPSU representatives several times expressed their extremely negative attitude toward M. S. Gorbachev. This tendency, which is not new in and of itself, seems extremely illogical precisely in the context of this talk.

Vilification of the one who had been party leader during the whole period that preceded the ban in no way met the official aims of the CPSU side during the process. If they had managed to stigmatize him sufficiently convincingly, their case, according to the whole logic of the litigation, would have been completely lost in the process. Did he act on this notion, which is obvious to any impartial observer? Not in the least. As soon as the case concerned the former general secretary, one passionate desire creeps in their words: to get their hands on his throat. And one cannot help but put the question: how can the appearance of M. Gorbachev at this court look?

Still, Nikolay Ivanovich supported one side and relied upon the support of one side. But nevertheless, now and then one became sorry for him: the man came with the intention to speak honestly and he tried to speak honestly, but the problem that was set before him precluded honest talk completely, and he was trapped more than once on "imprecisions," especially when the matter touched on the CPSU's money. Gorbachev's position will be much worse. The side friendly to N. Ryzhkov will be an implacable enemy of M. Gorbachev's: the CPSU's people openly condemned him in August, and nowadays they have themselves written him off as a "traitor" and do not back down from him. Of course, even the President's side will not spare him, it has no reason to do so. His whole past will not permit him to support either anticommunism or the militant pseudoanticommunism of his former party comrades. But the impression is left that very many of those sitting in the hall will require his presence, not so much in order to get at the truth as to degrade him.

I respect the Constitutional Court very much. It is not a formalistic phrase, which the law requires of each citizen, it is a conviction nurtured from observations of the court's work during several sessions. The high professionalism, objectivity, and persistent adherence to the principle of not allowing the process to be politicized—all this provokes no doubts. The harm inflicted on the court's authority by the nonappearance of M. Gorbachev as a witness is unpleasant to me. But I cannot rid myself of the thought: It would be distressing to me to see on the witness stand the former president of the country of which I was a citizen.

Soviet of Nationalities Deputy Chair on Ethnic Conflicts, Federation

934C0029A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 39, 24-30 Sep 92 p 4

[Interview with Vitaliy Syrovatko, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, conducted by Aleksey Vladimirov: "'I Don't Think I'm the Only One Who Is Concerned With the Search for Ways To Achieve Ethnic Accord'"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Vitaliy Grigoryevich Syrovatko is a candidate of economic sciences. A Ukrainian, he started his career as a

milling machine operator and engraver at the Armavir Experimental Machinery Plant, was elected first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, secretary of the CPSU rayon committee and secretary of the Bryansk Oblast Party Committee, and worked in the CPSU Central Committee. Before his parliamentary work, he was chairman of the Bryansk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee.

[Vladimirov] Vitaliy Grigoryevich! Our readers are interested in what is going on right now in the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, what the chamber's deputy chairman is engaged in, and what the range of his official duties is.

[Syrovatko] Our chamber began active work long before the opening of the Supreme Soviet's Fifth Session. In the commissions and committees, preparatory legislative work was under way, draft laws that it is proposed to submit to the session were examined, and "hot topics," including the problem of the Northern Caucasus, where a grave situation has developed in connection with events in Abkhazia, were discussed.

As for the official duties that have been assigned to me, they include coordination of the activities of deputies' commissions (four standing commissions and up to 10 ad hoc ones), and coordination of the work of the chamber and its commissions with corresponding structures in the Council of the Republic and with Supreme Soviet committees.

There is a lot of organizational work with individual deputies, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation republics, and the soviets of peoples deputies of the krays, oblasts and autonomous okrugs.

There is a whole set of tasks connected with monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the parliament and the Congress of People's Deputies.

[Vladimirov] On 22 September the Supreme Soviet's regular session opened. What hopes do you pin on it, and what are the most important draft laws it will consider in the near future?

[Syrovatko] First of all, I hope that the session will continue its lawmaking work to support the economic reform, which is proceeding with such great difficulty in Russia. That is the first thing.

A second set will be social issues. A third set of draft laws is connected with implementation of the Federal Treaty. We have to draw up a number of legislative acts that must provide for the normal life of all subjects of the federation. It is proposed that we adopt documents that will help the numerically small peoples in the difficult period of transition to a market economy and will reinforce their rights. I have in mind the draft Law on Kinship Communities and Family Areas of Numerically Small Peoples of the North and draft Law on National Minorities. I hope that the session will finally pluck up

its courage and pass the draft Law on the National Rayon and draft Law on the National Rural and Settlement Soviet, which have long been awaited at the local level. There is painstaking work to be done on documents concerning the rehabilitation of repressed and deported peoples.

And finally, the session will consider an important set of documents on the Russian Federation's historical, cultural and natural legacy.

In short, there is hard work to be done. The Supreme Soviet's Fifth Session should become a major political event in the life of the Russian state and its citizens.

[Vladimirov] How do you assess the political situation in Russia?

[Syrovatko] The social and political tension that exists in society requires coordinated, harmonious work of all legislative, executive and judicial structures, work that will finally help provide a normal life for every citizen of Russia. I consider a carefully considered, well thought-out approach to the draft new Constitution to be very important. Collective reason is required here—one "team" alone cannot handle that task. The deputy corps, I hope, will continue to work very vigorously on the model of the new Basic Law. It should reflect the positive things that we have in our society, provide a guarantee of civil rights and liberties, and open prospects to the Russian people.

I do not think I'm the only one who is concerned with the search for ways to achieve ethnic accord. And as we know, it depends, in part, on a strong Russian foreign policy. If such a policy does not exist or is conducted indecisively, discord will begin inside the country.

We should understand that stability in society is provided not only by the revolutionary solution of vitally important problems but also by not permitting the violation of the rights and liberties of the Federation's citizens beyond its borders.

I, for example, am not inclined, like certain politicians, to underestimate the potential consequences of events in Abkhazia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are would seem to be Georgia's internal affair. But let us look at the reverberations of the forcible methods of resolving interethnic relations employed by that country's State Council. The whole Northern Caucasus has been aroused; all of Russia has been aroused! I think that in connection with these events the rating of such a major politician as Eduard Shevardnadze has sharply declined in the West.

Look what is happening. In Moscow on 3 September the warring sides, with the mediation of the Russian president, seemingly agreed to a cease-fire and to shift to resolving the conflict through political methods and, first and foremost, through peace talks. Yet people are again shooting and accusing one another of violating the Moscow agreement.

If events in Abkhazia are not turned into a peaceful channel in the near future, that republic may become a powerful source of destabilization of the situation not just in the CIS countries but in the whole world community. A number of deputies are demanding that the Georgian-Abkhazian problem be discussed in the Supreme Soviet session. I am in favor of that!

[Vladimirov] What do you consider to be the key issues in the country's economic and political life?

[Syrovatko] Travels around the Russian villages and in my own Bryansk Oblast have persuaded me once again that we must work more persistently to get the government to consistently tackle the food problem, give the countryside what it has been promised, and carry out the decisions of the Congresses of People's Deputies and the Russian parliament on agrarian issues.

Reform in the countryside is spinning its wheels. This year the government provided for allocations of only 40 percent of the actual level of 1991 investments. And this is when an extremely grave situation—with respect to both machinery and to fuel and lubricants—has developed in the countryside. That is not to even mention the main thing—the fact that privatization in the countryside is failing and assuming distorted forms. We have still not given up administrative and pressure-based forms and time frames for bringing about change. Yet the peasant himself must be given the right to figure everything out for himself and decide what he should do—proceeding on the basis of his personal interests, and not the reformers' notions about the future agrarian system.

Sizing up and comparing everything, one can single out several main strategies of and conditions for privatization and the development of diverse types of economic operations in farming.

First, there is privatization on kolkhozes and sovkhoses on the basis of auctioning them off by means of determining employee shares with the subsequent allocation to these shares (or stock) part of the monies from profits.

Another form of the privatization of kolkhozes and sovkhoses is turning them into associations of peasant farms on the basis of a preliminary division of property and land among employees and the formation, as a result of this, of the semblance of individual farms. Realistically, one can evidently expect such a form, toward which the government agrarian reform program is oriented, to be the least common under current conditions.

It is possible, extremely useful, and in many cases essential to divide up kolkhozes and sovkhoses into independent individual farms or small cooperatives, for the development of which, incidentally, no provision is made in the Russian Law on Property. This sort of dividing up could be carried out with weak farms that have become sparsely populated, on which the problems that are inevitable on relatively prosperous farms will not arise.

From the standpoint of the extensive and effective development of individual farming at the present time, it is especially important to set aside separate individual farms from kolkhozes and sovkhoses that are being auctioned off. In order to carry out this strategy of privatization in farming, it is necessary to overcome the established and often artificial practice of contrasting agricultural enterprises to individual farms.

Indeed, what is the point of such contrast?! What is needed, first and foremost, is realistic financial support for peasant and individual farms. But it is not being provided. Last year R6,000 of credit at 25 percent annual interest was allocated per single individual farmer. You will not get very far on such money! It is no accident that individual farmers have been forced to abandon businesses they have started and return the land.

In short, it is time for the government to provide in the state budget for the necessary support for individual farming, as well as for the rural resident's whole social and cultural sphere—the support that is specified in decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies. For me this is a matter of principle; after all, this is a general federal problem.

I consider my position on implementation of the Federal Treaty to be a principled one, and I will defend it at the Fifth Session. Concluding it is of immense importance to the destinies of Russia's peoples. It represents the beginning of the attainment of social accord in the country, the cornerstone of the foundation that is being laid of a new state. It represents a major step toward the attainment of civil peace in the multinational Russian Federation and a stabilizing factor.

Unfortunately, by no means everyone holds a positive view of the Federal Treaty or correctly understands it. Some people consider the Federal Treaty a temporary phenomenon, others view it as something that is merely pro forma, while others regard it as harmful. If this were just talk among narrow-minded and uninformed people, it would not be a big problem. But such positions are sometimes taken by responsible people who are capable of influencing the social and political situation in the country. This complicates the problem of implementing the provisions of the Federal Treaty. Any delay in this process and any attempt to deviate from the provisions of the Federal Treaty or to violate them will introduce discord in the relationship between the Federation and its subjects, that is, actual state structures at various levels.

The present and anticipated difficulties in Russia's revival are not connected with the Federal Treaty, or with the desire to shift to a course of real federalism. On the contrary, failure to sign the Federal Treaty could have intensified negative tendencies in the development of Russian statehood. Our problem is a lack of federalism, not an excess of it.

Virtually all subjects of the Russian Federation took part in signing the Federal Treaty. Consequently, implementing it depends not only on federal agencies but also on the consistent, persistent work of republic, kray, oblast and autonomous-formation bodies of state authority.

I am not afraid to appear to be doctrinaire, but for me there is no question as to whether the soviets are needed. Any attempt to abandon representative bodies of authority should be regarded as frivolous and mistaken. Any state is made democratic by the representative nature of its government. The question is what level of representativeness, what level of popular rule. Consequently, when someone, under the guise of fighting the soviets, starts to oppose representative bodies of authority, he is opposing the foundations of democracy. Such designs can be nurtured either by ignorant people who do not realize what a state is or, conversely, by people who are cherishing a dream of returning to totalitarianism or authoritarianism. One can say with complete confidence that society will not support them.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet recognizes quite clearly everything that lies behind the rejection of representative bodies of authority, and it has taken them under its protection. I think that its position on this issue, like the position of the Congress of People's Deputies, will remain unchanged in the present. Fifth Session.

Conference Deals With Nationality Policy

934C0040E Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Sep 92
Morning edition p 2

[Article by Inga Prelovskaya: "Conflicts Must Be Foreseen if They Are To Be Prevented, and This Is Possible"]

[Text] The three-day international conference, "Nationality Policy in the Russian Federation," was held under the aegis of the Russian State Committee for Nationalities. Deputies and representatives of the republics' governmental entities and our own and foreign scientists, including a group of prominent American specialists on ethnic relationships and the settlement of conflicts, took part in it. V. Tishkov, Chairman of the State Committee on Nationality Policy and doctor of historical sciences, dedicated his report to the concept of Russia's nationality policy, which the government discussed at the end of July, and it was recommended that the Committee continue the work on it. The conference was an element of that work.

The process of nationality consolidation of Russians as citizens of a single state has not been perfected, said V. Tishkov in his report, and we must reject the dogma that the nationality problem can be solved once and for all.

In confirming the principles of genuine federalism, we have not avoided contradictions and dangers on this route. New ethnocratic elites, playing on correct demands for greater economic and political independence of the regions, use such a slogan as national

self-determination in the name of one nationality. But a directive on a preferential right of the entitling or, as we often say, indigenous nationalities, to control access to resources and to political and cultural institutions can lead to tens of millions of people's not receiving adequate opportunities for exercising their interests and rights, and this is fraught with conflicts. Indeed, more than half of the total territory has been declared "the territory of one's statehood" for just seven percent of Russia's citizens. With a minor exception, the population of the entitling nationalities do not comprise a majority in the entities formed within Russia, and their borders generally do not coincide with the boundaries of the actual distribution of peoples.

The notion that federalism is based primarily on the regional nationality principle contradicts all world practice, it was said at the conference. There are 3,000 peoples in the world but only 180 states, only about half a percent of which are made up of peoples of a single nationality. Life demands improvement of our federal arrangement, and the federation treaty has been a major step in this direction. But in order to implement the federalism of the new content, the institution of nationality and cultural autonomy, a right that all nationalities of a community have, must be established legislatively and developed. The nationality idea, said Tishkov, can and should be correlated with the idea of the wholeness of Russian statehood.

How to prevent and overcome conflicts? It was interesting to hear the opinions expressed on this matter by third parties, by those who compare our problems with their own and with world experience.

"The world is a huge historic mosaic of various cultures, but on the threshold of the 21st century we have no path other than that of living together," remarked David Hamburg, president of the Carnegie Fund. "Given the current might of weaponry, a worldwide system for forecasting and preventing conflicts is needed."

The Carnegie Fund will finance a research project that will include a Russo-American working group for developing recommendations on problems of nationality conflicts and on resolving conflicts. William Urey, director of the "System for Organizing Negotiations" at Harvard University, was the deputy chairman of this group. In answering the question of what position to take against the separatist strivings of various parts of a state, he remarked that division actually is not the decisive step in this world of dependencies that we live in. Borders have lost meaning in international understanding. But in entering into negotiations with those who are ready for secession, it is no use to take the position of do not give up anything. The Spanish government and the Canadian government have held negotiations for decades with, respectively, the Basques and the Province of Quebec, and they are gradually coming to compromises. The time spent on negotiations is justified, reducing the heat of passions.

"World experience," he said, "testifies to the fact that an imposed solution creates only the appearance of victory: such agreements can be violated easily. Force is the method of last resort, and economical application of it can make sense only in order to convert to more effective negotiations. It is necessary to strive for mutual satisfaction, not for victory, for a clarification of common interests and not for defending a stand."

The conference showed that scientists and practitioners want to find a common language. It is difficult to forestall conflicts but it is easier to do this when they have not yet matured.

Nationalities Policy Concept Author Interviewed

934C0048A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 39, 27 Sep-4 Oct 92 p 7

[Valery Tishkov interview by Vladimir Yemelyanenko]

[Text] [Yemelyanenko] You interpret the nation inhabiting Russia as "sovereign co-citizenship". What is it—a mosaic of nations or something integral?

[Tishkov] There are two points of view on this score. One is based on the principle of ethnonationalism: an ethnic group, and its highest type in the shape of nation, comprise the basis of the state. The second concept is poly-ethnic co-citizenship. This is not necessarily a Western model. It is a worldwide model. It underlies the self-determined states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the UN principles. Proceeding from it, we also speak about the national interests of Russia. Incidentally, these positions are being adopted both by the former "15 sisters" and by the Russian autonomies as they come of age and discard political romanticism. Thus, the Constitution of Tatarstan has no notion of the "Tatar nation". What it has is the "people of Tatarstan". Nursultan Nazarbayev also says that self-determination has been achieved not by the Kazakhs, but by the multinational "people of Kazakhstan". You understand that a thorough-going change is occurring in our understanding of the nationalities policy. We are kind of stripping the concept of "nation" of its monoethnic content.

[Yemelyanenko] But how does this idea differ from that of "internationalism as the merger of all nations and peoples"? Lenin, it will be recalled, was also opposed to monoethnicity. We know the results.

[Tishkov] I don't know such a scientific principle as internationalism. There is the universally-recognized right of the co-citizens of any nationality to stand up for their rights in the framework of the states which historically have taken shape. But state frontiers cannot be drawn along ethnic lines. If statehood were based on ethnicity, we would get privileges for titular peoples and the oppression of ethnic minorities. And this is a form of racism. The lesson, therefore, is about the impossibility of building a state around one nationality. This is an unrealized path. There are no such states, with the possible exception of Iceland.

[Yemelyanenko] And Korea, Poland, Japan, Germany?

[Tishkov] Not at all! This is merely a semblance of ethnic homogeneity. In Korea there are Japanese, in Japan it's vice versa. In Poland there are Lithuanians and Byelorussians. Indeed, Germany has been able to create Germans. But at first there was the unification of 246 princedoms which spoke different languages—as, incidentally, they do today as well. And the German nation was constituted solely through the will of politicians and that of Bismarck. You probably remember: through internecine war, blood and violence. Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, which have taken the same path, merely corroborate its tragic nature. The purpose of a different type of statehood, however, is not "Russification", "Georgianization" or "Romanization", but national unity within ethnic multiformity. This is one dimension. Another is the economy. A third is the state. In the old totalitarian regime all of this was blended into one piece—according to Stalin. It is up to us to divide this "heritage" into parts.

[Yemelyanenko] In line with your concept of "unity in multiformity", nations and peoples will have to forget about the right of self-determination, up to and including the right of secession. However, the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia proves that nations and peoples are ready to defend this right with arms.

[Tishkov] There is no concept such as the "right of nations to self-determination". This is our socialist misrepresentation. What there is is the right of peoples to self-determination, whereas the concept of "people" is not tantamount to that of ethnic group. Had it been otherwise, there would have been no India, Indonesia and a score of other states, including Russia. They would have been eroded by ethnic separatism. As far as the right of peoples to self-determination is concerned, it comprises three levels. The first is the right of the individual to self-determination in the life of society and in the bodies of authority. Here we have a lot of problems to contend with. In the course of the "parade of sovereignties", the indigenous nationality took power in hand, and the national majority in parliament does not represent the majority of the population. This has been the case in Yakutia and Tataria. And, conversely, there is the dominance of Russians at the federal level but poor representation of the Bashkirs, Mordvinians, Buryats and Chuvashes. What I bear in mind is not the parliamentary level, but the level of the ministries, government departments, theaters, institutions of higher learning, and so on. Here we shall most likely take the familiar path of additional quotas.

The second level is the right to national-cultural autonomy. If this is rigidly understood as territorial self-determination, then what will happen to the four-fifths of Tatars living outside Tatarstan and the 300,000 Tatars living in Moscow? Or the two-thirds of Mordvinians living outside Mordovia? The way out lies in national-cultural autonomy, which was once branded by

the Bolsheviks as a "bourgeois fabrication". It is the institution of the state system which we shall develop.

And, lastly, the third level is territorial self-determination. It is sometimes absolutized by giving pride of place to it in ordinary and even scientific lexicon. Indeed, territorial self-determination is the right of peoples, but in the framework of Russia's statehood. It is a major protective mechanism for self-preservation. It is not for nothing that one hears it said that a nation is a tribe, only with an army. This kind of self-determination has been realized in this country in the form of the Federation Treaty, and it will continue to be developed.

[Yemelyanenko] Russia, already a federation, concluded a Federation Treaty. Besides everything else, you also proclaim "new Russian federalism."

[Tishkov] Russia was declared a federation, but in fact it has remained a unitary state. While the republics take offence when I call them "autonomies", I tell them: "But now you don't amount even to autonomies." For instance, if the Kalmyks need to open a college now they go to Moscow. A new federalism first and foremost implies the decentralization of authority. We must accept different forms of federalism. It is one thing for Chechnya to claim to be a sovereign state. But it is something entirely different for the peoples of the north, who have yet to build a national-cultural autonomy. The territories and regions, on the one hand, and the national-territorial entities, on the other, have still not been equalized in their rights—yet this is a must. The potential of several territories and regions is higher than that of some republics. Moreover, there must also be transregional federalism. Why shouldn't the Ural and Volga regions, for example, unite, even if Moscow disapproves?

[Yemelyanenko] What is new in your federalism, if it is conceived of as territorial, following the pattern of the United States and Germany, and retains, moreover, the Stalin concept of national-territorial structure?

[Tishkov] The idea as such existed before Stalin and was used in different empires. He merely adopted it and put it into effect most fully. Today, however, there are two approaches towards a renewed Russia. One line, coming close to Academician Sakharov's vision, calls upon each people to have a state of their own. This principle is advocated by radical democrats, although they have become more cautious after seeing what this leads to. Others, the so-called etatists, have been calling for the establishment of federal lands and a return to the principle of gubernias (governorships). They range from Gavril Popov to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. I don't think that it is possible to raze what you defined as the Stalin concept to the ground. There exists a reality in the shape of established national-territorial entities, and it must be accepted. At the same time, it must be civilized, by lowering the national exceptionalism of the republics through endowing administrative entities with the same rights.

On the other hand, I don't hide my support for Oleg Rummyantsev's idea of uniting Russia's 60 regions into 20 larger lands. I understand, however, that the local nomenklatura will never accept this.

[Yemelyanenko] The national-territorial principle is bad, but it is better not to touch it, because this would trigger a civil war. But this principle has led us to unitarianism. Various peoples are calling for self-determination, understanding it as secession and doing so in the name of Sakharov. But even this variant spells bloodshed. The economic barons will not accept the federalism of lands, but your project calls for emulating the models established in the West.

[Tishkov] As I see it, you are over-dramatizing the situation. I wish we had the level of federalization which exists in the United States and Germany with their constitutions, parliaments and legal orders for the states and lands separately. Or why shouldn't we emulate India: the frontiers between its states come close to ethnic and linguistic boundaries, but nobody urges the States to be declared nation states. I would say that there is a need to emulate the level of decentralization in the West, while studying the development of national cultures in India. We must also study our own experience, it is not just a sad one.

[Yemelyanenko] I know that you take exception to the creation of a Russian republic. But doesn't the absence of such a republic, coupled with the idea of a polyethnic state, set the stage for reviving great Russian chauvinism?

[Tishkov] By no means. I am opposed to a Russian republic because it is unrealizable. It's an absurdity. It's enough to take a look at the map: how can the Russians be identified from among all, absolutely all, the republics? And if the Russians' lack of their own republic is to be considered a pretext for chauvinism, I can assure you that such chauvinism arose already, before the dispute about a republic. The Russians are the only ones among the world's major peoples to have been torn into 15 states in which their rights are being infringed upon. This is what gives impetus to great Russian chauvinism. As does the situation in Yakutia, Bashkiria or Tatarstan, where Russians are no longer allowed to sit in parliament.

[Yemelyanenko] Imperial mentality is alive not only in Russia, but throughout the CIS. More and more often one hears it said: "How good our life was in the USSR". There are Philistines, perhaps; but politicians are busy creating new entities—the interparliamentary assembly, the coordinating council—to replace the destroyed Union bodies. Is this a step backwards?

[Tishkov] It was difficult to keep the Union intact, and it was more difficult, as it turned out, to destroy it. But it is even more absurd to try and revive it. I am not inclined to view the USSR's disintegration as having been a historical inevitability. I believe that the historical

process is polyvariant. Had not Kryuchkov eavesdropped a conversation among Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and Gorbachev about the future—about sending everyone into retirement and placing Nazarbayev at the head of the Union government—the historical chain might have stretched in a different direction. But what happened, happened, and what remains for us is to build new relations—possibly a new Union—without bringing back the empire.

Poll: Russians Not Ready for Social Explosion

934C0040D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Dmitriy Olshanskiy, doctor of political sciences and psychologist: "Is a Social Explosion Possible?"]

[Text] No, thinks Dmitriy Olshanskiy, doctor of political sciences and psychologist.

How do people behave in crisis situations? The psychologists talk about various variants of conduct: none at all; every man for himself; they believe in the new values and they try to achieve them; and, finally, the last—mass hysteria. There are also the social explosion, that is, large-scale outbreaks directed at the authorities, destructive social and political actions by people who have been driven to the extreme. A difficult material and social situation, a definite psychological state—**anxiety and hopelessness**—can bring them to this boundary....

Thus a large-scale survey conducted by the Center for Social and Economic Problems of the Russian Academy's Population Institute (35,000 responses were received, and the results have been counted up in accordance with a proportional, representative social and demographic selection) says that 22.1 percent of those surveyed are ready to protest actively against the reforms. This is a basis for mass hysteria. But they do not hope for success of their action. So it is that 22.1 percent is still not the critical mass that can "come crashing down."

And society's moods are represented today as follows: 13.8 percent of those surveyed are striving for rational conduct under current conditions, 26.4 percent are seeking their place, and almost 25 percent believe and hope. And these indicators combined exceed the critical mass necessary for advancement of the reforms.

And as a whole the picture of widespread moods appears to be surprisingly symmetrical. Seventeen percent of the respondents have hope and 17 percent have a mood of hopelessness, and 50 percent defined their mood as "anxiety." The mood of hopelessness appeared in the age interval of 30-40 and reached a maximum, becoming almost unanimous in the 60-70 years-of-age interval. The mood of anxiety predominates with people in the 30-50 age group.

The feeling of confidence in tomorrow has practically vanished entirely. It was noted in only two percent of the respondents. Naturally, they are not at all those people who were in such a mood prior to August 1991.

As a whole, according to the survey's data, Russia's population stands for the reforms. However, this strategic mood is constantly being eroded by concrete tribulations associated with unsuccessful tactics in implementing the reforms, with concrete "consumer" consequences of the government's actions. And such situational moods define not only the population's psychological state but also the popular attitude toward the main directions of the reforms. Thus, the more hope that people have, the better their attitude toward the coming privatization as a means for freeing the personality. On the contrary, the less hope that they have and the greater their anxiety and hopelessness, the more negative is their perception of that privatization.

Now, in the autumn, one can forecast a new rise in the mood of protest. Hopelessness and anxiety, having been reinforced, can lead to desperation, nihilism.

As a whole, society still has not worked out a single, unified attitude toward what is happening.

Decree on Federal Migration Service

935D0011C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 5

["Decree of the government of the Russian Federation of 22 September 1992, No. 740, Moscow: Questions of the Federal Migration Service of Russia"]

[Text] In keeping with the ukase of the president of the Russian Federation of 14 June 1992, No. 625, "On the Federal Migration Service of Russia," the government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To establish that the Federal Migration Service of Russia (FMS of Russia) is a federal organ of state administration which implements state policy in the area of migration of the population and coordinates the activity of organs of administration in this area in the Russian Federation.

2. To entrust the Federal Migration Service of Russia with the performance of the following basic tasks:

a) preparing proposals for following the state migration policy and implementing it;

b) developing measures for regulation of migration processes in the Russian Federation and preparing draft laws and also normative acts;

c) organizing protection of the rights of migrants in keeping with existing legislation of the Russian Federation and norms of international law and submitting the appropriate proposals to the government of the Russian Federation;

d) supervising migration processes and the migration situation in the country, organizing work for issuing passports, passes, and permits for entering the border zone, recording entry and exit of citizens, address-reference work; registering foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship on the territory of the Russian Federation, issuing them documents for the right to residency, filling out documents and permits for entry into the Russian Federation and departure abroad; enforcing legislation on questions of citizenship pertaining to the Federal Migration Service of Russia;

e) developing drafts of migration programs and implementing them, distributing state funds allotted for solving migration problems and supervising their use;

f) implementing according to the established procedure cooperation with international and national government and nongovernment institutions and organizations handling migrant problems.

3. The Federal Migration Service of Russia is to form territorial organs and within three months develop and approve provisions concerning them.

4. To recommend to organs of executive power of the republics of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg that they render assistance to the Federal Migration Service of Russia in the creation of its territorial organs and maintain for this period functional subdivisions of local organs of administration handling migration problems.

5. To the Federal Migration Service of Russia:

to allot in 1992 for territorial organs of the Federal Migration Service of Russia located in regions of maximum influx of forced migrants funds for maintaining workers in a quantity of 280 units with allocations specified in the budget of the Russian Federation for maintaining state administrative organs;

to specify in the budget of the Russian Federation the allotment of special funds to the Federal Migration Service of Russia for performing the functions assigned to it and maintaining its territorial organs.

To establish that all funds allotted from the budget of the Russian Federation for solving problems of migration are issued through the Federal Migration Service of Russia.

6. To set the number of workers of the central staff of the Federal Migration Service of Russia at 350 (not including personnel for maintenance and service of buildings), including workers of the former Committee for Affairs of Migration of the Population under the Ministry of Labor and Employment of the Population of the Russian Federation—65, and the Administration of Visas and Registrations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation—92, and the wage fund per quarter in the amount of R4,785,000.

The structure and staff distribution chart of the central apparatus of the Federal Migration Service of Russia are approved by its chief within the limits of the established numbers and the wage fund for workers.

7. To establish that tasks specified by subpoint "d" of Point 2 of the present decree are to be performed by the Federal Migration Service of Russia as the corresponding changes are made in legislation of the Russian Federation.

The wage fund specified by Point 6 of the present decree is allotted in stages, taking into account the transfer of functions and the number of workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, to the Federal Migration Service of Russia.

8. To permit the Federal Migration Service of Russia to have four deputy chiefs, including one first chief, and a board consisting of 15 people.

9. To establish for workers of the central staff of the Federal Migration Service of Russia conditions for wages, material-consumer and medical service specified for workers of departments of the Russian Federation.

10. The State Committee of the Russian Federation for Administration of State Property with the participation of the government of Moscow within a month is to solve the problem of granting work premises to the Federal Migration Service of Russia.

11. To establish a list of organizations and institutions under the jurisdiction of the Federal Migration Service of Russia according to the appendix.

12. The Federal Migration Service of Russia within three months is to submit, in keeping with the established procedure, to the government of the Russian Federation a draft statute on the Federal Migration Service of Russia which is coordinated with interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.

Ukase on Housing Construction for People Moving From Russian North

935D0013A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 3

["Ukase of the President of the Russian Federation: On Measures for Acceleration of Construction on the Territory of the Russian Federation of Housing for Citizens Moving From Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Localities"]

[Text] In keeping with the decree of the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation "On the Socioeconomic Situation of Regions of the North and Equivalent Localities," in order to mobilize funds of the territorial organs of executive power and interested enterprises, organizations, and citizens to solve the important state problem of construction on the territory of the Russian Federation of housing and facilities of the

social infrastructure for citizens moving from regions of the Far North and equivalent localities, I decree:

1. To the government of the Russian Federation:

to develop and approve the state program for construction on the territory of the Russian Federation of housing for citizens moving from regions of the Far North and equivalent localities;

to specify beginning 1992 shared participation of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Socio-economic Development of the North in the implementation of this program with state capital investments allotted to it within the limits of funds specified by the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the corresponding years for investment financing;

in conjunction with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation, to resolve the issue of the possibility of granting preferred credit for construction of housing for people moving from regions of the Far North and equivalent localities who have worked there for 10 years and more;

to prepare and submit in the fourth quarter of 1992 for presentation to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation proposals on the question of beneficial taxation of enterprises and organizations constructing housing for citizens moving from regions of the Far North and equivalent localities and also other enterprises and organizations with respect to funds used for the aforementioned construction;

to envision measures of state support for enterprises and organizations constructing housing and facilities of the social infrastructure for citizens moving from regions of the Far North and equivalent localities with respect to provision of technical equipment, technology, and other necessary material-technical resources.

2. Organs of executive power of republics of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, and autonomous formations and also local organs of executive power are to provide for granting, according to the established procedure, plots of land for the construction of housing for citizens moving from regions of the Far North and equivalent localities.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
23 September 1992
No. 1122

Directive on Compensation to Crime Victims

935D0013E Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 4

["Directive of the President of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] For purposes of real support for the right guaranteed by the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian

Federation of crime victims to the most rapid compensation for harm caused to them and the creation of the necessary conditions for practical realization of the provisions of the law on reimbursement by the state for damages caused to a property owner by a crime, which is secured in Point 3 of Article 30 of the RSFSR law "On Property in the RSFSR":

1. The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation with the participation of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Procurator General of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and the State-Legal Administration of the president of the Russian Federation within three months are to develop and submit to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for approval a statute on the procedure for state reimbursement for damages caused to a property owner by a crime.

2. The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation within three months are to develop and approve instructions for applying the statute on the procedure for reimbursement by the state for damages caused to a property owner by a crime, having coordinated it with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Procurator General of the Russian Federation.

3. The government of the Russian Federation within two months is to submit, in keeping with the established procedure, proposals that envision real guarantees of state reimbursement for damages caused to a property owner by a crime, including the creation of a special fund with money from the budget and other sources.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
16 September 1992
No. 509-rp

Directive on Formation of Anticorruption Commission

935D0011F Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Oct 92 p 6

[Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation of 17 September 1992, No. 1761-r, Moscow]

[Text]

1. In order to consider the issues and develop proposals aimed at fighting corruption in the system of the state service and organize financial-legal control of economic activity in the most important branches of the economy, to form under the leadership of the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation a governmental commission consisting of the following:

Gaydar, Ye.T.—head of the commission.

Aven, P.O.—minister of foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation.

Barannikov, V.P.—minister of security of the Russian Federation.

Barchuk, V.V.—minister of finance of the Russian Federation.

Grushevenko, E.V.—first deputy minister of fuel and energy of the Russian Federation.

Yerin, V.F.—minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

Nechayev, A.A.—minister of the economy of the Russian Federation.

Gurtovoy, M.M.—assistant acting chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, secretary of the commission.

2. To form a work group of the government commission for preparing materials on questions of the commission and organizational support for its activity.

To instruct M.M. Gurtovoy to submit within 10 days to the government of the Russian Federation a draft statute on the government commission and proposals concerning the personnel of the work group.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

Decree on Realization of Law on Militia

935D0013B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 4

["Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation: On Organizational Measures for Implementation of the Decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet 'On the Procedure for Enactment of the RSFSR Law "On the Militia" "']

[Text] In execution of the decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 18 April 1991 "On the Procedure for Enactment of the RSFSR Law 'On the Militia,'" the government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, within a month's time:

to complete the transfer of militia functions for carrying out criminal punishments not involving incarceration to the corresponding specialized subdivisions of internal affairs organs;

in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and other interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, to submit a proposal to the government of the Russian Federation to transfer the functions assigned to the militia for issuing permits for the manufacture of seals and stamps, the opening of printing and stamping-engraving enterprises, and supervision of their activity to other organs.

2. To assign to:

the Ministry of Social Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation—duties for prevention of child neglect and organization of receiving and distribution activity for minors;

the Federal Migration Service of Russia—duties of issuing passports, passes, and permits for entering the border zone, registration and issuance of copies for citizens, address reference work; registration of foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship on the territory of the Russian Federation, issuance of residency documents to them, filling out of documents and permits for entry into the Russian Federation and departure abroad; enforcement of legislation on citizenship;

the Ministry of Public Health of the Russian Federation—duties for leadership of the work of medical detoxification facilities, filling out of medical records on chronic alcoholism and drug addiction for treatment, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation remains responsible for delivering citizens to medical detoxification facilities and ensuring order in them;

the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation—duties for organization of the issuance of permits for the acquisition, storage, and shipment of strong toxic substances, supervision of the observance of the rules for storage and shipment of these substances, and also the conditions for storage of radioactive substances in places for their permanent storage.

3. The Ministry of Social Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in conjunction with interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation to carry out reorganization of receiving-distribution organs of internal affairs and receiving and distribution organs for minors and, on their basis, create a network of social institutions for individuals without a particular place of residence and employment and also support for adolescents and children who have been left without parents.

4. The local administrations in the rayons, cities, rayons in cities, villages, and rural population points are to render aid in work and housing placement for individuals released from places of incarceration, thus relieving the militia of these duties.

5. To adopt the proposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, coordinated with the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation to transfer to the local administrations in the rayons, cities, rayons in cities, villages, and rural population points duties for conducting specialized installation and operational work for installing and operating technical means of controlling traffic.

6. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in conjunction with the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Administration of State Property, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,

and the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation is within two months' time to submit to the government of the Russian Federation coordinated proposals concerning the procedure and time periods for transferring workers, wage funds, allocations for maintaining the transferred facilities, and material funds over to the Ministry of Social Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Public Health of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, the Federal Migration Service of Russia, and also the corresponding organs of local administration in the rayons, cities, rayons in cities, villages, and rural population points which are necessary for performing the duties assigned to them by the present decree.

7. To establish that until the corresponding changes are made in existing legislation and there are solutions to all problems related to the transfer of duties of the militia to other organs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation continues to perform the functions indicated in Point 2 of the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation "On the Procedure for Enactment of the RSFSR Law 'On the Militia.'"

8. The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in conjunction with the interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation is to submit to the government of the Russian Federation within two months' time the corresponding proposals for making changes and additions to legislative and other legal acts in connection with the adoption of the present decree.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

Local SWAT Teams Formed

934C0043A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Svartsevich: "NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Together With SWAT Team Prevents Aircraft Hijacking; Il-62 Stormed in Krasnoyarsk"]

[Text] Terrorism

Krasnoyarsk Airport. A Krasnodar-Orenburg-Krasnoyarsk transit flight. The air traffic controller received a report, which has become more and more usual, that the Il-62 had been seized by terrorists, who were demanding to fly to Pakistan. The gunmen had one more condition—deliver weapons, money, and drugs to the aircraft.

All of the criminals' demands were met, but in a flash, owing to the skillful and capable actions of the kray's operational staff, of the professional and decisive actions of a SWAT [special weapons and tactics] team and of other operational services, the terrorists were disarmed.

Soon after, the fighting men and the terrorists were sitting under the belly of the aircraft, smoking. The zonal

exercises under the code name "Alarm," where nonstaff SWAT teams of the Krasnoyarsk directorate of the Ministry of Security of Russia were activated, had come to an end.

Security Major Vladislav Shebolin, the commander of the SWAT team, explained that the episode that was just reenacted had occurred in Krasnoyarsk a half year ago.

Today, in Shebolin's words, the Ministry of Security does not have enough forces for the fight against terrorism. Therefore, SWAT teams that are not part of the permanent staff were created in oblast and kray directorates of the MB [Ministry of Security] that have appropriate training and skills, and are ready during time off from their jobs to stop terrorist acts.

Ukase on Formation of Russian Aviation Search and Rescue Service

935D0013D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 5

["Ukase of the President of the Russian Federation: On the Formation of a Russian Federal Aviation-Space Search and Rescue Service"]

[Text] In order to promptly conduct search and rescue operations for passengers and crews of aircraft in distress, to render aid with means of aviation in emergencies and catastrophes and natural and ecological disasters, and to provide for operational search and evacuation of astronauts from landing sites, I decree:

1. To form the Russian Federal Aviation-Space Search and Rescue Service (FAKSPS) on the basis of the Unified State Aviation Search and Rescue Service of the USSR.

2. To appoint Major General of Aviation Gennadiy Vasilyevich Amelkin head of the Russian Federation Aviation-Space Search and Rescue Service.

3. Within two months the head of the Russian Federation Aviation-Space Search and Rescue Service is to submit to the government of the Russian Federation for approval a draft statute on the Russian Federation Aviation-Space Search and Rescue Service.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
16 September 1992
No. 1084

Association of Patriot-Businessmen Formed

934C0043B Moscow DEN in Russian No 39,
27 Sep 92-3 Oct 92 p 4

[Views of Ivan Komarov, chairman of the joint-stock company Tyazhmashtekhnika and an organizer of an association of patriot-businessmen, as reported by N. Anisin: "Give Me Your Hand, Brother! About an Unusual Association of Businessmen"]

[Text] **FACT:** There are people with bright intellects and skillful hands. They are able to design unique machine-tools, instruments, and automobiles. They are able to plan original buildings. They are able to write highbrow programs for computers. They are able to create efficient technologies.

NEED TO DEMONSTRATE: To whom the skills of these people in "democratic" Russia are necessary.

ANSWER: Of course, to no one. The authorities are busy with the creation of conditions for the primary accumulation of capital and, therefore, the authorities are not collecting the money needed to finance new scientific and technical developments. Powerful trade and commercial structures that accumulate capital in rubles convert them into dollars, into villas, and into businessmen's limousines. The state enterprises are being stifled by taxes and leap-frog prices, and they are unable not only to assimilate new, but even to produce the old products. All that is left for the bright intellects and clever hands to do is either, while engaged in creative work, to die of hunger, or to go into speculation, which is now referred to as commerce. Is there another way out for them? There is. It is reflected on by Ivan KOMAROV, chairman of the joint-stock company Tyazhmashtekhnika [Heavy Machinery Technology]—one of the organizers of the association of businessmen with the newspaper DEN. He has the floor.

Let us imagine a family where one brother is working hard at science at Moscow State University for a beggarly stipend, a second is standing at a drafting table at the ZIL factory making 4,000 rubles a month, and a third sells leather skirts at Luzhniki making around 50,000 a month. If they are not only brothers by blood, but also in spirit, then none of them will be especially harmed by the current cruel times. The student will not fall to pieces between the library, the lab, and his place of work, the engineer will not be fired from the plant and does not lose his qualification, and the merchant, helping his suffering brothers, does not become like an animal in the squandering of money. Today, all three need one another. And they will all need one another tomorrow, when different times arrive and when the labor of a highly educated scientist and an experienced engineer will be worth much more than the labor of a lottery player. Sooner or later, this is the way it will be, for Gaydar, just like Batu, is a phenomenon of the past in Rus. Both of them are not as frightening as it seems at first glance. And all of us normal Russian people will withstand the Gaydar invasion—we will not perish if we maintain brotherly relations among ourselves in families and in society.

The Gaydarization of the entire country, which divided our country into the hungry and the well-fed, did not change the primordial division into intelligent and stupid people, and into respectable people and scoundrels. Not all of the people among the hungry are good, and not all of the people among the well-fed are bad. Among those who have achieved a certain status for themselves in commerce and who have secured their

own business, there are many intellectual and moral people for whom business is not a method of profit, but something somewhere between a sport and an art.

As a rule, such people are not part of the elite of the new bourgeoisie; they do not control billions, but they do have some money, and they are not eager to send it off to foreign banks, for they are patriots of their country. They donated large sums for the purchase of medicines and bulletproof vests for the Dniester region, to help the families of those who were killed there, for the needs of the young and the old in various cities of Russia, and for the restoration of churches. And now, well-to-do Russian patriots can and must help those of their Russian brothers in spirit who, refusing to give up scientific-technical creativity, are languishing from poverty in scientific research institutes and in large enterprises and firms.

Of course, the small capital of the patriot-merchants will not preserve the health of our science and technology—only the state can do this; but it can prevent a complete dissipation of intellect and skill before the onset of Gaydarovitis. Therefore, one of the most important tasks in our society today is the unification of patriotic like-thinkers from the field of commerce, science, and industry. The attempt to resolve this task has been undertaken by the newspaper DEN.

The newspaper's action became possible owing to its special nature. DEN is not a communist and not a democratic newspaper. It professes an ideology whose essence, to put it simply, comes down to this: We Russians must not live according to the prescriptions of the long-since deceased literary men Marx and Lenin, and not according to the recommendations of American professors and the IMF, but as is suggested by common sense and dictated by our own historical experience—prerevolutionary, Soviet, and perestroika-era. This position of the newspaper is attracting to it those who wish to see Russia a strong and independent country, and not a colonial appendage of the West.

Recently, the newspaper appealed to all of them to get acquainted with one another by organizing meetings in residential areas and according to interests. After this appeal of the newspaper, an association of patriot-businessmen emerged, along with other associations according to interests, in which managers from various spheres of activity got together.

Up to the present time, about a hundred persons have agreed to join the association. We held a meeting, estimated the capabilities of each, and resolved to establish a company that has the status of a legal entity.

Relations in our company will unquestionably be fraternal, but not philanthropic, for we are not only a company of like-thinkers, but also entrepreneurs. The strong companions in it will assume the main share of general expenses, and they will take on the responsibility of rendering every kind of protection to the weaker members. But all of this will be done taking into account

the disclosure of the potential of those who are now in a difficult position and the return from them.

We are convinced that the entrepreneurs of a scientific-production orientation who are now dragging out a wretched existence will not be a burden to the merchants in the company. The latter, with all of their qualities for acquiring money, frequently do not have that which the former have—knowledge of latent production reserves, which is the basis of any kind of prosperity; they do not have one or another piece of equipment and premises at locations that are convenient for business, and there are no communications necessary for specific operations.

We have reason to believe that our company will become a company of mutual assistance and mutually advantageous cooperation, during which the exchange of capital and ideas and material resources and information that are so necessary to each and every one will occur. But what could be more advantageous now than the composition of the forces and capabilities of like-thinkers?

We are starting from scratch, and it will be difficult for us at first. Therefore, I would especially like to appeal to those patriotic businessmen who are now confidently standing on their feet: Support us in this moment of formation. We understand that support of a politicized opposition association of businessmen threatens to turn into unpleasantness for many of you, and that you could be exposed for this to plunder on the part of the government and cosmopolitan trade and financial clans. But our company can keep a secret. We will guarantee the confidentiality of your help to it. If patriots who do not hide their faces are not helped today, all of us will have to hide our views for too long.

Contact telephone: 200-11-65.

Address: 103662 Moscow, Tsvetnoy Avenue, 30. Newspaper DEN. Association of Businessmen.

Decree on Changes in Auto Price Compensation

935D0013C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 4

["Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 16 September 1991, No. 719, Moscow: On Making Changes to the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 12 June 1992, No. 394"]

[Text] The government of the Russian Federation decrees:

In the first paragraph of Point 2 of the decree of the government of the Russian Federation of 12 June 1992, No. 394, "On the Procedure for Compensating for Higher Costs of Passenger Vehicles to Owners of Special Checks on Which the Sales Deadline Expired in 1991," after the words "receipt of compensation," exclude the words "but not more than the prices as of 1 July 1992."

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

Directive on Support to Academy of Technical Science

935D0013F Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 5

["Directive of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: On State Support for the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] 1. To consider it necessary to provide state support and financing for the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation, which is in keeping with the ukase of the president of the Russian Federation of 18 March 1992, No. 257, "On the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation," which is responsible for the level of development of new science-intensive technologies.

2. To instruct the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation in conjunction with interested permanent commissions of the chambers and committees of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to develop the concept of technological renewal of Russia in order to deepen the socioeconomic reforms and the International Program for Electronic Monetary Circulation in Russia on the basis of new information and microelectronic technologies, the Program for Nanotechnologies and Nanoelectronics, and also the concept of organization under the conditions of a market economy of standardization, metrology, and certification in Russia with the participation of public associations and Russian and international associations of specialists in this area.

3. The Commission of the Soviet of the Republic of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for Budget, Plans, Taxes, and Prices and the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for Science and Public Education in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation are to envision, beginning with the fourth quarter of 1992, the allotment in the republic budget of annual financial funds for the implementation of priority Russia-wide and international scientific and technical programs developed on assignment from the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the government of the Russian Federation: "New technologies for acceleration of the solution to the food problem," "Nanotechnology and nanoelectronics," "New technologies for electronic money circulation in Russia," and "The Russian-Turkish center for science-intensive technologies."

4. The Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations is to take the necessary measures for the development of a Russian-Turkish center for science-intensive technologies, a department of countries of the Black Sea Basin of the Academy of Technological Sciences, a Russian-Brazilian Academy of Technological

Sciences, and other international departments and centers, instituted with the participation of the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation.

5. The government of the city of Moscow is to take the necessary practical measures for providing for conducting the Second International Conference and Exhibition of the Latest Technology of the 20th Century, nanotechnology, with the participation of the United States, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, the FRG, Brazil, and other countries, and also the founding congress of the World Federation of Technologists in the House of Unions in Moscow during 3-9 August 1993.

6. To recommend to the editorial staff of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and the television studio "Rossiyskiye Vesti" that they introduce a permanent weekly feature for covering the Russia-wide and international activity of the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation for technological renewal of Russia and deepening of the economic reforms.

7. In connection with the change in the legal status of the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation which follows from the ukase of the president of the Russian Federation of 18 March 1992, No. 257, which set for it the task of resolving state problems, the Academy of Technological Sciences of the Russian Federation is to make the corresponding changes in its Regulations.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov
8 September 1992
No. 3476/Irp-I

Statute on Protection of Property by MVD

935D0012F Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
10 Sep 92 p 3

["Statute on Extra-Departmental Security Units Attached to Russian Federation Internal Affairs Organs"]

[Text] Approved by Russian Federation Government Resolution No 589, issued 14 August 1992

1. Extra-departmental security units attached to Russian Federation internal affairs organs (subsequently to be referred to as extra-departmental security) are to be created on a contractual basis for the purpose of guarding the property of property owners and are to be organized in cities, rayon centers and urban-type towns.

Extra-departmental security is to be guided in its actions by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the RSFSR law "On the Militia," other Russian Federation laws, ukases and orders by the President of the Russian Federation, resolutions and orders by the Government of the Russian Federation, decisions by organs of state authority and administration in the Russian Federation's constituent republics, krays, oblasts, the cities of

Moscow and St. Petersburg and autonomous territories, the present Statute, and normative acts by the Russian Federation MVD.

2. The primary functions of extra-departmental security are:

- protection of property owners' property on a contractual basis;
- participation in the development and implementation of state measures to organize and improve protection for physical assets;
- implementation within the territory of the Russian Federation of a unified technical policy with regard to creation of security alarm devices, the industrial production thereof, monitoring of their quality, tactics for their use, their installation and their servicing.

3. Pursuant to the functions entrusted to it, extra-departmental security:

- provides protection for property, and also renders other services stipulated by contract with property owners;
- within the limits of its authority prepares drafts of normative acts on matters pertaining to protection of property from criminal or other illegal infringement;
- participates in the preparation and implementation of state, regional or other programs and measures intended to ensure the security of physical assets;
- inspects in-house security at enterprises, institutions and organizations;
- sponsors and carries out scientific research, design work and other work with regard to the creation and application of security alarm devices, and performs the function of general buyer of such devices for its own needs;
- carries out technical oversight of planning and installation work with security alarm systems at facilities under its protection, and also ensures that security devices and systems are used in accordance with their technical documentation, and approves them for use, service or repair; it performs this work on a contractual basis for the facilities which it guards;
- sponsors and carries out testing of security alarm devices, including foreign ones, and also ensures that certificates permitting the use of such devices within the territory of the Russian Federation are issued according to established procedure;
- takes part in the development and correlation of standards for security alarm devices.

4. Extra-departmental security is comprised of militia units, militarized units and watchmen's units, as well as technical and service personnel.

5. Direction of the operations of extra-departmental security is carried out by:

- the Main Administration for Extra-Departmental Security under the Russian Federation MVD;
- administrations (or departments) of extra-departmental security under ministries of internal affairs in the Russian Federation's constituent republics, internal affairs administrations (or main administrations) in krais, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast and autonomous territories;
- departments (or divisions) of extra-departmental security under the internal affairs organs of rayons, cities, urban rayons, and city and town militia divisions.

6. The structure and staff of extra-departmental security units are approved as follows:

- of the Main Administration for Extra-departmental Security—by the Russian Federation minister of internal affairs;
- of administrations (or departments) of extra-departmental security under ministries of internal affairs in the Russian Federation's constituent republics, internal affairs administrations (or main administrations) in krais, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast and autonomous territories—by the heads of the corresponding ministries and administrations (or main administrations) of internal affairs;
- of departments (or divisions) of extra-departmental security at the city, rayon or town level—by the heads of the higher-level extra-departmental security organs to which they are directly subordinate. The number of personnel in these units is to be based on the amount of funds received as payment for the services they provide.

7. The Main Administration for Extra-Departmental Security under the Russian Federation MVD and other extra-departmental security administrations, departments and divisions are legal persons, have seals and stamps bearing their names, and possess separate balance sheets, current accounts and other bank accounts.

8. In order to perform the functions entrusted to them, the personnel of extra-departmental security units are granted the right:

- to require the workers and employees of facilities under their protection and other persons to abide by an established pass regime;
- to detain individuals who attempt to illegally transport (or carry away) physical assets from a facility under their protection;

—to bring to official security offices or to the militia individuals suspected of committing crimes involving infringement upon property under their protection;

—to inspect items according to legally-established procedure and contractual stipulations, and in exceptional cases to conduct body searches at checkpoints, and also to inspect vehicles and check the correlation between goods being carried and their accompanying shipping documents upon departure from the territory of the facility being protected;

—to use technical means which are not harmful to citizens' lives or health or to the environment to detect and seize illegally removed property and to uncover illegal actions;

—to use firearms in cases and according to procedure set forth in legislation;

—to demand that officials comply with contractual obligations designed to ensure the protection of physical assets and provide safe working conditions for security personnel.

In the performance of their duties militia personnel serving in extra-departmental security units also possess the rights granted to them by the RSFSR law "On the Militia."

The guarantees of social protection established for workers and employees of facilities which involve hazardous working conditions also extend to extra-departmental security personnel serving at such facilities.

9. The selection of duties for militia personnel within the structure of extra-departmental security units as well as duties for the workers and employees of extra-departmental security units is to be carried out in accordance with legally-established procedure and normative acts issued by the Russian Federation MVD.

10. Extra-departmental security performs its functions based on the principles of self-support and self-financing and is maintained with special (non-budgetary) funds received through contracts with property owners.

Payment for protection of facilities and other services is to be made at contractual prices, with provision for justified expenses, and a 5-percent surplus of revenues over expenditures to compensate for losses in connection with theft and fires.

11. The salary fund for members of extra-departmental security units is to consist of 80 percent of the funds received by contract from property owners. Funds which remain at the disposition of extra-departmental security after payment of taxes are not subject to expropriation. They are to accumulate in accounts and be spent to develop extra-departmental security and finance social programs.

Unspent funds are also to be used to make payments into a central reserve fund to be used to provide compensation for losses resulting from major cases of theft and fires. A statute on this centralized reserve funds must be approved by the Russian Federation MVD by agreement with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance.

12. Extra-departmental security performs financial, commercial, contractual and foreign economic operations according to established procedure and within the limits of its authority.

13. Provision of motor vehicles, fuels and lubricants, communications equipment, organizational equipment, cables and wires, physical property and other property is to be carried out by the Russian Federation MVD for a fee and according to established standards, as well as by means of decentralized acquisition. The personnel of militarized and watchmen's security units are to be supplied with physical property without charge.

14. In order to arrange for security using centralized monitoring systems, extra-departmental security will utilize communications channels made available according to established procedure by the Russian Federation Ministry of Communications. Space in automated telephone station buildings to house extra-departmental security's alarm system equipment is to be rented by extra-departmental security from communications enterprises on a contractual basis.

15. Allocation of space to house extra-departmental security units, as well as organization of centralized security observation posts, is to be carried out by the appropriate organs of executive authority. Offices and auxiliary space housing equipment, supplies and services (water supply, lighting, communications equipment, heating, housekeeping and repair services) are to be made available to extra-departmental security without charge.

16. Allocation of housing to extra-departmental security personnel in dormitories, services by medical facilities and provision of health resorts and preschool facilities at facilities being guarded are to be carried out on a contractual basis.

Resolution on Protection of Private Property by MVD

935D0012E Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Sep 92 p 3

[Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 589: "On Approval of the Statute on Extra-Departmental Security Units Attached to Russian Federation Internal Affairs Organs"]

[Text] The Government of the Russian Federation hereby resolves:

1. to approve the attached Statute on Extra-Departmental Security Units Attached to Russian Federation Internal Affairs Organs.

2. to declare invalid RSFSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 538, issued on 18 June 1966, "On Approval of the Statute on Extra-Departmental Security Units Attached to Militia Organs of the RSFSR Ministry for the Protection of Public Order."

3. that the present resolution shall be enacted immediately upon adoption.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
14 August 1992, Moscow

Ukase on Development of Health Services

935D0012A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 92 p 6

[Russian Federation Presidential Ukase No 1137: "On Measures To Develop Health Care in the Russian Federation"]

[Text] In order to ensure state economic and social protection for the health care system, to stabilize it and to ensure its further development, I hereby resolve:

1. that the Government of the Russian Federation and organs of executive authority in the Russian Federation's constituent republics, krais, oblasts and autonomous territories and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg shall:

- recognize the necessity of financing health care expenditures proportional to revenues received and in an amount not less than 1991 in comparable prices, and with a view toward implementation of the RSFSR Law "On Medical Insurance for Citizens of the RSFSR";

- oversee the compilation and distribution of orders for construction of health care facilities to meet the state's federal needs;

- make provision for priority supply of physical and technical resources to health care facilities;

- if necessary, transfer parcels of land being used by institutions, enterprises and organizations in the health care system to their use pursuant to procedure established by land legislation.

2. that the Government of the Russian Federation shall:

- include in the Russian Federation Republic Budget directed financing of costly types of medical care based on a list of illnesses to be approved annually by the Russian Federation Ministry of Health;

- ensure introduction of mandatory medical insurance for citizens of the Russian Federation as an effective form of social protection of the public in connection with the transition to a market economy.

3. that the Russian Federation Ministry of Health, the Russian Federation State Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Oversight and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences shall, in conjunction with the affected ministries, agencies and trade union organs:

a. within three months' time submit proposals regarding:

- a new structure of health care administration suitable to the transition to a market economy;

- a series of standards regarding provision of medical care to every citizen of the Russian Federation which will guarantee a certain amount of medical care and a certain level of public health;

- delineation of federal property at each facility in the Russian Federation's constituent republics, krais, oblasts and autonomous territories and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and of municipal property within the health care system, as well as a procedure for the financing and utilization thereof;

- destatization and privatization of health care institutions and enterprises in the medical industry;

- a procedure for combination of scientific research institutes and the scientific sections (departments) of institutions of higher medical education and institutions for advanced physician training into unified scientific and educational complexes with the goal of improving the quality of professional training for physicians and scientists;

b. within one month's time submit proposals regarding social protection for health care workers;

c. within the shortest time possible submit proposals concerning unified Russian Federation state standards governing the quality of medical care, training of specialists for health care facilities and the methodology of price formation for health care services to the public.

4. to establish that when delineating federal property, the property of each of the Russian Federation's constituent republics, krais, oblasts, autonomous territories and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and municipal property for each facility and defining property rights it is not permitted to abolish or alter the official purpose of buildings and facilities being used as therapeutic and scientific institutions, enterprises and organizations in the health care system or under the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences without the consent of the Russian Federation Ministry of Health, the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Russian Federation State Committee for State Property Management and corresponding committees under the Russian Federation's constituent republics, krais, oblasts, autonomous territories and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

5. that the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance shall when compiling the Russian Federation Republic Budget make provision for allocations to the Russian Federation Ministry of Health, the Russian Federation

State Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Oversight and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences for the purchase of convertible currency funds from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in amounts necessary to acquire medical products in a timely manner, as well as to acquire equipment, raw materials and processed materials for the production thereof.

6. that the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local organs shall if necessary provide protection to officials of the public health service and other health care institutions in connection with performance of their official duties.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, The Kremlin
26 September 1992, No. 1137

Order on Realization of Suggestions Made at Executive-Representative Branch Talks

935D0012C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 5

[Russian Federation Presidential Order No. 529-rp: "On Measures To Implement Suggestions Made During Consultation With the Heads of Russian Federation Representative and Executive Organs"]

[Text] Resolved: to approve the Plan of Measures to Implement Suggestions Made During Consultation With the Heads of Russian Federation Representative and Executive Organs (Cheboksary, 11-12 September 1992); plan appended.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
22 September 1992, No. 529-rp

Plan of Measures To Implement Suggestions Made During Consultation With the Heads of Russian Federation Representative and Executive Organs (Cheboksary, 11-12 September 1992)

1. prepare and present a draft Russian Federation law on amendments to the RSFSR Law "On the RSFSR Central Bank (The Bank of Russia)"; assigned to the Government of the Russian Federation; due by 10 October 1992

2. prepare proposals concerning changes in the mechanism for sale of foreign currency receipts on the domestic currency market; assigned to the Russian Ministry of Finance; due by 15 October 1992

3. present proposals concerning regulation of the procedure for granting subsidies to inefficient enterprises; assigned to the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Ministry of the Economy; due by 1 November 1992

4. present proposals regarding measures to ensure a higher market value for privatization vouchers on the securities market, including measures to support and

facilitate the operations of investment funds; assigned to the Russian State Committee for Property Management; due by 15 October 1992

5. conduct analysis of operations by organs of executive authority in krais and oblasts and prepare proposals concerning repeal of legal acts which are in violation of the Constitution and other laws of the Russian Federation, ukases issued by the President of the Russian Federation and resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as those concerning criminal penalties for convicted officials; assigned to the Control Administration under the Russian Federation Presidential Administration; due by 1 November 1992

6. bring resolutions by the Government of the Russian Federation into line with statements contained in the Federation Treaty; assigned to the Government of the Russian Federation; due by 1 December 1992

7. present proposals concerning correlation of ukases and instructions by the President of the Russian Federation with the Federation Treaty; assigned to the State Law Administration under the President of the Russian Federation; due by 15 November 1992

8. conclude agreements with republic councils of ministers and with the administrations of krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs in connection with the exercise of authority in spheres of joint activity; assigned to the Government of the Russian Federation; due by 1 January 1993

9. submit proposals concerning the status and procedure for formation of federal executive organs at the local level; assigned to the Government of the Russian Federation and the State Law Administration under the President of the Russian Federation; due by 15 December 1992

10. verify the effectiveness with which organs of executive authority in the territories are utilizing special foreign economic privileges and submit appropriate proposals; assigned to the Control Administration under the Russian Federation Presidential Administration; due by 1 December 1992

11. submit proposals concerning procedure for interaction between the chiefs of kray (or oblast) administrations and administration chiefs in the corresponding kray (or oblast) centers; assigned to the Control Administration under the Russian Federation Presidential Administration; due by 10 October 1992

12. submit proposals regarding an amendment to the Russian Federation Law "On Kray and Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies and Kray and Oblast Administrations" and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet resolution on procedure for implementation of that Law (in the section concerning election of administration chiefs); assigned to the Control Administration under the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and the

State Law Administration under the President of the Russian Federation; due by 15 December 1992

Order on Creation of Legal Information System

935D0012D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 5

[Russian Federation Presidential Order No. 536-rp: "On Measures To Create a Legal Information System"]

[Text] In order to resolve urgent problems with legal information in connection with the operations of the Russian Federation Presidential State Law Administration and in order to ensure effective legal information support for operations by the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and the apparatus of the Government of the Russian Federation:

1. The Russian Federation Presidential State Law Administration is required to speed up creation of a standard legal information data bank as required for creation of the concept of legal policy, legislative drafting programs and legal support for the reforms being carried out by the Russian Federation, as stipulated in Russian Federation Presidential Ukase No. 363, issued on 4 April 1992.

2. It is to be established that the property of the Sistema Scientific-Technical Center, including the administration building at 48 Kirov St. currently listed on its balance sheet, is federal property.

3. The Sistema Scientific-Technical Center is to be transferred to the control of the Russian Federation Presidential Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information so that it may be used as a base upon which to organize the central node of a legal information system, including the nucleus of a standard legal information data bank. The scientific-technical center is to be supplied with the computer equipment required for those purposes.

4. The Russian Federation Ministry of Trade and Material Resources is required to transfer to the Russian Federation Presidential Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information within two days' time a two-machine complex as noted in the appendix for the Sistema Scientific-Technical Center (note: appendix not published).

5. The Russian Federation Presidential Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information will provide:

—installation of telecommunications lines and equipment for the legal information and computing system of the Russian Federation Presidential State Law Administration;

—gradual input of information into the standard legal information data bank within time limits agreed upon with the Russian Federation Presidential State Law Administration.

6. In 1992 the Russian Federation Presidential Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information is to be allocated R41.3 million [rubles] out of the Russian Federation Government Reserve Fund for purchases to meet the needs of the Russian Federation Presidential State Law Administration for essential equipment and computer programs.

7. The Russian Federation State Committee for State Property Management is to grant to the Russian Federation Government Archives Committee within three weeks' time a portion of the space (together with equipment and not less than 1,500 square meters) at the Central Medical Archive (located at 21 Marshal Timoshchenko St., Moscow) as the site of the Center for Contemporary Document Storage [Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoy dokumentatsii].

8. The office management division of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration is to disassemble equipment located at 56 Razin St. and set it up in the offices at 8/4 Ilinka St., and also relocate legislative and other materials from the former Juridical Department of the now-abolished USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

9. The Russian Federation Presidential State Law Administration is to oversee implementation of this order.

10. Hereby invalidated are the final paragraph of Point 2 in Russian Federation Presidential Order No. 241-r, issued 28 December 1991, and points 1-3 of Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 375, issued on 3 June 1992.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
24 September 1992, No. 536-rp

Ukase on Youth Policy

935D0014A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
25 Sep 92 p 4

[Ukase of the President of the Russian Federation on First Priority Measures in the Field of State Youth Policy. Moscow, The Kremlin. 16 Sep 92, No. 1075]

[Text] With a view to creating social, economic, legal, and organizational conditions and guarantees for the social development of youthful citizens and for discovering to the maximum the potential of our youth in the interests of the development of society, I decree:

1. Declare the existence of an integrated state youth policy in Russia as one of the priority areas of the state's socio-economic policy, keeping in mind:

provisions for observing the rights of youthful citizens, the establishment of guarantees for them in the sphere of work and employment, and help for their entrepreneurial activity;

the creation of conditions aimed at the physical and spiritual development of youth, and the granting of a guaranteed minimum of social services to youthful citizens;

implementation of support for the youthful family, talented youth, and youth associations; and

assistance to international youth exchanges.

Present to the Russian Federation President within two weeks, for forwarding to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, a draft of The Basic Directions for a State Youth Policy for Russia.

2. Form a Committee on Youth Affairs Under the Russian Federation Government for the purposes of formulating and implementing a unified state youth policy, and also in order to coordinate the activity of administrative bodies in youth matters within Russian Federation administrations.

The Russian Federation Government: Develop within two weeks the structure of and ratify a Statute on the Committee for Youth Affairs Under the Russian Federation Government.

The governments of republics within the Russian Federation, chiefs of administration of krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs and the mayors of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg: Adopt measures for the organizational and financial strengthening of youth-affairs agencies within the executive-power structure.

3. Create a Russian Fund for Federal Youth Programs for the purpose of organizational and financial support of priority programs for developing youth.

The Russian Federation Government: Taking into account the recommendations of youth and children's bodies, develop within two months and ratify a statute on the fund, and determine the sources of the appropriations necessary for the fund's formation and activity.

4. Support the establishment of a National Council of Youth Associations with a view to coordinating the activity of Russia's youth and children's associations that is aimed at protecting and realizing their interests and the rights of youth and children.

The Russian Federation Government: Examine within a month the recommendations of the National Council of Youth Associations, which are aimed at supporting the coordinated activity of the Russian Federation Government and All-Russian (or interregional) youth and children's associations in the execution of youth policy.

5. Create a Home for Russia's Children's and Youth Associations at the Russian Socio-Political Center.

6. The Russian Federation Government: When formulating the federal budget, call for the allocation of funds for financing part of the expenditures for executing the

programs and projects of All-Russian youth and children's associations in the area of state youth policy, with a view to supporting socially significant youth initiatives and stimulating youth's participation in the development and realization of programs that affect children, young citizens, and society as a whole.

Recommend to chiefs of executive power of the republics within the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg:

when formulating the corresponding budgets, call for the allocation annually of funds for financing part of the expenditures for executing programs and projects for youth and children's associations;

grant children's associations the right to make use of the premises of schools, extracurricular institutions, clubs, palaces, and cultural buildings, and sports and other structures free or under preferential terms, as well as help to allocate premises for youth and children's associations by granting preferences in levying rental payments; and

do not allow youth and children's centers, clubs, health camps, tourist centers, and other institutions which work with children and youth or the buildings, structures, equipment, or land sections of these institutions to be used for any other purpose, or the buildings and premises that belong to them or that they rent to be preempted.

7. Proceeding from the exceptional significance of state measures in the area of ensuring supervision and preventing lawbreaking among minors, the Russian Federation Government, in coordination with the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation: Develop within three weeks and present in the prescribed procedure drafts of standard enactments on reorganizing the system of state entities that execute the function of ensuring supervision and preventing criminality and other law-breaking by minors, and on creating appropriate entities, within the system of bodies of executive power at all levels, for protecting the rights of minors.

8. The Russian Federation Government, in coordination with the Russian Federation Central Bank and the Russian Federation Savings Bank: Review the matter of granting young families long-term credits for setting up housekeeping; for acquiring durable articles for everyday household use; and for making payments for education and retraining in educational institutions that operate on a commercial basis, for the construction and acquisition of houses (or separate apartments), for the fee for membership in a housing-construction (or housing) cooperative, as well as for favorable credits for completing construction that has been started on youth housing complexes, rural production youth-housing complexes, and other youth economic associations that build housing and facilities for cultural and domestic purposes in the countryside.

9. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, jointly with the fully empowered representative of the Russian Federation Government on Youth Affairs: Introduce within a month recommendations for developing international youth collaboration; for implementing intergovernmental agreements on youth exchanges; for integrating Russia into international youth organizations and Russia's participation in basic programs in this area through the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and other international organizations, and for simplifying the procedure for visa support of international youth exchanges, including free issuance of visas on the basis of reciprocity.

Recommend to the bodies of executive authority of the republics within the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg comprehensive help in developing international youth exchanges, and call for allocation of the appropriations necessary for these purposes through funds from their own budgets.

10. This Ukase goes into effect at the time it is signed.

Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin Moscow, The Kremlin 16 September 1992 No. 1075

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Complications of Voucherization Viewed

Inflationary Consequences Predicted

93440013A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Vladislav Inozemtsev, economic advisor of the Board of the People's "Free Russia" Party: "The Last 'Farewell' to Socialism"]

[Text] VOUCHERS

The impression is created that the authors of the "voucherization" program, the implementation of which is beginning to be carried out under conditions of extreme social tension, were obviously carried away by its potential political consequences, "forgetting" about the economic aspects of the problem.

The Goals and Their Achievement

The idea of the proposed emission of the vouchers should revive a "sense of ownership," among the people who have become owners, and, through the relations that have been formed on this basis, should ensure Russia a way out of the economic crisis, at the same time forming among the citizens the mentality and motivational system adequate for a market economy.

Have these goals been achieved under the conditions of the privatization scheme being considered? Hardly, it would seem. As is shown by the example of Czechoslovakia, which used the voucher system before we did.

about three-fourths of the population could not exchange the vouchers for shares by themselves. They simply placed their privatization checks in investment funds—actually only receiving dividends for the contributions, like interest on savings accounts, in no way, moreover, taking part in the management of the enterprises.

Then what path are we on?

On the one hand, the normative documents drawn up at Goskomimushchestva propose limiting the possibilities of buying up the shares issued by enterprises to 10-20 percent of their total number, so that they would not be concentrated in the same investment-fund hands. Considering the fact that the work collective has been endowed with the right to buy up to 35 percent of the shares of its enterprise at preferred prices, it is easy to understand that the controlling block of shares is assigned to its work collective.

The majority of our citizens are deprived of operational ties with a broad circle of Russian emitters, and of the appropriate information on them, and at best will most likely find themselves, with their vouchers, in a similar scene.

What is more, it appears, no major changes from voucherization are to be expected from the administrative front itself, since, with respect to the instructions drawn up in the Goskomimushchestva of Russia by one investment fund, no more than 10-15 percent of the shares of the enterprise being privatized can be bought out. Considering the fact that the work collective has the right to acquire, under preferential conditions, up to 35 percent of the shares, it is easily understandable that even the investment funds will not always be able to take part in controlling the privatized enterprises, since many decisions will be made by only a two-thirds majority of the total number of stockholders. A solid part of them can find themselves under the influence of the local administration.

A stalemate situation therefore arises, in which the stockholders will essentially attempt to control the enterprises without having any real possibility, not only of closing or respecializing them, but also of modernizing the administrative system that has formed.

Moreover, in the entire civilized world, joint-stock companies have arisen as the result of the development of isolated private companies, under the conditions of the need for urgent unification of private forces and capital. Historically, it is the form of private enterprise that is the primary consideration. Therefore, it should be made possible (although with the agreement of the work collective) for investment funds, commercial firms and perhaps even citizens, to acquire enterprises as property, instead of again dividing up the responsibility among various organizations.

In the latter case, an attempt is being made to generate a "feeling of ownership" among the entire population, although nowhere in the world does the proportion of the

entrepreneurs in the total mass of citizens exceed a few percent. By trying to create a system, traditional for a market economy, of motivation for everyone, we risk not generating it even among individuals. This variant of voucher privatization will therefore not bring about the proposed economic growth. The latter will even be suspended, since the privatization check is essentially nothing more than an

Investment Fiction

How is voucherization usually carried out? The state tries to hand over to the enterprises the property that is becoming a burden for the state budget or requires additional allocations for which there are no sources. Attracting additional resources to develop or respecialize a sector comes out as the goal of privatization.

Just what is happening in Russia? The vouchers are symbols of state property. This property is not, as a rule (and this is confirmed by the very need for privatization), very liquid. Therefore, the privatization check in itself is not money which can be used to develop a production base or for investment in the economy. Having bought shares in an enterprise for the vouchers, the purchaser does not pour additional resources into this enterprise, as was done in the case of the purchase of shares for money, which the enterprise could have at its disposal.

The real money, now found mainly among the entrepreneurial structures, is directed toward industry. The entrepreneurs must redeem the vouchers from the population, having paid fairly large sums from funds which are really capable of livening up economic activity. Even if the market value of the voucher proves to be one-or-two-fold lower than the face value, acquiring them requires diverting at least R80-120 billion from the investment market and transferring it for the personal consumption needs of the sellers. It is fully understandable that this measure will lead to reducing investment activity while increasing the monetary mass, that is, to reducing the offer of goods with an increase in the demand, and as a result, you and I are faced with living through the next

Splash of Inflation

Acceleration of the inflationary processes will, in my opinion, be the inevitable consequence of "voucherization." It can be suggested that development of these processes will take its course for two reasons.

In the first place, the removal of all restrictions on the sale of vouchers, proposed by the plan, will cause them to be used in settlements between private persons and commercial structures not connected with the state. As a result, a seemingly additional monetary mass will arise, and moreover the exchange rate of the voucher will depend on many circumstances and will hardly turn out to be easily controllable. Therefore, the state, which comes forth in this situation as the emitter of dubious

"quasi-money," will itself seemingly undermine the basis of its financial system.

In the second place, the sale of the vouchers to entrepreneurial structures will cause sizable monetary funds to appear in the hands of the population. One can presume, with certainty, that most of the voucher sellers will be representatives of the poorly-provided-for strata of the population, as the result of which the basic mass of monetary coverage of the privatization checks will be poured out on the consumer market, and moreover on the market for goods in daily demand, which will make the goods even more expensive.

These circumstances will ultimately determine the attitude of the population toward the proposed variant of privatization, for the people will behold the accelerated provision of money and the growth of prices, the picture of rapid buying up of potentially quoted vouchers by entrepreneurial structures and the intensification of social stratification. Awareness of the fact that the monetary sums obtained as the result of selling a voucher, at the present prices, is incommensurate with the actual contribution of each citizen to the creation of national wealth, and the insignificance of the dividends for the shares of the investment funds eaten up by inflation, will lead to the realization of one's having been deceived.

It is not too late to find a way out of the situation that has formed. One should at least be aware that voucherization, undertaken primarily as a means of resolving social conflicts, should be completely directed toward just this, since, in my opinion, it will hardly help to achieve a real solution to the economic problems.

This essentially socialist experiment, based on the unified distribution of state property, should be the last "farewell" to socialism. Nothing more need be required of it, for otherwise, the idea of capitalization will be denigrated and discredited on Russian soil just as successfully as the idea of capitalism was denigrated and discredited.

Regional Differences Problematic

934A0013B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Leonid Smirnyagin, chief expert of the APR Consortium: "Where Are Vouchers Going and Where Do They Come From: Are Regional Boundaries an Obstacle in Their Path"]

[Text] To all appearances, the main idea of "voucherizing the entire country" is the equality of shares of the state property being distributed for ownership as the embodiment of social justice. Realization of this idea, however, is opposed by many circumstances, including

the extreme unevenness of the location on Russian territory of fixed capital intended for output. In oblasts with a concentration of especially fund-intensive heavy industry enterprises, there will be a critical shortage of vouchers, and their price will prove to be higher than the average for the country. In other regions, where there are mainly plants with relatively low fund-intensiveness, there will prove to be too many vouchers, and their price will therefore drop.

The oblast boundaries, of course, are quite conventional, and the market in vouchers is gradually taking on an all-national nature. Vouchers flow from the place where there is an excess of them to regions with high rates. The conditions are gradually leveling out. For this, however, as calculations show, one-fifth of all the vouchers should be drawn into inter-oblast flows. In this way, at least every fifth voucher will be sold outside the limits of the oblast in which it was obtained.

The picture of these flows can, in its general features, already be imagined. It is formed comparing the geography of the fixed capital and the population density. The lion's share of the state property being privatized is made up of the production funds of industry, minus the funds of the VPK [military-industrial complex] and the fuel-energy complex, and also the degree of wear of the fixed capital. It is enough to make these arithmetical operations to obtain the approximate amount of the residual value of the state property which can be put forth to redeem the vouchers in a certain specific region. In Tyumen Oblast, for example, less than 10 percent of the existing production capital of industry is suitable for privatization, in Yakutia, less than one-fifth of it, but on the other hand, in Karelia or Ivanovo Oblast it is over 80 percent, and in Belgorod Oblast—almost 90 percent.

The residual value, in all likelihood, will affect the level of prices in the competition for state property (if, of course, this competition arises at all). In the future, the difference between regions, with respect to the real value of the fixed capital, can change greatly. These changes are also subject to evaluation and prediction, but right now it is a question of an approximate evaluation of only the starting situation, and moreover, without taking into consideration what part of the state property has already been "covered" by joint-stockholding, leasing and other forms of initial privatization.

In the table shown, one can see the share of each oblast, kray or republic, both in the fixed capital being privatized and in the total volume of vouchers. The higher the ratio of these shares in favor of vouchers, the greater the excess of them and the worse the conditions will be for selling them within the limits of the given region. The difference in these shares gives a rough idea of the absolute amount of future voucher "export" or "import" among regions.

Regions of Russia	Share of region, %		Difference in shares	Provision of voucher with funds (Russia = 1)
	in fixed capital	in number of vouchers		
Russia	100	100	0	1.00
Economic regions				
North	7.9	4.1	-3.7	0.53
East Siberia	10.7	6.2	-4.5	0.58
Central Chernozem	6.9	5.2	-1.7	0.76
Far East	6.9	5.4	-1.5	0.78
Volga area	12.1	11.2	-1.0	0.92
Urals	13.3	13.7	0.4	1.03
Northwest	5.8	6.3	0.4	1.08
West Siberia	8.5	10.2	1.7	1.21
Volgo-Vyatsk	4.7	5.7	1.0	1.22
Central	16.4	20.5	4.1	1.25
North Caucasus	6.8	11.5	4.6	1.67
Regions, oblasts with an acute shortage (of vouchers)				
Murmansk	2.4	0.8	-1.6	0.33
Krasnoyarsk	6.8	2.4	-4.4	0.36
Karelia	1.3	0.5	-0.8	0.41
Lipetsk	1.9	0.8	-1.1	0.43
Belgorod	2.2	0.9	-1.2	0.43
Kamchatka	0.7	0.3	-0.4	0.46
Vologod	1.8	0.9	-0.9	0.51
Regions, oblasts with noticeable shortage of vouchers				
Maritime	2.5	1.5	-0.9	0.62
Sakhalin	0.8	0.5	-0.3	0.63
Astrakhan	1.1	0.7	-0.4	0.65
Tomsk	1.0	0.7	-0.4	0.65
Chelyabinsk	3.7	3.5	-1.2	0.67
Kaliningrad	0.9	0.6	-0.3	0.67
Irkutsk	2.8	1.9	-0.9	0.68
Tatarstan	3.5	2.5	-1.0	0.71
Khabarovsk	1.7	1.2	-0.5	0.73
Kursk	1.2	0.9	-0.3	0.74
Yekaterinburg	4.2	3.2	-1.0	0.77
Arkhangelsk	1.4	1.1	-0.3	0.77
Leningrad	1.4	1.1	-0.3	0.81
Balanced regions, oblasts				
Komi	1.0	0.9	-0.1	0.86
Yaroslavl	1.1	1.0	-0.2	0.87
Orlov	0.7	0.6	-0.1	0.90
Kemerovo	2.4	2.1	-0.2	0.90
Smolensk	0.9	0.8	-0.1	0.92
Magadan	0.4	0.4	0	0.93
Saratov	1.9	1.8	-0.1	0.95
Rostov	3.0	2.9	-0.1	0.95

Regions of Russia	Share of region, %		Difference in shares	Provision of voucher with funds (Russia = 1)
Chubashia	0.9	0.9	0	0.99
Ulyanovsk	1.0	1.0	0	1.00
Vladimir	1.1	1.1	0	1.05
Volgograd	1.7	1.8	0.1	1.04
Orenburg	1.4	1.5	0.1	1.07
Samar	2.1	2.2	0.1	1.07
Tver	1.0	1.1	0.1	1.10
Kostroma	0.5	0.5	0	1.13
Nizhnevartovsk	2.1	2.5	0.4	1.17
Regions, oblasts with a noticeable excess of vouchers				
Mordovia	0.5	0.6	0.1	1.23
St. Petersburg	2.7	3.4	0.7	1.24
Altay	1.6	1.9	0.4	1.24
Penza	0.8	1.0	0.2	1.24
Pskov	0.5	0.6	0.1	1.25
Kabardino-Balkaria	0.4	0.5	0.1	1.27
Tyumen	1.7	2.1	0.4	1.29
Ryazan	0.7	0.9	0.2	1.30
Tambov	0.7	0.9	0.2	1.31
Perm	1.6	2.1	0.5	1.32
Moscow	4.4	6.1	1.7	1.37
Kurgansk	0.5	0.7	0.2	1.38
Buryatia	0.5	0.7	0.2	1.39
Amur	0.5	0.7	0.2	1.39
Tula	0.9	1.3	0.4	1.44
Mari-El	0.4	0.5	0.1	1.44
Bryansk	0.7	1.0	0.3	1.46
Kirov	0.7	1.1	0.4	1.54
Moskovskaya	2.9	4.5	1.6	1.47
Kaluga	0.5	0.7	0.2	1.59
Novosibirsk	1.1	1.9	0.8	1.71
Tuva	0.1	0.2	0.1	1.73
Voronezh	0.9	1.7	0.8	1.78
Novgorod	0.3	0.5	0.2	1.83
Bashkiria	1.4	2.7	1.3	1.88
Stavropol	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.88
Omsk	0.7	1.5	0.7	1.95
Regions, oblasts with a heavy excess				
Chitinsk	0.5	0.9	0.4	1.99
Yakutia	0.4	0.7	0.3	2.02
Udmurtia	0.5	1.1	0.6	2.05
Krasnodar	1.7	3.5	1.8	2.09
Kalmykia	0.1	0.2	0.1	2.99
Dagestan	0.3	1.2	0.9	3.73
Checheno-Ingushetia	0.1	0.9	0.8	6.30

Regions of Russia	Share of region, %		Difference in shares	Provision of voucher with funds (Russia = 1)
TOTAL:				
With a critical shortage	17.1	6.8	-10.3	0.40
With a noticeable shortage	27.2	19.2	-8.0	0.71
Balanced	23.1	23.1	0	1.00
With a noticeable excess	29.0	42.3	13.3	1.46
With a heavy excess	3.6	8.6	5.0	2.40

The data presented also show the tremendous difference in the conditions for selling the vouchers in regions: in Dagestan or Kalmykia, these conditions are almost worse by an order than in Murmansk or Lipetsk oblasts, because the first two have accumulated very little federal fixed capital and, for example, in Lipetsk Oblast there are several very large enterprises of national significance, such as the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine—one of the largest in the world with respect to capacity.

Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg oblasts, Tatarstan and Krasnoyarsk Krai will also become active absorbers of vouchers from other regions of Russia. There will be a critical shortage of vouchers in Kamchatka, Sakhalin and Karelia. The main sources of "excess" vouchers will be mainly the North Caucasus, particularly its autonomous states, where the population density is great, but the specialization sectors are low-fund-intensive, and also its oblasts like Omsk or Novosibirsk, where too large a part of the fixed capital is "under the cap" of the VPK, or Tyumen Oblast, the oil-and-gas complex of which is not subject to privatization. Moscow and its oblast may also become a voucher exporter: the relative difference between the local demand and the local supply will be relatively small, but in absolute calculation—quite impressive.

Superimposing this data on a map, it can be seen that in some places, oblasts with an acute shortage of vouchers and oblasts with a great excess of them adjoin. For example, the critically short Lipetsk and Belgorod oblasts adjoin oblasts with an excess—Voronezh and Tambov; West Siberian oblasts with a surplus adjoin the critically short Urals. The conclusion suggests itself that steady flows of vouchers will most likely arise between these oblasts, and a unified market for them will be formed. Not at all less rare, however, are cases when oblasts with a critical shortage of vouchers are farther removed from regions where there is an excess of privatization checks, and vice-versa. Like the North Caucasus—the largest "exporter" of vouchers among the economic regions of Russia—and like the northern region—one of the major "importers." Apparently, interregional flows of vouchers are acquiring great geographical scope.

These processes can substantially change the commercial geography of Russia. Today the "picture" is strongly fragmented, and has developed into a multitude of oblast markets, where the prices are formed quite autonomously. This can be judged if only from the level of retail prices (let us say, in Moscow ice cream costs 15 rubles

[R], in Yekaterinburg—R6-8, and in Ulyanovsk—R4-5). One of the factors of the defragmentation of the commercial geography of the country will, of course, become the inter-regional flows of vouchers. The point here is not so much the flows themselves as the fact that the possibility of operations with securities on distant markets will make the businessmen expand their business horizon, if not on all-national, than at least on a large-region scale.

Such processes will not only serve as a strong impetus for integration of the all-Russian market, but will most likely also give rise to local trends. There are quite a few politicians at the local level who will fight for the idea that the local funds absolutely belong to the local population and will oppose the influx of vouchers from outside. There are grounds for these moods. The main trump here lies in the rights of the work collectives, for it is through their labor that this fixed capital has been created, and they therefore have the advantage in leasing this capital, in holding joint-stock and in privatization.

It is quite possible that the local administrations, particularly in autonomies which have become wealthy through their capital, like Tatarstan, will not resist the temptation to somehow "mark" the vouchers of the local population and endow them with some sort of advantages when buying out local fixed capital. It is then that barriers will appear on the path of inter-regional voucher flows.

Anomalies in Instructions Found

934A0013C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Maks Khazin, IZVESTIYA: "The Instructions Are Cunning and Give Threats of Conflicts"]

[Text] On 20 August this year, the Russian Federation Goskomimushchestva approved the "Instructions on the Procedure for Issuing Privatization Checks to Citizens of the Russian Federation." The individual points of this document are causing confusion among lawyers.

This is the way Point 1.5 is set forth:

"IN CASE OF THE DEATH OF A PERSON ENTERED ON THE LIST OF THOSE HAVING THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE PRIVATIZATION CHECKS, THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE THE CHECK THROUGH INHERITANCE ARISES ONLY IF THE HEIR IS IN

POSSESSION OF A WILL, MADE OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE."

Let us examine at least a few of the possible situations in life that relate to this norm.

As we know, death gathers its grim reappings hourly, without asking whether its victim is entered on some list or other. No one guarantees, upon receiving a certain distribution in a slipshod manner, that in certain localities (through the fault of REU [Rayon Operations Administration], DEZ [Building Operation Board], ZhEU [Housing Operations Directorate] and the rural and village Soviets), lists will be compiled, very late or carelessly (they have to leave out someone), or just disappear (they are burned up, used as toilet paper, etc.). In this case, for the heir of the dead person, even if he has the will, his check may be regarded as lost. After all, the deceased person, like all of us today, had the RIGHT to receive the check. So would it not be more sensible, upon determining the fate of his inheritance, to be guided, not by a random factor—the success or lack of it in entering it on the list—but a Ukase of the president of the Russian Federation, in accordance with which "Each citizen of the Russian Federation has the right to obtain one privatization check with the face value of each issue."

Now about the will.

The requirement that the heir must have it so that the check can be handed to him runs counter to the law: after all, any other property (chattels or real property, cash or securities, etc.) is transferred to the heirs even if there is no will. Why, in this case, is an exception made for vouchers? I should like to, but it is difficult to, reject the notion that the authors of the instructions introduced this restriction cunningly and wittingly, knowing how seldom our people write wills, in general....

There are many categories of citizens, however, who simply cannot (even physically, not to mention all the rest) leave anything to anyone. There are insane people, children, after all. Alas, even children die.... And they have heirs—parents, and orphans have—brothers and sisters, grandfather and grandmother. With respect to them, a general principle has been violated—the right to property, just as to personal property, is inherited regardless of whether it has been written in a will.

One cannot agree with another statement of these instructions:

"CHILDREN WHO HAVE NOT REACHED THE AGE OF 16 YEARS ARE MINORS. FROM 16 YEARS OF AGE ON, THOSE HAVING AN IDENTITY CARD WILL RECEIVE THE CHECKS INDEPENDENTLY" (POINT 1.11).

Let us begin with the fact that, according to Russian legislation, majority is reached, not at the age of 16 years, but at the age of 18 years (Article 11 of the Civil Code). The Instructions, i.e., the legally binding act, has therefore "touched up" the law. But let us go on.

The independent receiving of the check by a minor actually gives him the opportunity to dispose of it independently: to sell it, give it away, invest it, lose it at cards.... Meanwhile, minors, according to our law, are capable only within limits, and do not have the right, without the consent of their parents or guardians, to complete transactions, with the exception of trivial everyday ones. Let us break away from the formal aspect, however, and turn to the reality of life.

The overwhelming majority of 16-17-year-olds are school children, students at vocational trade institutions, technical schools, etc. With the rare exception, they are all dependent on their parents. It is the parents who have the right to dispose of the property of their MINOR children. The appearance of hundreds of thousands of uncontrolled securities in the hands of juveniles makes it possible to predict the development around them of criminogenic situations, both in the form of the appearance of purely criminal (including juvenile) groups, and in the activation of various types of "business" structures of a certain direction.

Quite a lot of time will pass, and the instructions mentioned will become the basic working document for those who will be deciding directly—to issue or not to issue the check. Promptly amending the norms that do not correspond to the law will make it possible to avoid tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of conflict situations.

Ukase on Training Cadres to Operate Finance, Banking System

934D0024A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 5

[Text of ukase of the president of the Russian Federation: "On Measures to Train Cadres to Operate the Finance and Banking System"]

[Text] In order to train highly professional cadres for the finance and banking system (commercial banks, exchanges, the tax inspectorate, insurance companies, and so on) as an inalienable part of a market economy and to ensure integration into the world economy, I resolve:

1. To transform the State Finance Academy of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation into the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation.

The Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation shall bring in the Russian-American Banking Forum and foreign specialists to work out a State Program for the period 1992-95 for training cadres for finance and banking institutions of all forms of property, as well as to organize a system for retraining cadres to work in a market economy.

2. The State Tax Service of the Russian Federation, in conjunction with the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation and the Fund for

Social Guarantees for Servicemen under the Government of the Russian Federation (the *Garantiya Fund*), with the agreement of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, as well as the organs of executive power of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation and the *krais*, *oblasts*, autonomous formations, and cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, shall organize a system for training cadres for the tax service by recruiting servicemen discharged from the Armed Forces, security organs, and internal affairs organs.

3. Within a month's time, the Government of the Russian Federation shall:

- approve the status and structure of the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation; and
- decide issues related to the operation of the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation.

4. The State Committee on State Property Administration of the Russian Federation shall take on its balance sheet the complex of buildings (49-55 Leningrad Prospect, Moscow) and property transferred to the International Fund of Socioeconomic and Political Science Research (the *Gorbachev Fund*); the *Novoye Nagornoye* suburban settlement (Pushkino, Moscow Oblast); the dormitory (15-a V. Ulbricht Street, Moscow), and other property previously on the balance sheet of the Fund for Sociopolitical Research as of 1 October 1992, with their subsequent transfer according to legally established procedure to the full economic conduct of the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation.

5. The Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation shall present to the International Fund for Socioeconomic and Political Science Research (the *Gorbachev fund*), on leasing terms, under contract, offices of up to 1000 square meters in the building complex (49-55 Leningrad Prospect, Moscow) to house the Fund's operations.

6. Deem point 2 and point 3 of the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation of 23 December 1991, No. 129-rp "On the International Fund for Socioeconomic and Political Science Research (the *Gorbachev fund*)," insofar as they concern the transfer of property, to have lost their force.

7. Assign responsibility for supervising the execution of the present ukase on the Director of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

8. The present ukase shall go into force at the moment of its signing.

[Signed] *President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin*
Moscow, the Kremlin
7 October 1992
No. 1164

Ordinance Extending Exemption From Payments to State Employment Fund

935D0021A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Oct 92 p 4

[Ordinance of the president of the Russian Federation]

[Text] Extend Point 1 of the ukase of the president of the Russian Federation of 26 June 1992, No. 708 to apply to organs, military units, establishments, military training and educational establishments, enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Security of Russia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, FAPSI [Federal Government Communications and Information Agency], CVR [not further identified] of Russia, and the Main Administration for Protection of the Russian Federation, financed by the budget, exempting them in 1992 from payment of mandatory monthly deductions (insurance payments) into the state employment fund of the Russian Federation from finance allowances and other payments received by servicemen and privates and command personnel of internal security organs in connection with the performance by them of military or official duties.

[Signed] *B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation*
28 September 1992
No. 544-rp

Ordinance on Forming Agency to Implement UNCED Decisions

935D0021B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Sep 92 p 4

[Ordinance of 19 August 1992, No 1522-r Moscow]

[Text]

1. Adopt the proposal of the Ministry of Ecology of Russia concerning the creation of an interagency commission for the elaboration of proposals on the implementation of decisions of the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (June 1992).

Include in the interagency commission representatives from the Ministry of Ecology of Russia, the Ministry of Economics of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Ministry of Industry of Russia, the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia, the Ministry of Finance of Russia, the Ministry of Health of Russia, the Ministry of Science of Russia, the Ministry of Justice of Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Russia, the Ministry of Information and the Press of Russia, and of other interested ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation and the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Appoint V. I. Danilov-Danilyan, minister of ecology and natural resources of the Russian Federation as head of the commission.

2. The interagency commission to prepare and submit the following to the government of the Russian Federation:

By 1 November 1992—the draft of a national plan of action for implementation of the decisions of the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, as well as proposals on the participation of Russia in the General European Conference "Environment for Europe";

By 1 December 1992—proposals concerning approval of the Convention on Climatic Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

3. The Ministry of Ecology of Russia and the Ministry of Information and the Press of Russia to ensure availability of information for the public on results of work carried out by the UN Conference on the Environment and Development and decisions adopted by it.

[Signed] Ye. Gaidar

Educated Youth Face Limited Employment Opportunities

934A0034A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 24 Sep 92
p 6

[Interview with Yuriy Mikhaylovich Zabrodin, general director of the All-Russian Scientific-Practical Center of Occupational Orientation and Psychological Support to the Population, by Lidia Lukyanova; place and date not given: "In the Unemployment Lines With Degrees"]

[Text] As many as 25-30 million persons in Russia may find themselves without jobs by the beginning of the following year. This is a critical mass for the government, because in civilized countries, governments admit to a social crisis in the face of such a number of unemployed, and as a rule step down, being incapable of dealing promptly with this hottest of all social problems. Our situation is aggravated by another two circumstances. Ignorance of the authorities—we still do not have accurate statistics accounting for hidden forms of unemployment. Moreover, the labor exchanges and job placement offices are not registering graduates of schools of general education and vocational schools who are unable to find jobs. After their graduation ball, they find themselves in the unemployment lines with their diplomas. Why does this happen? Is there no demand for young specialists? Or have they become disenchanted with their acquired occupation by the end of their studies, and do they no longer want to work? Is there a large percentage of unemployed who studied and studied, consumed a lot of time and money, with the result that rather than acquiring young replacements, the society has been saddled with a dangerous burden associated with a mass of criminal problems? These and other questions are answered by Professor Yuriy Mikhaylovich Zabrodin, general director of

the All-Russian Scientific-Practical Center of Occupational Orientation and Psychological Support to the Population, academician, and the president of the psychologists' society of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

[Zabrodin] First let's at least look at the statistics that are available. Since 1 July of last year, 133,000 persons applied to the Moscow labor exchange, with 101,000 of them coming in connection with job placement problems. We were surprised by the unemployment structure: 24 percent white collar workers, 74 percent blue collar workers, 81 percent women and 56 percent people with a higher education. This is absolutely improbable! The diametrically opposite situation is observed in developed countries of the West: People with a higher education make up not more than 2-5 percent of the unemployed. Possessing rather high educational qualifications, they find jobs quite effectively. Let's return to our unemployed. Only 2 percent of the first-time job-seekers who applied to the exchange are graduates. It is clear, therefore, that they are not being registered. How many of them are there? We don't know exactly. Such is the real situation in the labor market.

Of course, on the backdrop of the general decline in social value of the educated person, this is a dramatic turn of events. Respect is reserved these days for "businessmen," and not for the educated. Such is the criterion of business morals. The objective of our center and of regional centers, which are working in close contact with the federal employment service, is to help solve the problem of establishing an adequate link between education and employment, inasmuch as every second person in our country changes his initial occupation.

[Lukyanova] Because of an error in choosing, or because they are looking for something better?

[Zabrodin] That's a valid question, but inasmuch as this situation was a revelation to even us, the reason is still not very clear. Be it a result of excesses of our educational system, or of rigid state planning of the relationship between occupational education and employment. In previous years, everything was preplanned—the number of graduates, their distribution, and the number of jobs, and there was a system of "serfdom" of young specialists. I don't think that low quality of their preparation is a reason for unemployment of graduates. Whatever the case, I believe that we are among the top 10 countries of the world in terms of the power of education and our cultural level. That the transitional regime is keeping us from realizing many of Russia's potentials is another matter.

The fate of a concrete individual is becoming for us the starting point in examining all social, educational and labor processes. This permits us to discover many surprising new things.

For example we had no idea that a serious problem exists between the professional school and professional labor. We felt that the objective of the professional school is to train people for professional labor. We saw some things

in the school itself that were bad, and we tried to eliminate them through several years of reorganization efforts. And labor seemed to be a rather understandable thing. A profession imposes certain requirements on the individual, and if the individual fulfills these requirements, he is an effective professional. The task was to fit the screw to the nut—that is, the problem of preparation for labor was viewed as developing certain professional capabilities to the point where they became automatic. But from the standpoint of human destiny, the picture appears entirely different: A person is born, he develops, he goes to school, and he works for certain reasons. That is, no one can explain why a person must work.

Or could it be that there was something that we did not understand about the desire to live normally, to live well? But what does it mean to "live well"? Our understanding of this is associated with our not altogether correct idea about social fairness and the value of the individual in society. For example, why do highly educated people in our country, or, let's say, persons who have undergone a long educational process—enormous amounts of the human labor of others and considerable amounts of public time are invested into them—why do these people, who by all public yardsticks are professionals of a high class, receive two to three times less than people in unskilled jobs? Like, for example, custodians working for the Metro.

[Lukyanova] But that is the way it has been all of our lives. And nothing is changing. A totally uneducated vendor in a market stall or a messenger working for a commercial enterprise receives more than an engineer or a designer in a state scientific research institute.

[Zabrodin] Have you given any thought to the reasons why wages are paid in this way? Is it because of imperfections in the system, or because of a failure to understand the structure of social production, or because of imperfections in our ideals, which have been crippled by our current social priorities? Once again I don't know the exact answer: We are only just beginning to address this issue from this standpoint. We are just beginning to discover that the principles of social fairness that seemed clear to us just 10-15 years ago are actually not all that good. Therefore the question that naturally arises is this: What is a "good life," and what is "social fairness"?

The totalitarian system controlled all spheres of the person's life, beginning with nursery school. In the beginning we used one means or another to force the individual to study, and we led him along a planned corridor to where it was believed he was needed by the state. You couldn't deviate to the right or to the left, and you couldn't fall, because you were being pulled forward, and the walls of the corridor kept you on track, and the movement seemed to be steady. But now the situation is different. The young person who finishes school is confronted by the question as to what to do next. No one tells him that he must go to a vocational-technical

school, a *tekhnikum*, or a *VUZ* [higher educational institution], and no one is forcing him. Do what you feel you need to do.

[Lukyanova] The trap of freedom of choice? I've got the freedom, but I don't know what to do with it.... Is that what you mean? Are you saying that young people are unprepared to effectively choose their destiny?

[Zabrodin] Yes. Before, the individual was shaped as a hired worker with the corresponding psychology. Nothing at work belonged to him. And so he could work poorly, break things, steal things.... However, in this case our ideology and science took it as an axiom that the individual wants to work in public production. The task was to teach him how.

But the employment problem faced by today's young people lies in something else: Does the individual want to work or not? The question is something entirely new to us. And as it turns out, young people don't want to work. On the other hand those who do are incapable of independently choosing their destiny. Consequently our problem lies in support, in occupational orientation: We must help the individual to make his personal choice.

[Lukyanova] Are there many who don't want to work in the sphere of material production?

[Zabrodin] Very many.

[Lukyanova] So how do they make their living?

[Zabrodin] They either hope to find the money somehow, or to obtain it through deception, or to take it away from someone.

Besides our usual forms of labor, completely different ones have come into being, ones which you can't even call labor.

[Lukyanova] They don't produce anything, but they have money. Could this be the root of the growing crime rate?

[Zabrodin] That's the question we are focusing on. We discovered that an enormous part of the population is outside the sphere of production, both state-supported and private. And this of course is a colossal problem. Each year the professional school graduates approximately 2-2.5 million specialists. Where do they go if they're not in the sphere of production? As I said earlier, only a few come to the labor exchange to find jobs. Where are the others, how are they employed? We don't know.

There are now very few people who possess life plans fitting into the normal social process. There is good reason why the president appealed for initiative. Without effective entrepreneurship, citizens will simply be unable to survive. But habitual socialistic dependency keeps us from understanding this: The thinking is that

someone—first the parents, and then the government, or some chief—is obligated to serve you, to give you your share, to provide for you.

[Lukyanova] This thirst is unquenchable in our country. And we can understand why: We don't need to think, because our leaders are doing the thinking.... This, I believe, was how Mayakovskiy expressed the party's ideological position some time ago. What a comfortable and carefree life this is!

[Zabrodin] Some people might find this to their liking, but this brings on a rather dangerous trend of some strength: Dependency has placed all of us in the position of a supplicant. This trend has penetrated into all levels of management: The country has become a supplicant. We wait for humanitarian assistance, we force out some benefits and money for ourselves, we do not offer anything in return, and we don't know how to solve our own problems. All we do is ask others to give us something. We ask for things beginning in adolescence, and on into our positions as directors and members of government. And we have no qualms about asking. On a statewide scale, this tendency of asking for things is dangerous. We ask for loans, but we forget that we have to pay them back. We never think that we will have to give something back in return later on—we have not yet been able to understand this because we have not yet established ourselves as independent personalities.

Our center provides psychological guidance to the individual. I think that this is a very correct idea—creating a social service which concerns itself with development of the individual in different stages of his life. It provides counseling, therapy and training, and it offers and demonstrates possibilities.

[Lukyanova] Isn't this help for those who have already understood that things aren't going the way they should for them?

[Zabrodin] The number who are coming to understand this is increasing. That's the basis of my optimism. We all understand that something in our life isn't right, regardless of how well off we are.

[Lukyanova] Does this mean that we can hope to rid ourselves of massive and dangerous dependency?

[Zabrodin] It's a difficult matter, because we have lost our understanding of the value of professionalism.

[Lukyanova] Is a distorted idea of social fairness an obstacle?

[Zabrodin] Yes, we used to define it as social equality. More accurately, as leveling. We could never climb out of poverty with this conception, because it was believed to be outrageous and shameful to be rich. Now the psychology is changing, it is no longer shameful to live a rich life, but now the rich are beginning to become objects of fierce envy. Consequently on the backdrop of what appears to be liberation of the possibilities of the individual, high social stresses are arising: Why aren't I

rich? In principle, the government is pursuing the correct line toward creating possibilities for manifesting business initiative. Albeit cautiously still, fearfully, afraid to give up its controlling functions.

[Lukyanova] What should we define as social fairness? Establishment of equal possibilities at the start line?

[Zabrodin] Why should the possibilities be equal? Wouldn't that be a utopia once again? We've never studied these questions: Instead, we assumed that "equal" means absolutely the same.

[Lukyanova] Private ownership is believed to be an even greater panacea. We have no doubts at all that it will appear on a mass scale, and that we will have a good, sated life. It's as if we're waiting for manna from heaven. And the press is already trying to arouse our respect for it. Like in the West, as a sacred and inviolable thing.

[Zabrodin] What is nurtured together with mother's milk in the West is respect not for property but for labor that creates private property. We on the other hand have always thought that property is the key. But what is valuable is not property per se but the labor that produced it, and it is what belongs to the individual.

[Lukyanova] Labor? But in our country we nurtured ours on the belief that labor is honorable!

[Zabrodin] That was one of the ideological abstractions. But whatever I created with my labor never belonged to me. Now the government intends to once again distribute part of state property through vouchers, transforming it into private property. But we still have no respect for labor. How can there be any respect for property? Look at what's happening in the streets. There is no respect for property, neither private nor state! And there will never be any, because there is no respect for labor. In the West, the smallest child knows from the earliest age how much you have to work to earn a dollar, rather than what you can buy for it. It's an entirely different position! There, value is placed on what one has created. If it is something that no one needs, then such labor is useless, and how much was invested into it is unimportant. We on the other hand mistakenly place value on things, on how much they cost in the world market. Instead, we need to value labor: A product should be valued by its labor, and not by money. Let me note that the social advantage of professionalism rests on the principle of working less to put out a better product. Recall that this is precisely what the Bolsheviks also did: They expropriated the expropriators. We cannot abandon the old models, you can't turn off the brain in a single second.

[Lukyanova] Isn't it obvious, then, that the minds of both the worker and the member of government are cluttered by these stereotypes? Could this be why the reforms aren't making headway?

[Zabrodin] How could things be otherwise, given the impossibility of finding a new psychology to replace the

old one? It is because of the old psychology that we assume that all we need to do is introduce private property ownership, and the wheels will start turning on their own. The conception that excludes the individual from the economy is absolutely wrong. I am referring to our former "Marxist"—if you will excuse my use of that term—notion that all we need to do is change the living conditions, and human psychology will change at once. And if we once again plant some abstract ideal, and replace the radiant summits of communism by the radiant summits of universal well-being, so that all will be healthy, sated and clothed, we will once again get nowhere until we come to understand what we have to do to reach these ideals. This takes us into the realm of professionalism, technology, living conditions and relations between people. In the meantime the link between labor and the produced product is broken. In my opinion this is a psychologically more important thing.

[Lukyanova] Could this be the source of all of our failures?

[Zabrodin] I think so. If we want to work only in order to earn as much as possible, then we have the wrong conception of life. In the short run it will solve a few things, and it might even be positive in the first stage of development, but beyond that, it will not have anything to offer. Because it always makes the individual think only of himself, and it will inevitably cause him to collide with the interests of other people. Which is what we are observing.

Social Protection Minister Addresses Pensioners' Concerns

934A0034B Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 33,
Sep 92 pp 1-3

[Interview with Russian Minister of Social Protection of the Population Ella Aleksandrovna Pamfilova by S. Vinogradova; place and date not given: "It's Not Their Fault That the Country Has Found Itself in This Position"]

[Text] Governments come and go. But the state remains, and whatever today's circumstances, it must fulfill its obligations before the senior generation, which labored for the good of the state and which built a foundation for younger generations through its labor. How are relations between pensioners and the state developing today? This was the subject of an interview with Russian Minister of Social Protection of the Population Ella Pamfilova.

[Vinogradova] Ella Aleksandrovna, in contrast to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, which interviewed you recently about the power of the rich and their privileges, VETERAN would like to discuss the poor with you. You are the minister of social protection. From whom will you be protecting the elderly?

[Pamfilova] Not from whom, but from what. From misfortunes, from poverty. But the thing that is most important is, well, let me put it this way: Many are now

accusing the government that it led the country to misfortune, to poverty. But this is demagoguery. Recall the way in which this government came into power last year, recall the situation and the economy. The avalanche had already begun. And it took courage to get a handle on the situation and implement the reforms. Naturally it's been difficult, since reform implies a decrease in the overall standard of living—that is, that things will be very difficult for all of us. And I think it's going to be an awfully long time before life gets back to normal, and even so, only on the condition that we all roll up our sleeves and work the way we should. Only then will we be able to drag Russia back up. But there are people to whom we are all indebted. It's not their fault that the country has found itself in this position. Our pensioners worked honestly, and I repeat, it's not their fault that our economy was always an absurdity, that it was organized upside-down, and that all of our wealth drifted away into some black hole somewhere.

[Vinogradova] But the transition to a market economy didn't "get moving," as Gorbachev liked to put it, spontaneously; this process is directed by the government team of which you are a part. Do you agree in all things with the head of the cabinet? Are there issues in regard to which the minister of social protection remains in opposition to the decisions being adopted, ones which, as you noted, affect the overall standard of living?

[Pamfilova] It is naturally impossible to always agree with everything that is happening.

[Vinogradova] But specifically, what have you tried to fight for, both successfully and unsuccessfully?

[Pamfilova] The government was placed in a situation in which there was no more time left, in which the situation itself forced particular actions. The task of the social block was to do as much as possible to satisfy social needs without doing harm to the economic reform, without hindering financial stabilization, and without eliciting inflation and hyperinflation. I don't think that we utilized our possibilities fully in this area. We were not always able to defend what we felt to be necessary.

[Vinogradova] Ella Aleksandrovna, 43 percent of pensioners are receiving minimum pensions. Today that means 900 plus 420, for a total of 1,320 rubles. In the meantime the subsistence minimum is, in different territories, from R2,500 to R3,000, R4,000, R5,000 and more. Is there some sort of mechanism in the ministry by which these changes can be tracked?

[Pamfilova] This has always been the job of the Ministry of Labor. But we have now reached the conclusion that we cannot stand idly by in the face of these problems, we need to tackle them, in order that we could substantiate our claims, or more accurately, the claims of our wards upon financial organs. But if we consider that over 50 percent of the population—80 percent to be more exact—is below the poverty line, we have to base ourselves not on what we should do, but on what is within

our means. Paradoxical as it may seem, there are families that have to live to some extent off of pensioners.

[Vinogradova] We of course do not receive any letters to that effect, but on the other hand the question that is invariably asked in letters from readers is this: "Why are they stealing from us, and belittling us?" And in fact, the savings of pensioners were devalued after liberalization, prices are outrageous and constantly rising, and payments of pensions are being delayed, such that by the time a person receives his pension it has already lost part of its purchasing power.

[Pamfilova] Yes, that's terrible. Payments are behind sometimes 2 and even 3 months. I have a mountain of letters and telegrams from different places on my desk. Here's one from Krasnodar Kray for example: "Tell me, how is a widowed pensioner to live if she hasn't received her pension for 3 months?"

[Vinogradova] Pensioners in Karelia besieged some collectors at a store and wouldn't let them go until money for pensions was taken to the post office. However, the cash crisis did not arise spontaneously. Most economists agree that when the government increased prices, it should have foreseen that more banknotes would be required. Does this mean that this is a mistake of the government?

[Pamfilova] It was the government that asked the Supreme Soviet to print large banknotes, but this proposal was rejected by the will of our respected speaker Khasbulatov. Unfortunately, political ambitions sometimes overshadow common sense in our country.

[Vinogradova] In what way is the Ministry of Social Protection preparing for the new jump in prices? How will it protect the poor?

[Pamfilova] Our organs of social support are simply exhausted by the pension recomputations. Previously awarded pensions had to be recomputed six times as a result of the several increases in minimum wages and pensions and the granting of compensation. They are now being recomputed for the seventh time in connection with payment of R420 compensation to pensioners. In the meantime only 5-7 percent of the need for modern equipment is satisfied. Social support institutions have always been financed on the basis of the remainder principle. A decree supporting our organs and furnishing them with computer equipment is now being drafted. We are working hard to teach people to work at a modern level. This is our biggest problem. As far as pensioners are concerned, we intend to raise minimum wages, and minimum pensions correspondingly, and beginning in October, pensions will be indexed on a quarterly basis. If inflation is over 6 percent on the basis of a quarter's results, pensions will be increased.

[Vinogradova] Ella Aleksandrovna, now a few questions from our mail. The government continues to say nothing about indexing savings. In his time, Pavlov gave us a laughable 40 percent in investment compensation at the

same time that prices doubled. Under Gaydar, prices, especially on basic necessities, increased by 20-30 times, while the purchasing power of money put away for a rainy day decreased correspondingly. The average savings of pensioners in, for example, cities and towns of Moscow Oblast are only enough to pay for a fourth of a coffin.

[Pamfilova] It's not all that simple. At present there are no possibilities for indexing savings. We went to the Supreme Soviet with a proposal to raise burial assistance at least to four times the minimum wage. The Supreme Soviet adopted a figure that was three times the minimum. Right now that's R2,700. That's not much, of course. We will submit new proposals, and my hope is that they will be supported.

[Vinogradova] The decline in the standard of living, the stress associated with dismantling of the system of values and ideals—all of this is reflecting upon the elderly in not the most favorable way. Is it permissible, is it humane to deprive them in such a situation even of free health care? Preparations are being made for a transition to insured health care, and it is being suggested more and more often that only emergency care will remain free of charge.

[Pamfilova] The situation that has evolved in public health is currently being analyzed. But without a doubt, health care continues to be one of the spheres in which social guarantees must be preserved. Four priority spheres have been singled out—public health, education, housing, and issues associated with privatization.

[Vinogradova] One more question in this connection. The following figures were given at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies: R1.8 billion were allocated for all public health in Russia, and 3 billion were allocated for the administrative machinery. Can the society allow such luxury at this time? Why for example has the size of the staff of your ministry grown, and why did you oppose the proposal to merge the Ministry of Social Protection with the Ministry of Labor?

[Pamfilova] Well, destroying something is the easiest thing to do. I agree that the social services need to be reformed, but this must be done not by mechanical merger but on the basis of a deeply pondered conception of social protection—that is, the structure must be tailored to the tasks that face it today. And as far as the number of associates is concerned, the ministry is undermanned: According to the table of organization there should be 500 persons, but at the moment we have 112 vacancies. We can't seem to attract specialists. Our functions have grown considerably, but the former privileges are no longer available.

[Vinogradova] But isn't the certainty that a state institution will not go bankrupt, will not close its doors, a privilege these days? Plus the rather high wages. By the way, what are the dynamics of the growth in average wages of an industrial worker and of managers at the highest level? Much is now being said about the wage

"multiple"—a minimum factor of 21 for the president, and a factor of 14 for a minister.

[Pamfilova] The Supreme Soviet raised the president's wages quite recently, but the deputies forgot about it. The government is fundamentally opposed to wages based on multiples. While such a system was approved by the Supreme Soviet, the government does not agree with it.

[Vinogradova] Ella Aleksandrovna, as long as you have touched upon the topic of privileges, what can you say about construction of the dachas for Yeltsin and Burbulis which, according to a report in one of the newspapers, are being erected by the Seventh Directorate of the former KGB in the vicinity of Gorki-10 and Molokovo?

[Pamfilova] I don't know anything about this. But in general, at a meeting of the government I did raise the issue of ensuring full glasnost. There should be some sort of control mechanism.

[Vinogradova] People are of course keenly interested in the privileges that go together with the power of the rich, all the more so because literally everyone is faced by this simple question today: How am I going to make it through tomorrow? And certainly all pensioners would like to know, straight from the source as they say, what the Ministry of Social Protection has been able to do to improve their situation.

[Pamfilova] In this extraordinary time, in this period of crisis, support must reach the most needy. I already mentioned the emergency social assistance services. According to data for the first half of the year they provided emergency assistance to over 800,000 persons. Associates of 7,000 departments providing home care regularly service 650,000 elderly people living alone. Around 600,000 have taken advantage of free lunches. Various privileges have been established for poor pensioners in many oblasts and krais, and they are provided with clothing and footwear. The Republic Fund for Social Support to the Population established in February allocated assets totaling R2.5 billion: 206.9 million for social assistance to disabled children, 257.6 million for orphaned children, 45 million for children who survived Chernobyl, 293.8 million for large families, and R496.8 million for pensioners living alone. A total of R483.2 million have been allocated for federal-regional programs of social protection to the population, which include organizing dining halls providing free meals and homeless shelters, for establishing a network of emergency social assistance services and for strengthening the material base of the subsidiary farms of boarding houses. And in the future we will develop physical assistance—food products and free meals.

[Vinogradova] But it is the food situation that is very alarming today: In comparison with June of last year, this June meat and milk production were 42 and 52.4 percent lower. Milk sales in the trade network decreased in connection with the increase in milk prices and decrease in the population's solvency. Peasants are

unable to sell bread to the state at the price offered by the government without suffering a loss. What is your position in this conflict, and do you believe that famine may be its consequence? The generation we are talking about survived at least three famines—in childhood in 1933, during the war, and after the war in 1946.

[Pamfilova] I don't think so. Not everyone is a saboteur, after all. A compromise will necessarily be found. Subsidies have been allocated on bread and milk in many oblasts. Furthermore, our old people will not allow themselves to yield to despair. According to sociologists they include a high percentage of people supporting the reform. The young, those who are panicking, should be ashamed before them.

[Vinogradova] Ella Aleksandrovna, you said in the interview with KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA that while you can't give bread, you are prepared to give the truth, that with it, it is easier to live. What kind of truth, and will it make life easier for the elderly?

[Pamfilova] We have to be honest, we must not be deceptive in anything. It's not my fault that the country has been plundered. A financial collapse is the most terrifying kind. Sacrifices have to be made, and some things have to be balanced against others. But once again let me repeat that the interests of the older generation will not be sacrificed. These people worked honestly, and they are not to blame for anything. The draft of the Law on Veterans is presently being written. A government commission in which all of these problems are being closely scrutinized is operating in connection with The Year of the Elderly. In short, everything possible is being done to surmount today's complex situation.

[Vinogradova] Thank you for the interview.

Fitur Protests Klochkov's Exclusion From TV Debate

934A0034C Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 6 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Golyayev: "Scandal in Ostankino and Its Echo"]

[Text] According to a *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* report, at the insistence of State Secretary G. Burbulis the Ostankino Television Broadcasting Company excluded FNPR [Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia] Council Chairman N. Klochkov from a broadcast devoted to social partnership. Good manners is not something they have learned here, and this is distressing. What recourse is there? Executives of sector trade union committees sent a letter to Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, in which they said that this incident was viewed as an insult to the trade unions, which is confirmed by dozens of telegrams from labor collectives. Moreover this was an attempt to curtail freedom of speech, and an unconcealed desire to subjugate Russia's

largest trade union center, to transform it into a "servant" and to simultaneously gather together more "convenient" partners.

The event in Ostankino raises the issue of preserving the partnership between the trade unions and government structures, the statement emphasizes.

Potato Crop Impact on Food Situation Examined

Answer to Reader's Question on Procurement, Availability

934A0024A Moscow *LESNAYA GAZETA* in Russian
19 Sep 92 p 3

[Editorial reply to a reader's question, under the "Press Service: Question-Answer" rubric: "Potatoes—The Second Bread"]

[Text] How is the situation with the potato harvest in Russia shaping up this year? I ask this pertinent question because, in this difficult time of transition to the market, we must not forget the popular wisdom: Bread is the head of everything (today it is expensive), but potatoes are the second bread. And in the stores today, they are more expensive than bread. In the state stores in Moscow, they go for 19 rubles [R] and more per kilogram. And for that you will get a package that is half rotten.

[Signed] P. Ilin
Moscow

This is what we were told at the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs:

Yes, the situation in the potato fields of the Russian Federation this year has shaped up to be not so favorable as to guarantee completely a constant supply to the residents of Russia's cities. The hot months of July and August brought losses to the harvest. In some regions, the potatoes were burned; in others they did not take on weight, and the harvest was small. But still, even in such a situation, there is no reason for despair. Now, when a massive harvest effort has been deployed in the gathering in of the potato crop, it must be carried out without losses, as happened in recent years, and then there will be sufficient quantities of the "second bread" both for food and for the seed fund. Potato stocks in that case will be not a bit less than last year. Such certainty on the part of the ministry specialists is understandable: The area under cultivation of this crop throughout Russia, in all categories of farms, including private farms, garden plots, and kitchen gardens, amounted to 200,000 hectares more than last year.

So Russians will not be left without potatoes this year. And if prices even in the state stores during the period of harvesting do not fall below R20, then our market relations are to blame, which in actuality are far from the market. Judge for yourself: Combines for the harvesting of potatoes costs up to a million apiece (and, by the way, there are not enough of them). In order to avoid financial

ruin, the farms raise the price of their produce. Add to that delivery and merchant costs, and you come up with hair-raising prices.

Potato Procurement, Price Problems

934A0024B Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian
6 Oct 92 p 1

[Series of short articles by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondents A. Glazkov, V. Shulgin, and V. Legankov: "Sure, We All Respect the Potato... If You Believe the Song by V. Vysotskiy. But, As Our Correspondents Testify, You Cannot Fill Up on Songs"]

[Text]

Smolensk—Bryansk—Kaluga Oblasts

On an ordinary Saturday in Krestyanskiy Market in Smolensk, potatoes were selling for R15 per kilogram, or for R100 a pailful. But customers wishing to buy at such prices were few. And that is completely understandable: This year, thousands of city dwellers, having received plots of land, guaranteed themselves the precious foodstuff. And the peasant kitchen gardens, likewise, did not go empty. The increase in potatoes in private farms was also felt in the rayon unions of consumers societies. More than 1,000 tonnes of them have been procured and shipped. The harvest is on in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, sailors of the Northern Fleet have come there to help, knowing that now one can place one's hope only in oneself, and not in the government supply system.

As for neighboring Bryansk Oblast, it has already sent the northerners a double quota of early potatoes. Three thousand tonnes went from Novozybkovskiy Rayon alone, including 1,570 tonnes from Norilsk. So far, no other customers are visible, and more than 8,000 tonnes of late varieties of tubers lie like a dead weight. Such is also the situation in other rayons.

One of the main consumers of the Bryansk tuber has always been Moscow. But the "emissaries" from the capital are not hurrying to Bryansk.

The peasants are accused of supposedly holding back stores of potatoes and demanding high prices. But the price is dictated by the circumstances. The latest price hike of the energy sources also tells negatively on the village. Also, the very harvest of the "second bread" is relatively small. Although there are kolkhozes and sovkhozes that get 150-200 quintals of tubers from a hectare. There again, Dutch technology came to the rescue.

All in all, what is the situation with the harvest? The drought, undoubtedly, reduced it by a factor of two, and in some places by a factor of three. A. Glukhov, the head of the selection and primary seed growing laboratory of the potato raising science and production association of Kaluga Oblast, notes that the quantity of budding tubers per shrub has been twice as small as in ordinary years, even at the Belousovskoye experimental-production

farm, the early and middle-early varieties yielded only 80-100 quintals. The potato Bryansk Oblast is also at the level of 100 quintals.

The next season of field work also dictates economic tactics. Indeed, it is still necessary to lay in the seeds and to keep them until spring. The high air temperature (even in the root zone, it reached 18-24 degrees Celsius) promoted the shortening of the natural dormancy of the tuber. Therefore, the period of cooling of the potato before the winter planting should be no more than 20-25 days.

Vologodsk Oblast

Last spring our newspaper stated that the townspeople of Vologodchina, for the first time in local agricultural history, did not see potatoes in the stores. Today, specialized potato farms charge up to half a hundred rubles for a kilogram of the tuber. Government purveyors shy away from such prices and send their messengers to other regions to purchase the "second bread." In their turn, the leaders of the local agriculture administration are not only not alarmed about the situation that has developed, but they are indignant that commerce refuses the local produce. And it poses the question in the form of an ultimatum.

Since that is the way it is, we are not going to plant potatoes at all, pouted, for example, administration specialists at one of the latest sessions of the harvesting headquarters

In this situation, I, a correspondent for a newspaper for agrarians, was compelled to cross over from the position of the farmers into the trenches of the government purveyors. If in the production of milk and meat there really are many serious obstacles from the government side, no one is hindering the cultivation of the highly remunerative potato: The seed tubers are privately owned, the land is privately owned, and there is as much fertilizer to be found on the cattle farms as one might desire. And it is impossible even to count the number of master field team leaders on the local kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

The main reason for the desolation of this field lies in the fact that the once nearly model system of potato growing has fallen apart. Ask today who it is that takes care of the initial seed production; who takes care of reproduction and commodity plantings, who keeps track of the plan for strain renovation. In answer you will get inarticulate generalizations, and no more. In the numerous agrarian transformations "for the improvement of the leadership of the agro-industrial complex," the potato was completely forgotten.

Belarus

Twenty-five rubles per kilogram—such is today's market price standard for the Belarusian potato. The kolkhozes do not want even to talk about less than R15. And since the merchants are in no hurry to loosen their purse

strings, the farms are in no rush to send consignments of the harvest to the vegetable bases.

And there is not much in particular to transport. Half of the oblasts do not dig up an average of 100 quintals. Only Brest Oblast, where the drained peat bogs, even in this unprecedentedly arid year, retained their moisture, came out with a republic "record" of 131 quintals per hectare.

So we cannot talk today about the traditional 1.5 million-2 million tonnes of state procurements and hundreds of thousands of tonnes in deliveries of Belarusian potatoes to Russia, particularly to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Northern Fleet. As it is, Minsk is on a hunger ration. For half a month, the rate of potato procurements for the city have turned out to be four to five times worse than last year's. At the end of September, Brest Oblast supplied all consumers with only one-fifth of what had been envisioned by agreement; Gomel Oblast and Grodno Oblast—one-eighth to one-tenth. And the harvest is everywhere drawing to a close.

Russian Decree on Grain Utilization

92SD0749A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 4

[Decree No 717 dated 16 September 1992 of the Government of the Russian Federation on the Utilization of Grain of the 1992 Harvest by Ye. Gaydar]

[Text] In execution of the Ukase No 916 dated 24 August 1992 of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To establish for 1992:

the volumes of delivery (shipment) to the federal fund of grain in the amount of 9.5 million tonnes, including high-grade and hybrid seeds of grain and pulse crops, among them corn, in the volume of 1.1 million tonnes with distribution throughout republics forming part of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, and autonomous formations according to appendix No 1.

The delivery (shipment) of grain to the federal fund is to be carried out from the grain purchased from kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agrofirms, agrocombines, peasant (private) farms, and other agricultural enterprises against its obligatory deliveries determined by the Regulation No 65-r dated 14 January 1992 of the Government of the Russian Federation;

the volumes of allocation of grain from the federal fund to republics forming part of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, and autonomous formations according to appendix No 2.

2. Bodies of executive power of republics forming part of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, and autonomous formations must make changes in the plans for grain deliveries to state resources for 1992, which in accordance with the Regulation No 65-r dated 14 January 1992 of the Government of the Russian Federation are

assigned to farms, at the base of which peasant (private) subsidiary farms of industrial enterprises and organizations, have been established.
farms and horticultural associations, as well as

Volumes of Delivery (Shipment) in 1992 to the Federal Fund of Grain and High-Grade and Hybrid Seeds of Grain and Pulse Crops, Including Corn, With Distribution Throughout Republics Forming Part of the Russian Federation, Krays, Oblasts, and Autonomous Formations (thous. tonnes)

	Total Grain	Including Seeds		
		of winter crops	of spring crops (with-out corn)	of corn
Orel Oblast	360	2	35	
Ryazan Oblast	100		5	
Tula Oblast	10		10	
Chuvash Republic	10		10	
Kirov Oblast	5	5		
Belgorod Oblast	250		50	
Voronezh Oblast	300		30	
Kursk Oblast	250		50	
Tambov Oblast	320		50	
Kalmykia Republic	50			
Tatarstan Republic	10		10	
Volgograd Oblast	900		15	
Penza Oblast	33	3	30	
Samara Oblast	20		20	
Saratov Oblast	600	2	10	
Ulyanovsk Oblast	150	2	30	
Adygea Republic	5			5
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	36			36
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	2			2
North Ossetian SSR	31			31
Krasnodar Kray	1600	4	4	125
Stavropol Kray	550	4		20
Rostov Oblast	1160		20	21
Bashkortostan Republic	53	3	50	
Kurgan Oblast	100		20	
Orenburg Oblast	1500	4	80	
Chelyabinsk Oblast	20		20	
Altay Kray	900	2	100	
Novosibirsk Oblast	52	2	50	
Omsk Oblast	52	2	50	
Krasnoyarsk Kray	30		30	
Amur Oblast	5		5	

Volumes of Allocation of Grain From the Federal Fund to Republics Forming Part of the Russian Federation, Krays, Oblasts, and Autonomous Formations (thous. tonnes)

Karelia Republic	230	North Ossetian SSR	170
Komi Republic	320	Bashkortostan Republic	53
Arkhangelsk Oblast	400	Udmurt Republic	300
Vologda Oblast	500	Perm Oblast	700
Murmansk Oblast	270	Sverdlovsk Oblast	1200
City of St. Petersburg	700	Chelyabinsk Oblast	200
Leningrad Oblast	1000	Gorno-Altay Republic	100
Novgorod Oblast	270		
Pskov Oblast	320	Kemerovo Oblast	700
Bryansk Oblast	200	Novosibirsk Oblast	52
Vladimir Oblast	400	Tomsk Oblast	200
Ivanovo Oblast	400	Tyumen Oblast	300
Kaluga Oblast	245	Buryat Republic	320
Kostroma Oblast	300	Tuva Republic	60
City of Moscow	1400	Khakassia Republic	150
Moscow Oblast	2100	Krasnoyarsk Kray	300
Smolensk Oblast	380	Irkutsk Oblast	340
Tver Oblast	500	Chita Oblast	200
Yaroslavl Oblast	400	Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	340
Mani El Republic	190		
Chuvash Republic	200	Maritime Kray	500
Kirov Oblast	300	Khabarovsk Kray	400
Nizhegorod Oblast	800	Jewish Autonomous Oblast	100
Tatarstan Republic	10		
Astrakhan Oblast	200	Amur Oblast	130
Dagestan Republic	350	Kamchatka Oblast	180
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	36	Magadan Oblast	185
Sakhalin Oblast	800		
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	100	Kaliningrad Oblast	300

Agricultural Leaders Air Problems in Open Letters

Lapshin, Others' Letter to Yeltsin

924A2048A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
29 Sep 92 p 1

[Open Letter to B. N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, from M. I. Lapshin, chairman of the parliamentary fraction the Agrarian Union of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, chairman of the Coordinating Council of Collective Actions by Workers of the Agro-Industrial Complex, A. Ye. Vorontsov, chairman of the Russian Council of Kolkhozes and Other Management Forms, A. D. Mikhaylov, executive secretary of the Agrarian Union of Russia, and A. S. Davydov, chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of APK [Agro-Industrial Complex] Workers of the Russian Federation]

[Text] Dear President!

The agro-industrial complex is the most important component of Russia's economy. A total of 40 percent of the national income is created in this economic sector and more than 70 percent of the consumer market is formed from foodstuffs and goods produced from agricultural raw materials. The agrarian sphere touches on the interests of every person and determines to a decisive degree the economic potential and political stability in the country.

The social and economic situation in society is determined by the population's totally unsatisfactory provision with foodstuffs.

The difficulties and problems in the agrarian sector are the results of numerous errors committed over a period of many years in all spheres of production, the infrastructure, and living conditions in rural areas.

On 8 June 1990 Russia's First Congress of People's Deputies adopted the decree "On the Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation" signed by you. In execution of this decision the Second (Extraordinary) Congress of People's Deputies, having thoroughly discussed the measures introduced by the government, adopted the decree "On the Program for the Revival of Russian Rural Areas and Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex," which was also signed by you.

The congress formulated the Program for the Development of Rural Areas and legalized three key directions in radical transformations in the agrarian sector: economic, social, and land directions. At the same time, the mutual coordination and conditionality of these directions in agrarian transformations in rural areas, which made it possible to increase food production, were stressed.

The people supported the program adopted by the congress. At that time rural workers pinned big hopes on its realization. However, the results of the past period make it possible to draw a conclusion on the actual revision and reexamination by the government of the program for reforms in rural areas adopted by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

Instead of an overall approach to the solution of economic, social, land, organizational, and other problems envisaged by the program, as well as strong financial support for the APK on the part of the state (15 percent of the national income for the APK), and a gradual formation—through reforms, not through a revolutionary breakdown—of a multistructured economy in the interest and with the active participation of peasants, there is a destruction of the productive forces that have been created, a disruption in the normal course of and an avalanche-like decline in production, an increase in social tension, and resistance to reform in localities, instead of its active support. In essence, a nonoverall, one-sided approach to the implementation of reforms during shock periods and inefficient forms of their implementation have emerged—forms aimed primarily at organizational and structural changes without due regard for the negative consequences for Russia's food supply.

Programs for housing and cultural-domestic construction in rural areas have been disrupted. The planned volumes of construction of gas supply, telephone, electrification, and water supply facilities are not being fulfilled. Land fertility is dropping, but work has been stopped.

The government's investment, tax, price, and credit policy leads to an economic impoverishment of rural areas and a reduction in the volumes of production of agricultural products.

The adopted formula for market construction (demonopolization, destatization, and privatization of the right of physical possession, not of the right of use) leads to the

appearance in Russia of an economy with a fundamentally different structure than that characteristic for developed countries. In fact, the economic space is divided into small production facilities, in which the economic structure of underdeveloped countries is reproduced.

If to briefly sum up the course of transformations, it is possible to stress with good reason that in its present form agrarian reform has failed. The results of the beginning of agrarian transformations are deplorable—this must be stated honestly. If such results also continue subsequently, the agricultural sector will be threatened with a complete breakdown and a collapse.

In a few months prices of food products have jumped up dozenfold. Entire sections and groups of the population have been thrown below the poverty line. As compared with last year, people have begun to consume almost one-fourth less dairy products and 15 percent less meat and fish products. The share of fats in the total structure of the diet is approaching a critical level—30 percent, below which it is not allowed to drop according to medical norms.

The unsatisfactory situation with foodstuffs is the most sensitive factor feeding social tension and its build-up.

For the purpose of a fundamental improvement in the existing explosive situation in the country, we propose:

1. To hold a meeting at your office with representatives of the country's entire agro-industrial complex. (Such proposals were previously made to you).
2. To immediately prepare and hold a special government meeting with our participation in order to examine the accumulated economic and social problems and to adopt decisions ensuring an increase in the production of agricultural products. Such proposals were sent to Ye. T. Gaydar on 27 August 1992, but have not been carried out to this day.

The agrarian sector is in the most difficult crisis situation. The time has come for the president to display the necessary courage, to make a sober evaluation of existing conditions, and to show honesty and devotion to the people who elected you.

Grinev Letter to Yeltsin, Khasbulatov

924A2048B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
29 Sep 92 p 1

[Letter to B. N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, and to R. I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, from Ye. Grinev, president of Russia's Agro-Industrial Union]

[Text] Dear Boris Nikolayevich and Ruslan Imranovich!

The appeal to you is dictated by the intention to consolidate government and nongovernment organizations and all the progressive forces of society who sincerely want a

successful development of radical reforms for the good of the Russian people and the state.

The state of affairs in the agro-industrial sector of the economy is not unique—it is a reflection of the general state of the Russian economy. However, precisely in a halt in the development of negative processes in the agro-industrial complex we see one of the key factors in the turning point in the crisis situation and in the turn to a positive development of reform in the entire economy.

The volume of the letter does not enable me to set forth the totality of our proposals, which, in our opinion, make it possible to change the situation for the better. Therefore, only some considerations, which can serve as the basis for the consolidation of true supporters of reform, are cited.

The strategy of reforms (transition from the totalitarian pseudoeconomy to the market economy, replacement of vertical administrative command structures with an economic system and primarily horizontal structures, change of 100 percent of the state property into private, joint-stock, and collective-share property, leaving state property only in necessary cases, replacement of state monopoly with competition among independent producers, transition to international legal norms and from a closed to an open society with the widest inclusion in the world market and in all the aspects of international activity and development, and change in the primacy of goals from the state to man)—such a strategy is not only noble, but has also been confirmed by the experience of developed countries. At the same time, such a strategy cannot fail to lean on an all-around democratization of society. However, the democratization of society means not only the possibility for an independent and open discussion of the processes occurring in it, but primarily the possibility for a direct participation and effect of productive forces on the process of state management. Yet precisely this key aspect of society's true democratization has not been realized today. And this leads to the fact that the chosen tactics and technology of implementation of reforms are seriously out of touch with reality.

Actively introducing market structures and creating conditions for a mass appearance of independent market producers, including in the person of former state production structures, the government does not take the necessary steps to build a civilized mechanism of interaction with self-management structures established by the producers themselves. This forms a gap between executive power in the person of the government and superministries established by it and productive forces. Without this mechanism ministries, no matter how they restructure and increase their apparatus, which is bulky as it is, will not be able to give real support to producers.

In the structure of presidential power and the government there are numerous commissions, councils, and other institutions with recommendatory functions, which are called upon to reflect the opinion of society

and its productive forces. In fact, however, these structures are either completely detached from real producers, or reflect a very narrow sphere of interests. Moreover, the participation of these structures in management is of a very discrete and nonoverall nature. As a result, only a semblance of democratization of management is created.

Without going into the details of the implemented price, tax, investment, credit and financial, preferential, and other directions in economic policy, it should be stated that, owing to the lack of the above-mentioned mechanism, the specific nature and real state of the agro-industrial complex are extremely poorly taken into account during the implementation of the enumerated directions in the economic policy of the state. There is a big delay in the allocation of investments and subsidies to the agro-industrial complex and their volume is totally insufficient. There was the same delay in the adoption of decisions on lowering the rates of the tax and interest on credit. At the same time, the entire infrastructure of the agro-industrial complex was totally ignored.

On the whole, government measures are constantly late and can only temporarily and partially suppress, but not change, negative processes in the agro-industrial sector of the economy. As a result, the drop in production volumes and, especially, the development of the infrastructure have reached a critical point and programs for production and housing construction, gas and electricity supply, land reclamation, social development of rural areas, road construction, and a number of other programs are being curtailed. Producing more than one-half of the world volume of fertilizers, we apply seven- to tenfold less per hectare than developed countries. Under these conditions reform in the agro-industrial complex will simply not be able to realize itself. And it is not a matter of a low or high activity of the Ministry of Agriculture—the ministry is forced to act within the framework of government policy. The point is that levers of effect and the influence of independent producers through their self-management structures should determine to a significant degree the economic policy of the state and then it will begin not only to really meet producers' needs, but will be carried out in an interested and efficient manner. An objection can be raised that the government simply does not have the necessary funds and capabilities. However, the trouble lies not in this, but in the fact that existing funds and capabilities are not utilized promptly and efficiently. There are numerous examples of this. Advocating the demonopolization and independence of producers, the government has assigned to some ministries and committees monopoly functions, which fetter foreign economic activity and the choice of the legal status and forms of ownership and management on the part of producers. All this has been done under the banner of elimination of violations, protection of state interests, and fight against monopolism. However, the overwhelming majority of violations have been carried out or inspired (under conditions of the monopolization of functions this will assume even bigger dimensions) by

officials of ministries and departments, the interests of which by no means always coincide with state interests. The fight against monopolism and privatization often are carried out according to a formal scheme, without due regard for the specific nature and structure of production and technological and cooperative ties. It is advisable to transfer all these matters to the authority of producers' self-management structures under the control of appropriate ministries and departments.

It should be added that the Agro-Industrial Union uniting the collectives of enterprises and organizations in the infrastructure of the agro-industrial complex with more than 9 million workers concentrated a powerful intellectual and scientific production potential capable of making a significant contribution to the economic policy of the state in the agro-industrial sphere.

One can agree or disagree with the statements by A. I. Volskiy, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, but, undoubtedly, he is right in one thing: Nongovernment structures cannot be ignored—one must cooperate with them.

In particular, a competent mechanism of interaction would make it possible—in a short time on a contractual basis—to attain a slowdown in the rates of rise in prices and, consequently, inflation, to improve the mutual provision of industry and agriculture with raw materials, equipment, foodstuffs, and consumer goods, and to solve a number of other important problems. The formation of such a mechanism will make it possible to establish in practice a strong executive power, which takes into account both the specific nature of producers and the territorial and social aspects of statewide economic policy.

On the basis of the above-stated we ask the president and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet to discuss at a joint conference with our participation the package of urgent measures to improve economic policy in the agro-industrial complex and, primarily, the proposals on an immediate formation of a mechanism of constant interaction of the government, the Supreme Soviet, and all-Russian nongovernment structures, which in the very near future will make it possible to lower tension and to develop and carry out a joint policy of reforms.

Appealing to you, we count on your goodwill, desire for cooperation, and understanding of the fact that the consolidation of efforts will make it possible to increase the realistic nature of the tactics of economic policy, greatly expand the number of its advocates, and significantly accelerate the movement of productive forces along the path of reforms.

In the name and on behalf of the collectives of Russia's Agro-Industrial Union,

[Signed] Ye. Grinev, president of Russia's Agro-Industrial Union

Availability of Land for Multi-Child Families

924A2034B Moscow *LESNAYA GAZETA* in Russian
5 Sep 92 p 3

[Reader's letter and response under rubric "Press-Service: Question-Answer": "Land for Multi-Child Families"]

[Text] Recently, an ukase went into effect "On Measures for the Social Support of Multi-Child Families." I would like to know what benefits are granted by these documents in the organization of the farm economy. G. Pozharov, Vologda Oblast.

The ukase "On Measures for the Social Support of Multi-Child Families" establishes different kinds of assistance for those families who desire to organize a peasant (farmer) farm, small enterprises, and other commercial structures. For example, the allotment of land parcels at favorable land tax remittances and lease payments. In addition, the organs of authority in the localities have the right to decide whether to exempt such families from the payment of tax fully or partially for a specific period, or whether the tax rate simply will be lowered. Incidentally, this provision of the document, as is stated in the ukase, goes into effect in a procedure stipulated by a resolution of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies of 1 November 1991 "On the Legal Support of Economic Reform."

To reimburse expenditures on the development of farms, these families will be granted material support free of charge or interest-free loans. As physical persons engaged in entrepreneurial activity, multi-child parents must also be fully or partially free from the payment of registration fees.

The document also discusses the priority allotment of orchard-vegetable garden parcels in sizes of not less than 0.15 hectares and assistance in granting multi-child families favorable credits, subsidies, and interest-free loans for the acquisition of building materials and the erection of housing.

In the development of regional employment programs, parents of multi-child families must be placed in jobs in the required procedure, taking into account flexible forms of labor (partial work day, working at home, temporary work, etc.). Their training and retraining should be organized taking into account the needs of the region's economy. In view of specialists' forecasts on the further growth in unemployment, this provision is especially urgent.

Anticorruption Team Targets Illegal Oil Exports

934A0008A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 2 Oct 92 p 4

[Interview with M. Gurtovoy, anticorruption team head, by O. Boguslavskaya; place and date not given: "How Much Does a Rusty Toyota Cost, or Why Is Russian Oil Being Smuggled to the West?"]

[Text] On the staff that is executing the duties of Ye. T. Gaydar, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, there is a special group headed up by his assistant, Mikhail Gurtovoy, which is involved in the fight against corruption.

[TRUD] Mikhail Moiseyevich, in Russia ever since Saltykov-Shchedrin, and maybe even before that, there has always been the idea that "all officials are on the take." The glasnost period has been marked by the fact that we have learned something about the scale of corruption in the echelons of power. Choosing our new authority by democratic means raised hopes for the incorruptibility of our elected officials. Today, it seems, certainty of this has lessened somewhat. Even in the press there have been quite a few articles on this topic. Your group was not created as a preventive organization, I assume. Since the necessity for it arose, doesn't this speak to some bad symptoms?

[Gurtovoy] Do you think people have become different, new and above reproach? Of course society bears within itself the same sins that were placed into it by our 70-year history of totalitarianism. But you know what's so horrible about conversations about widespread thievery? They create the atmosphere of condoned theft and are fanned by those who actually steal. It's a psychological justification for them: "If everyone else steals, then why can't I pinch something, too?" But for me these are idle conversations because corruption of an official has to be proven and then he has to be dismissed. Which is what happens when we go to the government with these kinds of facts. There is a presidential decree on the fight against corruption, and here our positions—I have in mind the members of the group and Gaydar—wholly coincide.

[TRUD] Is he a harsh person?

[Gurtovoy] No, he's an intelligent person and like any intelligent person he does not like thieves. And he very much does not want there to be any among the people involved in state service. Unfortunately, like us, he has to deal with this by force of the nature of his duties. How this works can be seen simply in the case against the Ministry of Health, which your honored paper wrote about. Many defended the deputy minister, Gromyko, and various methods of pressure were utilized. This man has been involved in foreign trade activity for many years, he had colossal ties, and naturally his last name helped. But when documents were presented proving his guilt, no one and nothing could talk Gaydar out of making any exceptions to the prohibition against state officials participating in commercial structures. In this he is truly a person of absolutely definite views and harsh positions. I assure you, the image of the academic scholar cut off from real life who his opponents actively foist policy on is being created intentionally. I submit that not last in line here are those who are very worried about the disclosure of anti-state affairs that our commission is now preparing.

[TRUD] As I see it, it talks about the conditions and effectiveness of the sale of our raw materials and timber to the West?

[Gurtovoy] Oil. That is what bothers us most of all. We have had great losses in all strategic materials, but the oil matter is utterly catastrophic. I don't think more than a quarter of the true cost of the exported oil is returning to the country.

[TRUD] You mean someone is transforming three fourths of Russia's oil into gold for himself? Where do they get chances at that kind of smuggling?

[Gurtovoy] Oil, you see, is all black. You can't tell it by color or smell. I'll explain how it works. I want to do this in TRUD because I have special respect for this newspaper, many of whose readers are workers, including oil workers. They should understand the mechanism that is helping to rob them twice over. Today we already have proof that money for millions of tonnes of our oil has wound up in the accounts of Western firms. How did this happen? In order to support and stabilize the oil branch, billions of dollars had to be invested in it. Naturally there is no hidden pocket in the state budget where that kind of money goes. The idea of creating joint Russian-foreign enterprises was approved in order to attract Western investors. With the help of these investments it was proposed to renew technology and create decent living conditions for oil workers.

What actually happened? The big Western companies, who treasure their reputation, acted cautiously. They were in no hurry to invest money, assuming that we still didn't have sufficient legal guarantees, so they waited. But a swarm of midges and scoundrels who very quickly found a common language with our oil generals came running. All these joint ventures, which brought together the selfish interests of both sides, lacked power and couldn't drill or develop anything, not that they ever planned to. What they do is take oil out of the state order—the same oil that's supposed to go for our needs—steal it and send it abroad. That's an example. According to one agreement, one joint venture was supposed to have drilled a specific number of bore-holes by a certain date. And pump out 649,000 tonnes of oil. Look at the documents. They show that not a single bore-hole was drilled, but they're contracting for the sale of 700,000 tonnes. Where is it coming from? What is this, some kind of invention—pumping oil out of undrilled bore-holes? The production association under which this joint venture was created won't answer a single inquiry. Which means... which means the drilling is not falling at all within the volumes being reported to us. Further on there is a natural chain of events: a huge shortage of gasoline in the country, forcing the government to raise the price.

[TRUD] Are you certain that the workers pumping the oil have no interest in the affairs of the joint venture and their directors? They are probably being given used Toyotas or something for this.

[Gurtovoy] Of course, they're being given some trifle. But if they ever dreamed how they were being exploited . . . First of all, they're being robbed like all of us citizens of Russia are, by taking away oil we could use to buy grain, medicines, the latest technology. In addition, they are being robbed as oil workers, and they don't get the greater part of that sale—it goes into the accounts of the people stealing the oil, who are also degrading them with cheap sops.

This issue is strategic for the country. Today we are plunging deeper and deeper into an oil debt hole. We are getting wheat only on credits or else in exchange for petroleum products.

But it is not merely a matter of not allowing new leaks of oil. We also need to return to the state what belongs to it by rights. Yes, certainly, this is possible. Only we have to keep in mind the mistakes it has made, for example, in the matter of Party funds. We don't need to run around the country asking whether they have our money. We need to prove that the money is there and is ours. Then it will be more to their advantage to give it up than to dishonor their name with complicity in illegality. Yes, in certain instances, clearly, we are getting back less than we lost, but then that is what we pay for our own sloppiness.

[TRUD] May I ask a personal question? Mikhail Moiseyevich, you are a professional journalist, and you were doing remarkably well in that field. . . .

[Gurtovoy] Why did I become a bureaucrat? My motives are the same as my colleagues'. It's not very nice to dig around in dirty affairs, but if the boat springs a leak, you either have to bail water or save yourself by abandoning ship. I'll tell you something else: you could not call our team of one political mind. What we are agreed on is the conviction that you can't take life easy, or grumble, or scrutinize where you used to work; you have to get rid of these obstructions. We have gathered around us a very high class of professionals. I've been able to learn about the work of Interpol and the FBI. Comparing, I can assert that my comrade Yevgeniy Pavlovich Karabanov is indisputably one of the best policemen in Europe. When he was still deputy head of the Moscow and Moscow Oblast KGB and was involved with smuggling cases, he saved the state tens of billions of dollars. Sergey Fomin is a responsible man of rare working capacity. Nikolay Yemelyanov recently successfully closed a case involving the theft of geological information and forced Western firms to return to Russia more than two and a half million dollars. Here's a note on my calendar: 500,000 Norwegian kroner were returned to the government's reserves in connection with that case. That is the doing of Nikolay Alekseyevich. It may not be a large sum, but we bought insulin for children with diabetes with that money. Their mamas should light a candle for his health. And I want to say that there are very many people who help us. We have contacts with the law-keeping organs. The Tyumen police are doing remarkable work, unlike, say, the procurator's office of the same

region. After all, without exaggeration, those who untangle these snarls risk bullets. They are threatened and frightened. For example, there was a warning here after a publication in a certain American magazine. Interesting, isn't it? The magazine isn't even published here.

[TRUD] Do materials like the publication of 10 September in TRUD, "Beat Your Own So that Foreigners Laugh" come into your team's field of vision?

[Gurtovoy] Of course. We treat corruption in medicine, too, with special disquiet. TRUD is absolutely correct, openly discussing these severe and, without exaggeration, fatal problems. We are always ready to share information gathered in our computers with your newspaper.

[TRUD] May I inquire as to how cases under your jurisdiction in Moscow are going? Ever since Gavril Popov, as mayor of the capital, declared in an interview in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY that it is all right to take bribes if you call them something else, trust in municipal bureaucrats has scarcely risen. Privatization has added to the rumors.

[Gurtovoy] Yes, the process of privatization in Moscow is yielding facts for our attention, too.

[TRUD] "The mafia is immortal," Mikhail Moiseyevich?

[Gurtovoy] Immortal? The order that existed here for 70 years led us into an anthropological catastrophe. That order was reinforced by the fact that it made everyone an accomplice in theft: the general secretary took a lot, his comrade-in-arms a little less, and they let the worker take away two nails to pound in at his home or dacha. Everyone was smeared by this. Civilization proves that it is more advantageous for someone to be honest. Look at Switzerland. There's nothing there but honesty and the world brings it trillions of dollars for safekeeping. The income they have from that has allowed them to create a very high standard of living. But we have been sent back to the caves because we created a country of prison camps and all our leaders were permeated with the psychology of criminal old men. Come on, sure it's hard, but let's sort our way out of this. "The mafia is immortal"? So what? Let me conclude our conversation with a metaphor. For centuries the Dutch have been pumping the water that constantly washes onto their land through canals. If they give it up they'll drown. We don't want to be drowned, do we?

Thermoplane Flight Testing Highlighted

934A0019A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Dolgikh: "They Are Putting 'Flying Saucers' Together in Ulyanovsk"]

[Text] The concept of creating an aircraft whose principle of operation is based on lift from an inert gas (hydrogen, helium), as well as hot air, and which acquired the name "thermoplane" (this word is not in the dictionaries yet) came into being after 1984, when there was talk of developing the boundless expanses of Siberia as quickly as possible and utilizing its resources more efficiently. It is common knowledge that solution of this problem without the extensive use of aircraft is impossible because of the lack of roads there. Which of the existing types of aircraft are most suited to carry out this task?

Helicopters? A little expensive, and their lifting power is limited. Airplanes? It takes a lot of funds and time just to build the runways. Generally speaking, we have returned to where we began in the history of flight. Essentially, we have returned to the balloons. Taking into account everything that has been developed in aircraft manufacturing to date, naturally.

The project is being carried out by associates of the "Termoplan" Design Bureau, which was created especially in 1988 in the Moscow Aviation Institute imeni S. Ordzhonikidze. The program's objective is "to devise and develop aerostatic transport and installation aircraft (ALA) with a lifting capacity of 800 metric tons and a range of up to 5,000 kilometers" (this is how it was defined in the assignment from the Russian Federation Government). It is assumed that in the future, thermoplanes would deliver most of the industrial equipment and various facilities to regions in Siberia and the Far North that are under development. One such aircraft is able to carry oil derricks, machinery, houses...that is, an entire settlement with all its infrastructure, for long distances, either suspended externally or carried on board, at a respectable speed (about 220 kilometers per hour).

Aside from purely transport assignments, the thermoplane will make it possible to conduct logging work, geological prospecting, large-scale emergency and rescue operations, and to perform work associated with tourism, including international tourism.

Dozens of Russian enterprises and different KB and NII [design bureaus and scientific research institutes] have been included in the project. A number of foreign banks and firms in Canada, Germany, Italy, and France have expressed their desire to take part in it.

So just what is this mysterious aircraft? From above, it looks like a disk about 20 meters in diameter. From the side, it looks like a lens, to which the fuselage and engines of an airplane have been "attached." It is planned to utilize the fuselages of Tu-142M, Tu-95, An-22, and other aircraft which have completed their service life or which have been removed from active service in the VVS [Air Forces]. The "air" part of the thermoplane consists of two compartments: one of them is filled with inert gas, and the other one holds the engines' exhaust gases. By regulating the intake of hot

air, not only the thermoplane's speed but the actual process of ascent and descent can be changed. Incidentally, it is planned to use hydrogen instead of the inert gas. Do not be surprised. One of the MAI [Moscow Aviation Institute] laboratories has developed a special inhibiting additive which makes hydrogen completely safe when it used as a working medium.

As already noted, the cargo may be transported on an external platform or, if special care is required in carrying it, within the "balloon." A special chamber has been provided for this. A system of winches here will make it possible to hoist and lower cargoes for a distance of up to 60 meters.

The envelope for this "balloon" must be very durable, naturally. The "fabric" for it has already been developed by the specialists—chemists and textile workers. Composite materials, carbon plastics and fiber glass are used in its construction.

How are things proceeding now? Yuriy Ishkov, head of the "Termoplan" KB, comments on this.

"The other day we completed the first stage in the ground design tests of the industrial test stand prototype of the new aircraft. For the time being, this model is one-fifth the actual size, but it has enabled us to thoroughly study all the aspects we were interested in. One or two drawbacks were revealed, of course, but generally speaking, even our boldest predictions were justified."

"This is interesting, too," the designer continued. "Even this small replica of the thermoplane, which is only an intermediate link in the research and logically should be turned over for scrap, has attracted the attention of various specialists—in communications, ecology, and polar studies. Specific orders are already being mentioned. Experimental prototypes of the thermoplanes are being put together at the Ulyanovsk Aviation [Plant] now. Most likely the series aircraft will be assembled there as well. I will point out, by the way, that out of all the aircraft with such power today, the thermoplane is the most ecologically clean."

So if someone sees an unusual aircraft in the sky which resembles a giant disk in the not too distant future, he should not be in a hurry to talk about NLO [unidentified flying objects].

Aeroflot Becomes Joint-Stock Company

934A0019B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Oct 92
Morning Edition p 6

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Viktor Belikov: "Aeroflot Becomes a Joint-Stock Company"]

[Text] After existing for almost 70 years as a monopolistic state aviation enterprise, "Aeroflot-Soviet Airlines" will become an open-type joint-stock company in a few days.

The official name of the new national airline, which serves foreign routes, is "Aeroflot-Russian International

Airlines." It "inherits" the powers under the current intergovernmental agreement on air service with foreign states.

When the airline is registered soon, flights by aircraft with its symbol and emblems will be authorized only for airplanes and helicopters of Russian aviation enterprises. In other words, aircraft from the former republics of the USSR which have been using the "Aeroflot" markings must replace them with new markings that have been registered in international organizations; otherwise, they will not be accepted at foreign airports and will not be able to start service there.

It was announced at the press conference on 29 September that formation of the joint-stock company, with federation ownership of the controlling block of stock for 3 years, was supported by decisions of the labor collectives of most structural subunits in civil aviation which are making and servicing flights from Sheremetyevo Airport. However, three so-called "subsidiary companies" which were formed recently—"Zolotaya Zvezda," "Russkiye Vityazi," and RAL [Russian Airlines]—which are flying the West European A-310 Airbuses, as well as an air cargo complex, oppose their inclusion in the new company. Under the law, they can remain independent.

As of today, what does the updated Aeroflot have at its disposal? Authorized capital of the joint-stock company, which has 19,500 employees and whose worth is valued at 2.77 billion rubles. It has a fleet of about 100 (quite obsolete!) aircraft. In the opinion of our economists and foreign experts, Aeroflot's formation as a joint-stock company will give it freer access to foreign investments and credits.

Moscow Air Show Critiqued

924a2047A Moscow VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT
in Russian No. 36, Sep 92 p 5

[Article by Yu. Ostapenko: "Reflections On The Future"]

[Text] The passions and emotions generated by the unprecedented phenomenon in the aviation world of Russia have subsided: the show, or its English translation, spectacle. And from the scorching August heat of Moscow to the scorching heat of the Moscow suburb of Zhukovskiy, electric railroads, autobuses and limousines with foreign license plates have been scurrying about all week—some were hurrying to view the incredible aerial acrobatic maneuvers (show), while others wished to meet with colleagues, businessmen and producers of aviation products (business).

Let us leave the subject of the incredible acrobatic maneuvers to subsequent reviews and also the demonstration flights of fighter aircraft, helicopters, interceptor aircraft, amphibious airplanes and civilian air liners, which were simply tremendously interesting and exciting. Let us attempt to understand the organization of the air show held in Moscow in 1992.

Proper credit must be given to the courageous individuals who organized this grandiose measure, individuals who undertook risks during the crisis which overtook the aviation industry during the period of economic devastation, and who are displaying our achievements (expressed in the language of socialist realism) in the aerospace sphere before the court of world opinion. The country's prestige, if you please.

Moreover, it is here that we find the basis for this gallant step: if an attempt is not made now to enter the free market for international aviation trade, then the crisis may prove to be not only prolonged but even fatal.

Thus, the city of Zhukovskiy, the airfield of the LII [Letno-ispytatelnyy institut; Flight-Research Institute] (the largest in Europe) and the Moscow Air Show. And, as we agreed, if we overlook the flights (spectacles), then it turns out that the measure carried out here had far-reaching goals and produced a tremendous effect. Actually, the term "show" to a large degree serves to conceal the scale of the events that took place here. I venture to say that we were witnesses at the birth of a new annual aviation exhibition, a very popular and efficient form for advertising and the sale of aviation equipment throughout the world. The reputation of the annual Parisian exhibition at Le Bourget is so great that it hardly bears mentioning. The English town of Farnborough became known throughout the world only because it created the annual aviation holiday. Peking and Singapore recently became "aviation capitals." Although it would appear to be difficult to join this select company, the Germans did not think so. Following the unification of Germany, the Germans decided to revive their annual Berlin aviation exhibition. Try to object if everything began at Berlin—the oldest annual exhibition in the world.

Everything? If this were true! The rich Arabs favored developing Arabia as an aviation province and did not spare the money needed for organizing their own annual exhibition in the city of Dubai. Money is money and the organization of an air show in the Persian Gulf region aroused many questions among those who wished to further such a happening.

And now we make an appearance. Regardless of how difficult a time this is for Russia, a place has been found for annual aviation exhibitions. Such a place had to become available. Throughout the world, the respect held for our Soviet (we are still using this word) aviation specialists is still very high, especially in the area of military, space and even civilian air liners (particularly helicopters).

Foreign firms immediately displayed interest in the future annual aviation exhibition and a contract was concluded with the German firm "Glakhe Internatsional KN" for the development of an exhibit and the installation of pavilions. And the contract was carried out. The places in the pavilions were bought up immediately by

the participants—more than 200 domestic (OKB [special design bureaus], plants and independent aviation companies) and also several dozen foreign firms, including such firms as "United Technologies," "Airbus Industry" and others. They began returning to the treasury of the organizational committee the 500 million rubles spent for organizing the exposition: indeed, one square meter of exposition space cost a lessee 770 dollars.

At the beginning of this article, I made a point of mentioning the presence of many machines bearing foreign license numbers at the gates of the LII on the territory of the exhibit. The number of observers and representatives from practically all of the aviation firms was indeed considerable. But the foreign partners did not present any winged exhibits. In all probability, this represented caution on their part. So what if this is an air show? Is it a show or an annual exhibit? To send one's machines to an annual exhibition is one thing and quite another to fly them—the expenses are not repaid. On the other hand, given the success realized by this measure, it is believed that the Zhukovskiy airfield will appear quite different in 1993. The caution shown by the western partners was nourished by still one other circumstance. I have in mind the matter of secrecy. Here we encounter a paradox. Everything shown in our country, owing to some ridiculous tradition, was held under such a thorough and skilful cloak of secrecy that our citizens not only did not see an Su-27, Mig-31 or Tu-160, but in fact they never even heard of them. On the other hand, these and other models were exhibited and flown repeatedly at foreign annual aviation exhibitions, arousing both admiration and business-like interest.

This time the armored train of suspicion was reserved for the railroad sidings and super-secret LII airfield. All those who were not lazy among our fellow-countrymen and also guests rushed forward in a wave. And at the airfield, one found not only a Tu-104 and an Mi-8, but also all (practically all) of the latest air liner models from the various KB's [design bureaus], aircraft engines, equipment, instruments and everything else associated with aviation. Even those models (for example, the "Molniya-1") which are only being prepared for flight. And one could touch all of this with his hands, sit in a cabin and snap photographs. And they photographed, touched and sat. And nothing happened.

Tired of hearing the roar of the fighter aircraft, I willingly or unwillingly spent some time at the stands and exhibits associated one way or another with civil aviation. And I saw a great deal. There was the stunning Il-96 and its various modifications, the Tu-204 and the Il-114—long ago promised and long-awaited. And aircraft which were quite mysterious—short range and limited capacity. On wheels, on pontoons, flying boats. The quite small "Yunior" and "Molniya," new motors and electronic equipment. Comfortable seats, rescue equipment. It turns out that everything is within the capability of the KB's. Everything. Only a market is required. And it appeared

in the form of the Moscow Air Show. And perhaps this is the main achievement of this measure.

Moreover, any annual exhibition is not simply an exhibit of new equipment. It is indeed a market for air transport operations. This is why I studied very attentively all of the exhibits offered during the annual exhibition. Unfortunately, I saw very little here. One shop (part of a hangar), reserved by one exhibitor, was purchased by the Department of Air Transport of Russia. And—surprise! The Bashkir BAL aviation company had a shop. Our newspaper has already written about the leader of BAL, Valeriy Burnayev, a promising and far-seeing commander. And this step taken by him once again confirms our conclusion. The list of exhibitors included several independent aviation companies—and this was all. Thought must be given to the fact that a future annual aviation exhibition in Zhukovskiy, when it becomes an annual exhibition rather than a spectacle, will attract exhibitors and this represents one more lesson to be drawn from the measure already carried out.

The general director of the exhibit, Professor Yuriy Nagayev, when evaluating the results of the Moscow Air Show, stated that the review of our achievements was without a doubt a success, since the volume of transactions exceeded all expectations (particularly the large-scale transaction between Aviaprom [Aviation Industry] and the world renowned firms of "Boeing" and "Rolls Royce." But the importance of the measure carried out transcended by far the transactions realized. Russia entered the international aviation market—this was the most important result.

I entitled my notes "Reflections On The Future," owing to the fact that when evaluating the show at Zhukovskiy I had to look into the future, at which time the annual exhibition at Zhukovskiy would be ranked among the world's leading aviation expositions. And without fail it will become a leading exposition. Order will be restored out on the airfield, the runways will be asphalted, an information system will be organized and so forth. And it will all be for the benefit of the annual exhibition. Moreover, it must happen very soon.

Coal Mine Safety Issues Detailed

924A2056A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*
in Russian No 36, Sep 92 p 13

[Interview with Vitaliy Semenovich Shatalov by Yu. Yevdokimov: "On the Verge of Catastrophe"; date and place not given]

[Text] More than three years ago, in an interview for *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN* ("Injury," No 7, 1989), we heard of the unfavorable accident-prevention situation in a number of mines from the lips of USSR Gosgortekhnadzor Deputy Chairman V. Shatalov. Today Shatalov is chief specialist for safety administration for the coal industry, at the Russian Federation Gosgortekhnadzor [State Committee for Supervision of Work Safety in Industry and Mining]. First among those on the unsafe

list was Sukhodolskaya-Vostochnaya; yet, there was no reaction to the newspaper article on the part of Minugle-prom [Ministry of the Coal Industry]. Had the ministry undertaken energetic measures at that time, it is possible that the terrible tragedy which shook the Donbass on 9 June of this year might have been avoided. As a result of the accident, 63 people perished (59 miners and four mine-rescue workers). Material expenses for disability allowances and compensation, replacement and repair of equipment alone came to R84,242,000.

Unfortunately, there are no guarantees whatsoever that such a misfortune will not happen again in another coal region. Our correspondent asked Vitaliy Semenovich Shatalov to describe the state of accident prevention in the mines of Russia.

[Shatalov] At the present time, coal and shale is extracted from 280 mines and 110 open-cast mines in the country. The average depth of the strata being worked ranges from 500 to 700 meters, but certain ones are over 1,000 meters deep. Fifteen percent of the mines are subject to sudden gas and coal blowouts; 73 percent are working gas-rich veins, the coal dust from which is dangerously explosive; and 27 percent are in dangerous shock regions. As you can see, the natural mineral and geological condition of Russian mines is very complicated. This is aggravated by the fact that one sees a significant amount of lag in reconstruction (27 percent of mines), repair and replacement of equipment (about 24,000 units), and so on.

I would especially like to call attention to the unacceptable situation in work on reconstruction of ventilation systems. At the present time 38 percent of the mines are not supplied with the required amount of air: these include the Severokuzbassugol [Northern Kuznets Basin Coal] Co.—three mines (Sudzhinskaya, Fizkulturnik, and Siberskoe); the Prokopyevskugol Association—three mines (Imeni Dzerzhinskogo, Zimika, and Krasnogorskaya); and the Kuznetskugol Co.—with three mines (Zyryanovskaya, Kapitalnaya and Imeni Lenina). In 1991 the number of mines not having an air reserve grew from 28 to 42. Year after year the situation in putting new exhaust fans into operation gets worse. For example, in 1991 it was stipulated that eight exhaust fans be installed in the main ventilator system; whereas, only three were actually put into operation.

And it is no coincidence that of 350,000 violations disclosed by mine-safety inspectors last year, over 11,000 were violations of dust and gas conditions. Twelve gas explosions have occurred this year already. These included some which might have ended in a catastrophe such as that which took place in the Sukhodolskaya-Vostochnaya mine. The accident at the Taybinskaya mine in Kuzbass, which occurred during drilling operations in a cul-de-sac working, can serve as an example. During the course of the work, ventilation of the cul-de-sac was interrupted, and as a result the working was filled with gas. When electrical current was applied to the drilling equipment, the motor, which was

found to be defective, produced a spark and set off a methane explosion. When the site of the explosion was investigated, it was found that the gas level in the cul-de-sac was more than 40 percent, and the working was largely filled with dust. One can only thank one's lucky stars that the accident did not grow into a catastrophe. Unfortunately, there are many such examples.

[Correspondent] Today the coal industry is in a complex economic situation. How does this affect the state of accident prevention in the sector?

[Shatalov] A number of engineering-technical staff workers and mine supervisors, while striving to survive in the market that is taking shape, are doing everything they can to produce coal. And they are doing this, as a rule, at the expense of the safety factors in the workings, increasing the risk for the mine workers.

As everyone knows, the Rospadskaya mine in Kuzbass is the flagship of the industry. This is practically the largest mine in Russia, built and outfitted in consideration of the most advanced methods of coal mining, having the best mineral-geological conditions. Unfortunately, however, it has now become a mine where the health and lives of the miners employed in its workings cannot be guaranteed. For instance, several accidents were allowed to happen here, in which people suffered. The most serious accident took place when methane and dust exploded and 18 people perished. Every year three people die in this mine. This year five have died already.

One is struck by the lackadaisical attitude of the managers of this enterprise. For in the shafts they have violated the holy of holies, proposing and insisting upon workings in long-wall facings, the upper part of which lacks a ventilation duct. It is quite obvious that in this case, normal ventilation is impossible. Fortunately, not all managers have such an attitude toward their mines and collectives. In 211 mines (75 percent) no fatal accidents were permitted to happen this year. But nevertheless, in comparison with the similar period last year, fatal injuries in the coal enterprises of Russia increased by a factor of 1.5, and such accidents as gas explosions increased more than five-fold.

[Correspondent] With such an attitude toward accident prevention, the only hope remaining is that the inspection authorities will be able to stop the irresponsible and dangerous actions of the mine managers in time.

[Shatalov] Unfortunately, the accident prevention system has practically ceased to operate in the sector. The accident prevention services are being reduced or are simply disappearing along with the old structures, and no new ones are being created. Enterprise managers and the newly-created management structures, if they engage in safety work at all, do so in the majority of cases in an "amateurish" fashion. Their excuse is that the founders did not delegate this right to them.

Such a situation only encourages irresponsibility among the engineering and technical staff and the managers.

There is no longer anyone to ask, and awareness in the localities is poor. And if one adds to this the fact that the managers depend completely on the collectives, with whom agreements are reached via the STK [Council of Labor Collectives] on work and even on wages, it becomes clear why they are not straining their relations with violators of the safety rules. I suppose that the practice of appointing and removing mine managers under conditions of especially complex production and the interdependence of those who work there is not directed toward the good of the cause. The principal managers, and especially the technical leaders, should be appointed by a higher administrative organ (by a council of directors and the like). Then they would feel less pressure from the executors and, as a result, would have greater opportunity for establishing safe working conditions for production.

It must be pointed out that in recent years, work with violators of safety rules has practically ceased. Nor has anyone even begun to look for more effective forms for ensuring safety on the job. There is no doubt that, in time, market relationships will define a system of mutual dependence in assuring accident prevention. But it would be more proper not to wait for the results of a spontaneous movement in the market, but to design a system today that is well-organized and intelligent.

The situation in the coal industry demands taking radical measures in order to ensure the normal operation of enterprises and to permit us to avoid accidents in the future, with their severe consequences and human victims.

According to Data from Gosgortekhnadzor RF

Number of Accidents in Russian Mines			
Type Accident	1989	1990	1991
Category 1	27	38	35
Category 2	129	115	88
Losses Resulting From Russian Mine Accidents, 1000-Rubles			
Type Accident	1989	1990	1991
Category 1 and 2	25,827	51,935	129,680

According to Data from Gosgortekhnadzor RF

Injuries at Russian Coal Industry Enterprises			
	1989	1990	1991
Total Number of Accidents	14,583	18,338	17,560
Number of Accidents With Fatal Results	199	215	185
Total Accidents Per 1,000 Workers	27.8	36.6	35.7
Total Fatal Accidents Per 1,000 Workers	0.38	0.43	0.37
Total Fatal Accidents Per 1 Million Tonnes of Coal Mined	0.48	0.6	0.52

On Maintaining General-Use Motor Transport

924A2024A Moscow AVTOMOBILNYY TRANSPORT in Russian No 4, Apr 92 pp 4-7

[Article by M. Yevsyukov: "How to Survive? Preserve General-Use Motor Transport"]

[Text] A session of the board of the Rosavtotrans [Russian Motor Transport] Concern was held in Moscow on January 28, and the concern's council met on January 29, 1992. The board discussed a program for implementing a concept for the development of material and technical supply, as well as measures to produce spare parts for 1992. G. Gubernatorov, vice-president of the concern and director of the Material and Technical Supply Firm, and G. Nikolayev, director of the Production and Technical Firm, spoke on these issues.

The concept for organizing supplies to the concern's enterprises of rolling stock, tires, batteries, fuel, spare parts, scrap metal, and other resources calls for their centralized provision and purchase, under direct contracts, from wholesale trade organizations, via long-term contractual ties with producer-plants, through market structures and barter deals, and by setting up the concern's own production.

On the basis of this concept, a program for the concern's material and technical supply has now been drawn up and is being implemented. The Russian State Economic Committee has set allocation limits of 31,300 trucks, 17,700 buses, and 12,300 taxicabs for 1992. By decision of the Russian Federation government, foreign currency will be used to finance purchases of Ikarus buses in the amount of \$300 million; this means that it will be

possible to buy nearly 3,500 buses. Centralized allocation limits of 1 million truck and bus tires and 350,000 passenger car tires have been set. This is approximately at the 1991 level. The situation is worse where batteries are concerned, although the allocation limits that have been set are 40 percent above last year's level (170,000 units). However, the demand for batteries (nearly 220,000 units) is not being met. The possibility of manufacturing batteries at the Podolsk plant (30,000 units) and at the Tumen plant is currently being studied.

Where motor fuel is concerned, allocation limits of 2.2 million tonnes of gasoline and 600,000 tonnes of diesel fuel have been set for passenger transport only (excluding taxis).

As is common knowledge, the need for spare parts has never been fully met. It could be said that this is an eternal problem for motor transport. The main cause of the shortage is the flawed practice followed for many years in which the automotive industry considered its main task to be to increase automobile production. Organizing spare parts production and developing production capacity for this was accorded secondary importance. For example, at the Kama Automotive Plant Association, the capacity of all spare-parts plants and suppliers is designed to supply 500,000 motor vehicles. But there are now 870,000 units in the former USSR. Consequently, there is absolutely no capacity for producing spare parts for 370,000 Kama trucks. In 1991, on account of a lack of foreign currency, the situation with spare parts for Ikarus buses became sharply aggravated. In view of this situation, various ways for maintaining the fleet in working order were proposed. First, some motor vehicles could be written off and used to maintain the rest. But that could result in our being left with no rolling stock at all, and so such a policy cannot be followed. It is a dead end. It would also be possible to set up the concern's own production and reconditioning of spare parts, and to use domestically produced spare parts for imported vehicles. This is the path that the concern decided to take. A division was created that deals with placing orders for the production of spare parts at both branch enterprises and outside enterprises, including defense plants undergoing conversion. As a result, 73 million rubles' worth of spare parts were produced in 1991, and plans call for increasing this figure to 92 million rubles (in 1991 prices) in 1992.

The meeting of the concern's council was attended by officials of almost all Russia's territorial motor transport associations. The chief topic was the existence of general-use motor transport and its role and place in Russia's economy in the emerging market economy. The situation, of course, is very difficult. In 1991, general-use transport, despite all the upheaval in the republic, tried to provide (and did provide) a normal life for the public. Transport services were also provided to industry and construction, insofar as possible. Automotive transport workers met their contractual commitments.

The question now arises. Where do we go from here? How do we survive?

In his address, A. Vasilyev, president of the Rosavtotrans Concern, said that in 1991, despite all the difficulties, general-use motor transport nonetheless operated in a stable fashion. And while production declined in other branches by as much as 15 percent to 20 percent, transport workers stood firm and maintained their performance indices, and the branch held its own. Now a critical period has begun. Prices have been freed, the property privatization program has been approved, and it is necessary to sort out the prospects for the branch's existence and development.

The basic course here is enterprise privatization. The concern's council adopted a decision in May 1991 to convert the Rosavtotrans Concern into a Corporation of Joint-Stock General-Use Enterprises. A statute on a Russian Joint-Stock Motor Transport Corporation was drafted, and a method for appraising the value of various facilities to be privatized was devised. These documents were submitted to the Russian government. However, in view of the fact that the Russian law on privatizing state and municipal enterprises does not allow the State Property Committee to transfer to other organizations the right to sell state property, a Russian presidential decree on privatizing general-use motor transport was drafted. The draft called for the establishment of a Russian holding company to be known as the Rosavtotranskholding [Russian Motor Transport Holding] Company. The company's charter states that it is made up of state and other general-use motor transport enterprises whose capital funds include a share of federal property. The company can also be joined on a voluntary basis by enterprises and organizations with other forms of property. Territorial production associations are to be converted into regional joint-stock companies, their capital funds will include a share of federal property. Ownership rights can be granted to either the Rosavtotrans Concern directly, or through the Russian Federation Ministry of Transportation. The enterprises and organizations that make up the company will maintain their economic autonomy and status as juridical persons and operate on the basis of Russian legislation.

This privatization system is now being tested at Mosoblavtotrans [Moscow Oblast Automotive Transport], a leased territorial production association. In conjunction with the Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, a decision was taken to convert Mosoblavtotrans into a joint-stock holding association charged with drawing up a plan for and carrying out privatization of general-use motor transport associations in Moscow Oblast. The experience gained in organizing this work must be used throughout the republic.

Territorial association directors who addressed the council said that regional motor transport divisions are now being accused of having monopolies. V. Sergeychik, general director of the Chelyabinskavtotrans [Chelyabinsk Motor Transport] Consumer Society, said in his

speech that general-use motor transport is viewed as a monopoly in his oblast. Is that the case? We account for 12 percent, maybe even less, of all transport, but we handle more than 40 percent of all shipping. What kind of a monopoly is that? It is not a monopoly, needless to say. It is simply a well-organized system for directing and managing motor transport at the regional level. As for increasing the efficiency of motor transport as a whole, we must first of all figure out how the remaining transport is being used, which accounts for nearly 90 percent. Why destroy something that is still working, especially considering the fact that general-use transport is intended first of all to support vital services in the oblast and its cities and rayons. The Chelyabinsk Transport Consumers Society (to be more precise, its staff) has been registered as an autonomous commercial and supply organization and is a juridical person with its own account. It has no right to manage the property of the oblast's enterprises or to influence them. How can these enterprises be managed? It is essential to put everything in its proper place. Either we give the association the right of ownership, in order that general-use transport in the region as a whole can be managed and its vital functioning ensured on a legal basis, or we eliminate this management structure.

Other council members who serve as directors of territorial agencies cited similar arguments in favor of the existence of a general-use motor transport system at the republic level, with divisions in the various regions. They included F. Kharayev of Karbardino-Balkaria, V. Baranov (Yaroslavl), N. Glazatov (Orenburg), V. Kuchinskiy (Krasnoyarsk), I. Bogatyrev (Omsk), A. Markianov (Kareliya) and others. A whole series of issues that must be resolved on an urgent basis through joint effort was discussed. These issues have to do first and foremost with providing passenger transport service to the public in cities and suburbs, as well as with supplying the public with food products (bread, milk, and others). In order to solve these problems in an integrated and intelligent fashion, an appropriate management structure is needed. Such a structure has been established and is operating, but it is now in danger of collapse. Various types of organizations and enterprises (private, cooperative, joint-stock) are now being created with the goal of making the greatest possible profit with the fewest outlays. Often they simply take the pickings, as we say. Against the backdrop of universal shortages, they set their rates and prices in such a way as to take from enterprises and the public everything they can. After all, they don't care about such functions, for example, as providing passenger service to the public or promptly delivering essential goods to the stores. They are free entrepreneurs who look for the jobs that can earn them windfall profits, and they can pay their workers two or three times as much as general-use enterprises can. Naturally, highly skilled personnel are going over to them. One could understand this and somehow justify it if it all benefited society. But for the most part, our people, whom we trained, are going over to these other organizations, and we're losing our personnel.

A second issue is social security for workers and their families, as well as housing construction. A large number of children's camps, vacation centers, boarding houses, preventive-treatment clinics, and so forth has been established in the branch. There are also health facilities and sports complexes, cultural centers, and medical centers and facilities. Enormous amounts of money have been spent on these facilities; the money has come from the enterprises themselves and from funds centrally allocated by the Ministry of Motor Transport from the state budget.

If we ignore the benefit that these social-sphere facilities provide to the employees, they generate nothing but losses. Enormous amounts of money are required to maintain them. How can they be maintained and with what funds? In the present situation, we don't even have enough money for wages. So what do we do, sell them to somebody or close them? And if we do that, how do we explain this kind of privatization to our employees? How can we retain our personnel? After all, a good social base at an enterprises is a powerful means of attracting workers and keeping them.

Another extremely urgent and vital issue is prices and price-setting. Today total confusion reigns where prices are concerned. They go up every day by 10 to 20 times and more. In this kind of situation, how can we plan operations even in the near-term (for the next month or quarter), not to mention annual planning? Figuratively speaking, we have to work with our eyes closed, just in order to survive somehow. Today massive numbers of various intermediary organizations are sprouting up like mushrooms, and they are fleecing enterprises. They often do this under specious pretexts. For example, much as been said about vehicle maintenance services provided by the producer-plants. The concern has made and is making great efforts to set up such a system in conjunction with the automotive plants. The idea is that motor transport enterprises will be involved in setting up a network to provide guaranteed maintenance and pre-sale preparation services by making available, when possible, necessary production space, equipment, and personnel for this purpose. But what is happening now? The AvtoGAZ [Gorky Automotive Plant] Association has set up its Gazavtotekhhobsluzhivaniye [Gorky Automotive Plant Maintenance] system and is selling vehicles through it. This would seem to be fine. But what is happening in actual practice? For example, an Avtotekhhobsluzhivaniye [Automotive Maintenance] regional center has been set up in Northern Ossetia. What exactly is it? Two wooden warehouses have been leased from a meat-and-bone meal plant. And these facilities are supposed to supply the entire region with spare parts and motor vehicles, as well as perform necessary presale preparation work and provide services. In reality, the upshot is once again a monopoly. This so-called firm charges a markup of 25 percent of the automobiles' price; customers in the region are forced to buy the automobiles only through the firm, not from the plant. Needless to say, there can be no question of any

presale maintenance or other services. But people have to pay the money, and it is a hefty sum indeed. This is not an isolated instance; rather, it is becoming the trend.

I don't think that anyone can cope with such plunderous business practices on his own. For this reason, general-use motor transport workers need to pool their efforts and to have their own interated management structure. As we know, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution of October 11, 1991, forbids all newly created concerns, associations, and corporations to carry out power functions with respect to the enterprises that make up these associations. However, without an integrated management system, general-use motor transport will simply collapse; it will be pulled apart at the local level and unable to defend itself. In the final analysis, it would be possible to impose a boycott on buying rolling stock, spare parts, assemblies, and so forth on the producers, in order to somehow moderate their exorbitant prices. But if Russia's general-use motor transport is destroyed as a system, that will be the end of it. Many administration officials at the local level also think that there should definitely be regional structures to organize and provide transport services to the public of an entire oblast, kray, or republic economy.

In other words, the officials of Russia's general-use motor transport regional organizations unanimously supported the need for a Russia-wide structure for this motor transport. This can in no way be attributed to the claim that they are trying to hold onto their positions or that the administrative-command system was for them a great benefit that they cannot bring themselves to let go of. This is hardly the case. These people are committed to their work. Their chief concern (and their collectives support them in this) is to prevent collapse and anarchy in the republic's economy, at least at the level of motor transport—a system that is vital to the functioning of our economy.

V. Savtsov, vice-president of the concern, spoke to the council about measures that the concern is taking to provide assistance to Russia's regional general-use motor transport agencies in financing passenger transport, buying rolling stock, and obtaining state support for the branch's enterprises. The most important thing for us, and for Russia's entire economy, he said, is to preserve the general-use motor transport branch. As is common knowledge, it operates 50 percent to 100 percent more efficiently than departmentally operated transport, and hence its unit production costs are lower. Is this any accident? Of course not; the fact is that the system works. Needless to say, we're not smarter than anyone else, it's just that this system has dealt more effectively with managing transport, servicing and maintaining rolling stock, it selects and trains personnel for this, and it divides labor and responsibilities. In short, everything possible is done to ensure the branch's effective functioning. It is harder to do this at individual enterprises, as has been demonstrated by world practice. In other countries, transport firms, corporations, or other transport associations also work much better than small or

private enterprises. This is why it is essential to preserve the general-use motor transport system. How can this be done?

The leasing system has exhausted its capabilities. We need to have other forms of ownership and to find our place and role with respect to it and on the basis of existing legislation. G. Savtsov recalled that in May 1991, everybody in the council came to the unanimous conclusion that it was necessary to move toward privatizing property through conversion into joint-stock companies. The decision was adopted and time has gone by, but we have in many respects not progressed very far from what we used to have. Why? It might seem the the fault lies with insufficient preparation by the concern and its staff, but this is not quite the case. It takes time to move from an idea to its implementation. At that time there were neither laws nor legally binding ordinances that could be used to implement the idea. Meanwhile, conducting experiments on the entire branch, let alone in the conditions that have arisen in the republic, would have entailed great risk. However, much work has been done. Documents and methods have been drawn up. Incidentally, these documents and methods have now been used as a basis for certain all-Russian normative acts. Many changes have occurred since that time, a new Russian government has come to power, and these efforts have been stalled. It has now been decided to convert our corporation into a holding company. This is the only method that allows us, on behalf of the state (the State Property Committee or the Russian Property Fund), to transfer our rights with respect to privatization and conversion into joint-stock companies to the concern and its divisions. We have obtained the consent in principle of the Russian State Property Committee to do this and are now examining concrete questions: Who should be given the right to dispose of property and in what percentages? The concern needs support in these undertakings. A holding company is a modern managerial system used throughout the world, and we need to adopt it in order to preserve the branch.

The concern and its executive bodies should provide the greatest possible assistance to territorial motor transport associations in carrying out measures to meet the economy's and the public's needs for transport and services and in monitoring implementation of the branch rate agreement concluded by the Russian government, the Russian Rosavtotrans State Concern, and the Russian Federation Motor Transport and Road Workers Union for 1992. As regards the future of Russian general-use motor transport, the Council of the Rosavtotrans Concern resolved to complete in the first quarter of 1992 the study of all necessary questions with respect to creating the Rostranskholding Joint-Stock Company and to provide practical assistance to the concern's members in drafting and implementing the privatization program for 1992.

The council was addressed by Russian Federation Minister of Transport V. Yefimov. In response to questions from many general-use motor transport officials, he said

that the Russian government is working on the basis of the laws that have been adopted and are in effect. An economic management system cannot be based on different principles governing the approach to property. On the one hand, I am the proprietor or property owner and I manage my property as I please, and on the other hand, the specific nature of my work is such that I would like to leave socialist principles intact—i.e., some sort of centralized support system on the part of the state. We must clarify this issue. Of course, it is necessary to preserve the branch, but in doing so we must be guided by existing laws adopted by the Russian President and government. There were many questions here, and striking was suggested as one means of resolving them. Of course, this is no solution. A strike could produce some sort of one-time result, but for a very short time. After all, you can't make something out of nothing. The consequences of a strike have to be borne in mind. When a person is killed in a traffic accident, that's one thing. Various circumstances contributed to this and it is possible to identify exactly what was to blame. But if people die as a result of a strike by motor transport workers who deliver, for example, bread or milk, how can this be explained?

We must take a sensible and prudent approach to the situation that has arisen. In order to survive and to preserve the amassed potential and especially personnel, we need to modify the orientation in our work. Above all, and this is suggested by world experience, we must greatly expand the scale of transport and dispatching work and not be mere carriers. We must organize a comprehensive goods-delivery network and play a dominant role in it. Otherwise, other people will come (and already are coming), and they will take the commanding positions, while the professional motor transport workers of our branch will remain just that—carriers.

At the proposal of the council's members, a petition to the Russian President and government was adopted regarding the need to preserve general-use motor transport and to provide state support to it.

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Railway Line Maintenance Status, Future examined

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[Article by V. N. Sazonov, chief of the Lines Main Administration of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Railways: "The Track Facilities of Russia's Railroads. Condition and Prospects."]

[Text] The total length of main track on Russia's railroads is equal to 124,000 kilometers and that of station track and sidings is about 68,000 kilometers. A total of 453 subdivisions and 190 PMS [track machine stations] with a complement of 272,000 people repair and maintain it. The total number of track facility enterprises, including plants, quarries and line railroad workshops, is 797. A total of 282,000 people work in them.

Track facilities are a branch where the reliability potential has been created over decades through long-term programs and expensive technical measures. The assets invested provide a return over the course of many years. At the same time, the ill-timed investment of assets to maintain the facilities quickly leads to irreplaceable losses and breakdowns. Subsequent restoration requires incomparably more resources than does smooth operation.

With the limited financial assets, the primary task of all line workers is not to lose the existing potential little by little but to establish conditions for the reliable working of the lines and, thereby, insure coping with planned shipping volumes with the appropriate traffic regularity and safety.

Track and Engineering Structures

Rails

For many years, the Ministry of Railways has insured the laying of only heavy-type new rails on main routes because the capacity of the rails has constantly grown despite the low level in satisfying the railroads' requirements (78 percent in 1991). During the last five years, the average weight of a rail has increased from 61.3 to 62.8 kilograms per meter although it should have already reached 65 kilograms based on the density of freight traffic. At the same time, the percentage of R75- and R65-type rails on main routes has risen from 77 to 86 percent.

The repeat use of heavy-type rails removed from sections with a high freight traffic density has played a substantial role in increasing the capacity of the rails. On main routes, re-laid rails are serving a second term on 13,700 kilometers or 11 percent of the total available.

The qualitative characteristics of rails have also changed during the past years. The percentage of tempered ones has grown from 63 to 80 percent and rails of the first group, which are made from high quality steel and resist contact and fatigue damages better, have increased from 14 to 30 percent. The length of continuous welded track with reinforced concrete ties has grown by 3,500 kilometers.

This has reduced the number of acutely defective rails being replaced individually. In 1987, 96 rails with dangerous defects were replaced for every 100 kilometers of track; in 1991—only 68. The only exceptions were the Gorkiy, Krasnoyarsk, Transbaykal, Far Eastern, and the Baykal-Amur railroads. These rejections of rails were considerably reduced on all the others, for example, 1.5-fold on the October, Kuybyshev, Sverdlovsk, and West Siberian and 1.8-fold on the South Urals.

Due to the failure to deliver new rails, however, the length of track with rails which had exhausted their

service life increased from 20,000 kilometers (16.5 percent) to 22,000 (17.8 percent) and the number of defective ones—from 8,800 kilometers (7.3 percent) to 10,800 (8.7 percent) on high density freight traffic avenues.

There are more rails which are defective and overdue for replacement on the Transbaykal—36 percent and 12 percent, respectively; West Siberian—32 percent and 29 percent, respectively; Gorkiy—27 percent and 11 percent, respectively; North Caucasus—27 percent and 10 percent, respectively; and Sverdlovsk—20 percent and 9 percent, respectively, than on other railroads.

The main administration has analyzed the condition and future of rail facilities for each mainline and has determined that, if the delivery of rails to the railroads is kept at the amount planned for 1992 (1.272 million tonnes—9,800 kilometers) until 1995, the percentage of rails with above-norm operating time will increase by three percent on the average for the network by 1996 and, on the stretch having a freight density of more than 25 million gross tonne-kilometers per kilometer a year, will reach 23 percent of the total length of main routes. That is why it is possible that the number of places with speed restrictions will grow 1.4-fold and the number of unsatisfactory kilometers by 25 percent with a corresponding increase in operating costs.

In order to preserve a high level of rail reliability, 18 billion rubles a year are required for their purchase at the prices in effect in May and the railroads have earmarked only 21 billion for the entire track repair program. All told, the cost of the rails in this complex of work is 30 percent.

The railroad chiefs must once again weigh financial capabilities and search for assets to repair track. This especially concerns the Moscow, Gorkiy, Southeastern, South Urals, Transbaykal, and Far East mainlines which have allocated about 30 percent of the required assets for the above-mentioned purposes.

Under these conditions, the following should become the main avenues of technical policy in the rail area.

1. Supervising very strictly the distribution of new rails to rail-laying areas in accordance with their metallurgical quality so that rails with an increased operating stability will only be used on high freight traffic density sections; expanding the laying volumes of continuous welded track both by welding new and old rails and bringing its share in the annual amounts of capital repairs to 40-45 percent by 1996 instead of the 30 percent at the present time.

2. Increasing—at a minimum, twofold—the amounts and raising the quality of repairs to heavy-type old rails, which have been taken from high density freight traffic sections, at rail welding enterprises. In the latter, capacities were kept running at only 77 percent, all told, in 1991 and only 830 kilometers of old rails were welded. For example, with an RSP [rail-welding train] load level of up to 60 percent, the Northern Railroad repaired only

12 kilometers of rails; the Kuybyshev and Transbaykal—23 kilometers each; and the Southeastern—38 kilometers. At the same time, the Gorkiy, Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Far Eastern improved more than 100 kilometers of rails.

3. Expanding the stretch for laying old rails removed from high density freight traffic sections. Based on research and tests and considering operating experience, the main administration has introduced changes in the norms and has permitted these rails to be used on sections with a freight traffic density of up to 25 million gross tonne-kilometers per kilometer a year instead of 15 million tonne-kilometers and for the replacement of intensively worn-out rails on the outside thread of curves—without freight density limitations (Ministry of Railways Instruction No A-2785 dated 18 March 1992). Calculations show that this measure will permit the standard requirement for new rails, which is now 1.7 million tonnes a year, to be reduced by 0.2 million tonnes.

4. Grinding rails. A radical re-examination of the approach to this is necessary. It is time to end the smoothing of kilometers for the RShP [rail-grinding train] plan on runs of 40-60 kilometers and to grind rails purposefully on sections, which have carried the standard tonnage and on which major overhauls will not be carried out in the next two-three years, and on sections where medium track repairs are being carried out and old rails are being laid. On lines with intense traffic and high speeds, a considerable effect is achieved by grinding the new rails laid on the track. Track services must shift to planning RShP in connection with specific grinding sections and review the payment system, orienting it on final results. VNIIZhT [All-Union Railroad Transport Scientific Research Institute] experiments and the experience of a number of South Urals Railroad subdivisions have shown that putting the rail grinding system in order can increase their operating time by 15-20 percent with a reduction in expenditures for current track maintenance.

It is necessary to continue the hard-facing of rail ends and their welding on the track; special attention should be paid to restoring the broken lashes which lie for several years at times with the cuttings. This leads not only to needless expenditures but also to violations of traffic safety as occurred in May on the Volga Railroad.

5. Equipping the railroads with technical assets for lubricating the rails on sharp curves and wheel ridges in accordance with Ministry of Railways Instructions No P-432u dated 19 May 1992 that provides for the manufacturing of 15 mobile rail lubricators during the current year and another 30 during 1993-1995 and 490 and 1,920 ridge lubricators, respectively.

The Rail Base

A total of 246 million wooden ties, 84 million reinforced concrete ones and 183,300 switch-tie sets are located on Ministry of Railways lines. Because of the insufficient delivery of tie items to the railroads (58 percent of the

wooden ties and 34 percent of the switch ties were received in 1991), the rail base condition is worsening. At the beginning of 1992, all lines had 35 million unfit wooden ties, or 14.2 percent of the total number; 31,000 switch-tie sets, or 17 percent and, considering ties instead of beams were laid at switches,—26 percent. On the average, the number of unfit ties on the system almost exceeds the permissible level for normal operating conditions five-fold and the number of switch ties—10-fold.

An extremely unfavorable situation regarding the condition of ties is being created on some railroads. Thus, the number of unfit ties is 23.6 percent and the number of switch ties is 25.6 percent on the North Caucasus; 21.0 and 20.4 percent, respectively, on the Kuybyshev; 19.0 and 16.6 percent, respectively, on the October; 18.0 and 13.6 percent, respectively, on the Moscow; and 17.4 and 21.9 percent, respectively, on the West Siberian.

Approximately 100 warnings are in effect on 1,800 kilometers of main track because of unfit ties and beams. However, this is not all. In 1991, eight accidents and one wreck occurred due to the poor condition of the rail base.

If the situation with respect to deliveries of tie raw materials remains at this year's level (ties—7.7 million items; beams—3,200 sets), the percentage of unfit ties on all routes will be 20 percent and that of switch ties—37.2 percent by 1996 on the average for the network. This could require train movement speed restrictions of up to 25-40 kilometers per hour on a stretch of 25,000-27,000 kilometers of the total length of main track. However, estimates about maintaining the delivery level may be unrealistic if railroads do not find the assets to purchase products. Moreover, based on the results of the first five months, they owed 311 million rubles [R] to tie-impregnation plants for the products shipped and the plants owed the lumber industry about R300 million. It has come to a halt in the dispatch of raw materials and the gradual halting of the plants.

A system for the repeat use of old ties has been introduced in track facilities. The laid amount of old grids with reinforced concrete ties grew to 2,200 kilometers in 1991; however, the network plan for this indicator was completed by only 78 percent. The October (50 percent), Volga and Kuybyshev (66 percent), Northern (72 percent), and North Caucasus (85 percent) did not meet their quotas. Only 20 percent of the total number of grids were re-laid on the main tracks.

The repeat use of old wooden ties grew by 10 percent in 1991 compared with 1990 and reached 55.8 percent of all those removed from the track. Unfortunately, this indicator was significantly lower on a number of railroads: on the Moscow, it was 12.9 percent; on the October—27.2 percent; on the Baykal-Amur—29 percent; and on the Southeastern—34.2 percent.

Under these conditions, the main administration considers the following to be the most important tasks.

1. Increasing the production and expanding the areas for laying reinforced concrete ties and switch ties to bring their output volume to 9.1 million pieces and 3,000 sets, respectively, by the year 1995—the more so since the cost of reinforced concrete items is twofold lower than wooden ones.

At the present time, the possibility of purchasing abroad equipment for manufacturing intermediate fasteners for the planned laying volume of reinforced concrete rail foundations (12,000 tonnes of spring clamps, 8,000 tonnes of wood screws, and 10,000 tonnes of clamping and laying bolts) is being examined at the governmental level. At the same time, the railroads themselves could display initiative and, using the capacities of local industry, arrange for the production of intermediate fastening items for the reinforced concrete ties.

2. Laying old track grids with reinforced concrete ties on the main tracks, without limiting them only to station track and spurs. Investigations have shown that up to 70 percent of these grids with KB [expansion not given] fasteners can effectively operate with a freight density of up to 25 million gross tonne-kilometers per kilometer a year.

3. Special attention should be paid to the repeat use of wooden ties. It is necessary to bring their repair volume in tie-repairing shops to 3.5 million pieces in 1995 and not permit ties suitable for laying on the track to be used for other purposes.

4. In 1992, participating institutes should complete tests to determine production processes for manufacturing composite ties based on the use of polymers and wood chips, which have been obtained from unsuitable ones, for the further operation of wooden ties and begin their series production in an amount of 500,000-600,000 items a year in 1993.

Ballast Layer

The stability of the rail threads' placement in cross section and plane depends a great deal on the ballast layer, its type, thickness and pollution. Crushed rock and asbestos ballast, whose percentages are 61 percent and 31 percent, respectively, on the main tracks, predominate on the Russian Federation's railroads. Gravel and sand ballasts, which are primarily found on the Baykal-Amur (1,700 kilometers), Gorkiy (1,100 kilometers) and Transbaykal (600 kilometers), are still on 10,000 kilometers (8 percent) of the sections with little activity.

The ballast layer's thickness corresponds almost everywhere to the prescribed norms. Matters are significantly worse with its contamination and clogging. By the beginning of this year, the length of sections with dirty crushed rock ballast for the network as a whole was equal to 17,100 kilometers—22.6 percent of the length of main track using this ballast. Despite the cleaning done during major and medium repairs, the percentage of polluted ballast has increased by four percent during the last five years. The situation worsened on all roads except the

South Urals and Volga and this despite the fact that they annually clean approximately 5,000 kilometers (4 percent of the length) on the network.

The highest percentage of dirty crushed rock is on the West Siberian—49 percent; North Caucasus—42 percent; Southeastern—37 percent; Gorkiy—29 percent; East Siberian—27 percent; and Sverdlovsk, Kemerovo and Krasnoyarsk railroads—25 percent each.

The main cause of the contamination is its clogging by freight spilling from rolling stock. Although the problem of freight losses has been known for decades and has been repeatedly examined in the Ministry of Railways Collegium, there has been no improvement in solving it. According to VNIIZhT data, approximately 18 million tonnes of coal, flux, mineral fertilizer, salt, and other freight, i.e., on the average up to 150 tonnes per one kilometer, spill on the track each year.

It is ineffective to use straightening machines on polluted ballast and the wheel residual deformation accumulation rate grows 2.5-3-fold. That is why one can state that not only track cleaning and straightening expenditures but also the quality of its maintenance, on which both traffic safety and the serviceability of the upper structures and rolling stock's elements depend, are directly linked with the failure to safeguard shipments of loose freight.

Of course, the amounts of crushed-stone cleaning should be increased. The appropriate equipment exists for this; however, a number of railroads, especially the West Siberian, East Siberian, Gorkiy, and several others are using it unsatisfactorily. The radical step is to prevent losses of loose cargo. In the main administration's opinion, the task can be solved. The experience of foreign mainlines, where massive shipments of such freight do not pollute the track, indicates this.

The expenses, which are directly connected with cleaning the crushed stone and which transport bears annually, are extremely significant. You see, the cost of medium repairs, even without considering the increase in prices for energy, are already more than 600,000 rubles today and total expenditures for the network have grown to 5 billion rubles.

In order to reduce the clogging of the ballast prism, the railroads must insure the complete implementation of Ministry of Railways Order No 7Ts dated 6 February 1991 entitled "On Improving the Technical Condition of the Freight Car Pool", paying special attention to the mandatory railroad worker's acceptance of each railcar after freight operations in a maintained, cleaned and ready-for-transport condition (Point 16.1). Track workers should take a more principled position in this matter.

During repair and track work, it is important to clean the crushed rock in a very high quality manner, cut off the polluted layer of asbestos ballast, level the ballast prism, and set up a reliable water drainage system. One must

primarily plan the use of asbestos ballast on sections susceptible to heavy clogging.

In order to increase the effectiveness in using crushed-stone cleaning machines on the railroads, one must equip and provide modern diesel locomotives (of the 2TE10, 2TE116, etc., types) and not TE2 and TE3 locomotives, which have completed their service life and which do not provide the necessary traction.

In order to speed up the production of new competitive crushed-stone cleaning machines, industrial plants and design organizations should accelerate the building of a new generation of this equipment having a tool equipped with a barrow chain and expand the cooperation with foreign partners (MTKh [expansion not given] - Prague, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic), which has been begun for the cooperative manufacturing of new machinery with improved qualities and ecological characteristics which permit the qualities of the ballast prism and roadbed to be restored.

Switches

A total of 213,000 switches are operating on the Russian Federation's railroad network; 64,000 of them are on main tracks. The average weight of the rails on main-track switches lags behind the average weight of a rail. Approximately 14,000 switches, which do not correspond to operating conditions and the type of rails on adjoining main tracks, require replacement with heavier types. More than 24,000 (11.5 percent) defective switches and 25,000 (11.9 percent) defective frogs are in service in all routes.

The steps taken by the Ministry of Railways to reconstruct and expand branch switch plants; the reduction in deliveries of new switches to foreign customers; the extension of the service life of switches and their elements, which the railroads have implemented; and the rational use of resources permitted the situation with respect to switches to be somewhat stabilized by 1989.

With the commissioning of new capacities at Ministry of Railways plants, deliveries of switches to Russia's railroads increased from 12,000 in 1987 to 15,700 in 1991. This halted the increase in the presence of switch defects on the main lines.

The delivery of individual frogs did not increase during this period but a massive supplying of the railroads with Mark 1/11-type R65 switches with a frog having a rotary core began during 1986-1987. They were intended for high freight density sections and their service life is twofold-threefold more than frogs with a cast core.

The number of warnings about switches began to grow again beginning in 1990 and has reached 1,100 this year. This is primarily connected with the sharp—almost twofold—decrease by Russia's switch plants in manufacturing and supplying individual tongues and frogs to the railroads. At the same time, a program approved by the Ministry of Railways on 14 February 1991 provides for

raising their output. In 1992, production of separate Mark 1/11-type R50 frogs was halted in the Orenburg workshop of the Abdulinskiy PRMZ [expansion not given]. The reason was the Lyublinskiy Mechanical Foundry's halting of the production of cast frog cores made from high manganese steel and the fact that the capacities commissioned at the Muromskiy Switch Plant are operating at only 60 percent of their rated productivity.

The worsening in the supplying of spare parts (tongues, frogs, stock rails), the incomplete delivery of switch items, and the failure of the production products list to comply with requirements for individual types of items, combined with the railroads' insufficient assets, has again led to an increase in the number of defective switches and speed restrictions on trains traveling over them.

In order to stabilize the situation regarding railroad switches and considering the scarcity of material resources and the shortage of financial assets, it is necessary to implement the following measures.

The Soyuzzheldorremash Concern must re-examine the product list for the production of switches in Russia's plants in accordance with the railroads' requirements, primarily increasing the output of separate tongues, frogs and repair sets.

During 1992 and subsequent years, the Novosibirskiy and Muromskiy switch plants must insure the production of switches for laying on reinforced concrete beams in an amount corresponding to the production of these beams.

Track services must engage more energetically in extending the service life of switches through the timely hard-facing and gouging of frogs, grinding of tongues and stock rails, increasing the amounts of machine straightening and cleaning of crushed stone, and the repeat laying—after they have been repaired—of switches on routes that have little activity. Strict supervision, which precludes the shipping of fit switch elements for scrap, must be established on the railroads. This primarily concerns shoes, connection strips, shelves, bridges, pads, bolts, terminals, and other fastening items.

Engineering Structures

A total of 30,485 railroad bridges and overpasses serve Russia's railroads; 3,658 of them are defective. On the average, bridges are located every 2.9 kilometers of operating track length. From this data, the importance of good maintenance and repair of the above-mentioned installations is clear. Along with the passage structures, the condition of the bridge floor, where defective beams alone number 18 percent and even 30-35 percent on certain railroads, evokes serious alarm. Speed restrictions are being introduced on many bridges, including large ones, for this reason; however, this step cannot, in the final analysis, guarantee traffic safety and continuity.

The Ministry of Railways together with the Ministry of Trade and Material Resources has taken steps to put the delivery of bridge beams in order. However, a number of railroads are displaying impermissible slowness in this matter. Even when the main administration has found suppliers, the Moscow, Southeastern and Gorkiy mainlines refuse to conclude contracts. Generally speaking, the railroads have allocated, all told, three percent of the assets from the total amount for financing repair work to the repair of man-made structures when at least 10 percent were directed towards these purposes in 1991.

This reduction in financing will drag out the completion of the replacement of passage structures, which were built according to 1884-1907 norms, until 2035 instead of 2000 as was stipulated by a Ministry of Railways program (Instruction No 311u dated 9 June 1988). As a result, the service life of bridges will exceed the standard more than twofold and they will not be able to let modern rolling stock across even at a reduced speed.

The railroad directors must clearly picture the future and once again weigh capabilities, comparing them with the consequences of decisions being taken today when there will be—in the not too distant future—a bridge, on which it will be necessary to restrict speed to 15-40 kilometers per hour, every 24 kilometers on the average.

Matters are no better with the roadbed. The total length of sections with bumps, defects and violations of the requirements in technical norms is 12,400 kilometers or 12.8 percent of the network's operating length.

Deformities are primarily caused by the complicating of the roadbed's operating conditions, an insufficient amount of its major overhaul, and the strong practice of accepting new lines and secondary lines with low quality cutting and filling structures and a large number of imperfections, which has taken shape. One can cite as an example the newly constructed Karlaman-Beloretsk and Krasnodar-Tuapse lines, Ufa's southern bypass, etc. Serious deformities with grave consequences have occurred on the North Caucasus mainline (the Tuapse-Adler section) because of gross defects allowed during construction and the absence of the necessary supervision and formal acceptance.

The problem of strengthening and repairing the subgrade on BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] is especially complicated. Throughout its length (and especially in the eastern section), the track on every third kilometer is subjected to uneven subsidence at a rate of 10-50 centimeters a year because of the thawing of the foundation's permafrost soil. At least 1.5 million cubic meters of ballast and 9 million cubic meters of rock are required annually to eliminate the subsidence and widen the roadbed.

Deformations in the slopes of cuttings and fillings occurred on a number of railroads during 1990-1991 and wash-outs and landslides sharply intensified. A total of 18 sudden collapses have occurred; because of them, interruptions in train movement reached 1,113 hours. In

March of this year, train movement was halted for almost 73 hours in all because of a deformity in a high filling on the Armavir-Mineralnyye Vody section. Approximately 10 million rubles were spent on restoration work. This would not have happened with timely work performance.

Another reason for the unsatisfactory condition of the subgrade is the violation of track major overhaul technologies where the lay-out of the main area and the cleaning and lay-out of slopes are not carried out and drainage structures are not put in order.

At the present time, approximately 780-800 million cubic meters of soil are required to be poured just to expand the main area and position the slopes of fillings, without considering the elimination of deformities. The problems of protecting the track against mountain landslides, landslips, mud flows, and wash-outs on the North Caucasus, Krasnoyarsk, Far Eastern, and Transbaykal railroads and the strengthening of the banks of Lake Baykal on the East Siberian, Batrak, Ulyanovsk and Ufa landslide hill-sides on the Kuybyshev require an urgent solution.

At the roadbed major overhaul rates existing prior to 1991 when six percent of the total amount of the financing of track repair work was allocated, it was not only impossible to decrease the defects and deformities but also to maintain the track in an operating condition. This year, the railroads have allocated three-fold fewer assets for these purposes. In comparison with last year, the Southeastern and BAM have even reduced the absolute size of the assets designated to repair the subgrade. Moreover, the Southeastern assimilated only 20 percent of the planned assets in 1991.

In order to improve the condition of engineering structures, it is necessary in the near future:

To strengthen supervision over the condition of bridges constructed during past years and not permit a reduction in the replacement rates of defective and obsolete metal and reinforced concrete passage structures, preserving replacement volumes no lower than those outlined in the program (Ministry of Railways Instruction No 311u dated 9 June 1988);

In connection with the limited assets and material and technical resources for sharply increasing repair work and considering the presence of a large number of bridges with a low freight-carrying capacity, to develop measures to strengthen bridges constructed in the past, raise their carrying capacity, extend their service life, and incorporate new durable materials and designs during the current maintenance and repair of man-made structures;

In order to lengthen the service life of man-made structures and the subgrade and reduce expenditures for major overhauls, to devote primary attention to their

current maintenance and an increase in the role and responsibility of all commanders responsible for these facilities;

During capital repairs of the track, to improve without fail the subgrade's main area, eliminate unstable ballast plumes, position the slopes of fillings and put the ditches of cuttings in order;

To introduce new technologies for repairing track and cleaning crushed stone of contaminants and its removal beyond the limits of the section being repaired;

To strengthen special subgrade PMS, granting them a priority right to purchase transport and earth-moving equipment;

For the Spetszhelezobeton Concern to organize, beginning in 1993, the production of plates for a ballast-free bridge roadbed based on the railroads' annual requirement for 15,000 cubic meters.

Industrial Base

An evaluation of the condition of track facilities and an analysis of the production capacities of its industrial, repair and maintenance base permit the conclusion to be drawn that track subdivisions and PMS can perform the entire complex of work to maintain the tracks in good repair.

Russia's 15 tie-impregnating plants have an annual wood impregnation production capability equal to 2.4 million cubic meters. A total of 40 crushed-stone plants, which are producing 15.6 million cubic meters of crushed stone at a time when the railroads' total requirement is 17.9 million cubic meters, are operating within the Ministry of Railways system. Only 9 of the 19 mainlines are completely satisfying their needs; the others are forced to import this material. A total of 43 stationary production lines are working in the 23 rail welding enterprises. The capacities of the welding complex provide an opportunity to manufacture grids and standard length rails for 4,000 kilometers of track a year and also to repair and weld old rails with high quality for almost 2,000 kilometers of track.

The Remputmash Production Association, which was established in 1987 and which includes eight PRMZ, is able to satisfy the railroads' requirement for repairing the key track machines. Besides this, the association is organizing the production of machine building products—AGD-1 railway inspection freight cars, UP-3 trailers with hydraulic mechanical arms, UM-1 earth removers, and track repair trucks based on the GAZ-55 motor vehicle; in cooperation with the Czech MPKh Association (Prague), the Kaluzhskiy PRMZ manufactured and tested the SCH-600 crushed-stone cleaning set.

Renewing the Track

The Russian Federation's railroads have 190 PMS where 37,315 people work; 164 track machine stations are up to strength with track-laying equipment sets

On the average for the network, the production for one PMS is 98 kilometers put in order; however, a number of track machine stations have not reached the required development and their productivity does not exceed 50-60 kilometers on the Northern, Volga, Kemerovo, and Baykal-Amur mainlines. The most important indicator is the production per one hour of "window." Certain railroads continue to keep this indicator at a rather high level. In 1991, it was 297 meters on the average; however, it was 408 meters on the East Siberian, 400 meters on the West Siberian, 360 meters on the Krasnoyarsk, 354 meters on the Kuybyshev, and 341 on the Far Eastern. At the same time, it did not exceed 240 meters on the Volga, North Caucasus and Baykal-Amur

railroads due to the poor preparation of the technical equipment, lack of coordination between the workers in related services and serious shortcomings in setting up the "window."

The capacities of all PMS permit major overhauls to be completed on more than 10,000 kilometers of track; however, due to asset and resource limitations, it was planned to make major overhauls on 6,369 kilometers in 1992 and complete medium repairs on 7,912 kilometers and grade repairs on 5,814 kilometers.

The performance of track work (in kilometers) based on 1 June 1992 situation is described by the data cited in the table.

Designation of Work	Annual Plan	Schedule on 1 June	Completed on 1 June	Completion, %	
				Of the Plan	Of the Schedule
Track major overhaul:					
To repair	6369	655	521	8.2	79.5
To commission	6369	325	271	4.3	83.4
Medium repairs	7912	487	404.9	5.1	83.4
Grade repairs	5814	322	255.4	4.4	79.3
Laying of reinforced concrete ties	2053	265	270.6	13.2	102.1
Laying of continuous welded track	2053	215	270.7	13.2	125.9
Repeat laying of old grids with reinforced concrete ties	1382	106	109.1	7.9	102.9
Major overhauls on the most important avenues	1668.7	293	163.3	9.7	55.4

With the shortage of assets for major track overhauls and in order to retain PMS personnel and maintain their work efficiency, it is necessary to transfer other types of repairs—medium, a part of the grade, switch replacement—to them and, besides this, target them toward the improvement of industrial enterprise sidings based on bilateral contracts; this is being practiced on some railroads but in limited amounts.

It is necessary to point out that the amounts of major overhauls, which have grown with each year, were performed with low quality on a number of sections during past years. Main routes were improved without replacing switches and restoring the drainage qualities of the ballast prism under them.

At the present time with the decrease in the amount of repairs, it is necessary to orient track subunit directors toward a sharp increase in quality. One of the avenues in this regard is restoring the drainage qualities of the ballast by cleaning the crushed stone to a depth of at least 25-30 centimeters lower than the tie bed using ShchOM-4M, OT-400 and other crushed-stone cleaning machines. The October Railroad is devoting the greatest attention to this. Here, ShchOM-4M production processes for cleaning crushed stone are being widely used on newly laid rail-tie grids and the loosening of the crushed stone layer when the track grid is removed. This production process provides an opportunity to repair track and

clean crushed stone to a depth of up to 20 centimeters—and with the addition of a minimal amount of new ballast (300-400 cubic meters per kilometer). This was demonstrated at the end of June in the network school for progressive experience in the October mainline's OPMS-I.

Social Questions, New Technologies and Mechanization Systems

On 1 January 1992, there were 103,124 track installers or 58.5 percent of the estimated requirement. Compared with 1990, there were 600 fewer of them. Low staffing continues on the Transbaykal mainline—46.7 percent; Far Eastern—52.3 percent; and Moscow—57.6 percent. This level is significantly higher on railroads who pay the necessary attention to the selection of personnel, for example, it is 79.1 percent on the Baykal-Amur, 69.4 percent on the Krasnoyarsk, and 67.1 percent on the South Urals although the climate conditions there are more severe than on railroads in the European part and work conditions are more difficult.

According to a decision of the railroad directors, the acceptance of workers in the mass trades is being restricted. The main administration thinks that this decision on track installers should not spread because their replacement was only 48 percent in 1991. If this ban exists for a prolonged time, the complete staffing of

brigades will be sharply reduced and, as a consequence, the track's condition will worsen. However, a number of mainlines, for example, the Moscow, are not considering this circumstance. Recruitment is even being restricted on subdivisions located in large cities where there is a 65-70 percent shortage of installers.

The willing reduction in the installer contingent is impermissible. Ministry of Railways Order No 38Ts dated 1988 sets clear norms on whose basis a cut-back through such measures as, for example, strengthening the track, repairing it, introducing machine assets, or in connection with a drop in shipping volumes could be calculated.

The average wage of workers employed in operations was equal to 3,703.6 rubles in March 1992 and had increased 3.5-fold in comparison with November 1991. It was only 2,716 rubles on the Gorkiy mainline and had increased only 2.7-fold (the minimum increase during this period was 2.9-fold according to the tariff agreement). Wages are also low on the Moscow Railroad. They are less by 1,420 rubles in comparison with the October which operates under similar conditions. With the high inflation, wages are the main source for the workers' social protection and a very important measure for preventing personnel turnover and establishing stable labor collectives.

The housing construction program, which was approved by Ministry of Railways Directive No G-1838u dated 23 July 1990, was carried out by 94 percent in 1991. Housing was erected quickly on railroads where the directors are concerned about people. Thus, the Baykal-Amur mainline fulfilled its 1991 task by 300 percent; the East Siberian—by 210 percent; and the Volga—by 247 percent.

Here is how they display a "concern" for workers on the North Caucasus: They coped with the quota by only 34 percent. The Krasnoyarsk (47 percent), Transbaykal and Northern (57 percent), and Sverdlovsk (62 percent) were not far ahead. The problem of resettling the 2,000 families living in railcars is especially acute. Primarily, this must be done on the Gorkiy mainline which has 293 of these families. Northern where there are 251. South-eastern where there are 286. Kuybyshev where there are 245, and the Sverdlovsk where there are 208 families.

The extent of supplying track work with mechanization systems is equal to 43 percent of the estimated one; in routine maintenance, it is only 30 percent. Approximately 20 percent of the main track machines are operating above the norms (more than 20 years). During 1985-1991, 16 new types of machines, which were not present in the technological networks of sets for maintaining and repairing track, were built by expanding the track machine building plants. These are the VPO-3-3000, VPR-02 and VPRS-02 machines; the KRASH rail grinding set; BPB high-speed ballast leveler; AGD-1 railway inspection car; AS-3 railway motor passenger car; UP-3 trailer; and a number of others. Improved

machines for routine maintenance are being developed: VPR-03, VPRS-03, PMG-02, BUM-02, ROM-4, ShZM tie replacer, ShchOM-6 crushed-stone cleaner, SM-5 snow remover, and new non-destructive testing and track measuring systems.

The railroads of Eastern Siberia and the Transbaykal Railroad are equipped with track surfacing, lining and flattening machines of the VPR and VPRS type at a 20-35 percent level and with crushed-stone cleaning machines at a 44-56 percent level of the system average. Track machine building plants (Transmash Concern) can increase deliveries of equipment from the CIS countries. However, the delivery of machines and the putting of their production on line are being delayed primarily by a shortage of financial assets. During 1992, the main administration asked the railroads for 1.6 billion rubles in January 1992 prices for a centralized fund to acquire track equipment. The railroads approved the allocation of 1.5 billion rubles. During the first five months, 0.5 billion have been received in accordance with the contracts that were concluded. Considering the increase in prices during April-May, another 2.3 billion rubles are required before the end of the year. Some mainlines, including the Transbaykal and Volga, have already exhausted the asset limit and the sending of equipment to them has been halted. If the railroads do not increase financing, the main administration will be forced to reduce purchases twofold. This will involve halting the production of a number of track machines and their deliveries in 1992 will be carried out at a 20-25 percent level of the annual requirement.

Considering the relatively small share of assets for purchasing track machines; expenditures of only about 3 percent of the total expenditures for acquiring rolling stock, locomotives, and superstructure materials; other expenditures; and the inadmissibility of halting the production of the machines, the railroads must search for additional assets to acquire track equipment.

A system for repairing and servicing track machines on the network has been established by setting up 69 base enterprises and 15 maintenance stations on the divisions of the railroads or at large hubs. The October, North Caucasus, Kuybyshev, and Kemerovo mainlines, where all the equipment has been dispersed to subdivisions and track machine stations, are lagging behind in solving these questions. It is necessary to accelerate the establishment of these enterprises and stations on the Krasnoyarsk, East Siberian and Transbaykal railroads where the pool of machines should be rapidly filled up.

Much has been done to expand track railroad workshops and to organize the output of machines and devices in them. During 1991, 13 enterprises, including two test plants for repairing track equipment and manufacturing new or modernized existing machines, were operating on Russia's railroads. There, the production of machines for replacing switches (MSP), crushed-stone cleaners (ShchOM-MF), track aligning machines (PRB), ballast trimmers, power nut-drivers of various modifications,

etc., have been put into production. The manufacturing of machine building products grew threefold during 1986-1990.

The October, Northern, Gorkiy, Volga, Sverdlovsk, and South Urals mainlines have mastered the medium repair of equipment for routine track maintenance (VPR, VPRS, PMG, ROM, etc.). On the other railroads having PDM, it is necessary to reconstruct and equip the railroad workshops with the amount of equipment required to perform routine repairs on these machines. The necessary equipment repair organization has not been set up on the Kuybyshev, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, and East Siberian mainlines. You see, its medium repair, timely servicing, and maintenance in working order is severalfold cheaper than repairing it in a plant.

The cost of equipment has risen considerably. For example, a minimum set consisting of five machines designed for the complete restoration of continuous welded track costs almost 30 million rubles in this year's second quarter prices. Current operating expenses for the machines have also grown. This means, the efficient use of this expensive equipment is becoming even more urgent. Here, the main avenue of activity is the introduction everywhere of the South Urals mainline's experience in setting up sets of track machines for routine maintenance. During 1991, 34 of these sets, which restored 5,800 kilometers of main track, were established on the railroads. At the same time, the North Caucasus, Kuybyshev and Volga mainlines did not fulfill their prescribed quotas. During 1992, 66 sets had already been established on 10 railroads. Their first month's work showed good results on the South Urals, Moscow, North Caucasus, and Sverdlovsk railroads and an unsatisfactory organization on the October, Gorkiy, West Siberian, and Volga.

Financing Track Work

According to existing norms, 8,700 kilometers of track need major overhaul, including 2,200 kilometers on the most important avenues; 70.7 and 17.8 billion rubles, respectively, are required for this. More than 150 billion rubles will be required after the liberalization of prices for energy.

Only 40-60 percent of the standard requirement for all types of track work is planned for this year. However, one will not manage to complete even this amount because of the lack of assets. In order to handle the above-mentioned minimal amount, 42 billion rubles—in prices in effect on 15 April 1992—are required and expenditures will be more than 100 billion rubles with the freeing of energy prices.

The railroads have provided 21 billion rubles, or 40 percent of the cost of the work, to the repair fund for track work but some of them, in particular, the Gorkiy, Transbaykal and South Urals—only 15-20 percent. The assets allocated for the annual work volume have already been almost completely expended. If this situation continues, approximately 4,000 kilometers of track will not

undergo major overhaul. This will cause an increase in its failure, speed reductions and—on individual avenues—the removal of passenger trains from circulation.

The situation is also aggravated by the fact that even the small assets, which are being allocated to the railroads, are not being used due to their absence in bank accounts. As a result, the indebtedness of enterprises for shipped materials reached 4.5 billion rubles at the end of May.

In evaluating the extremely complicated situation, the Lines Main Administration considers it necessary to take the following measures.

1. Re-examine the structure of the railroads' expenditures. Change the direction of profit and, by this, increase the repair fund for track facilities.

2. Form a Ministry of Railways repair fund in accordance with norms in an amount sufficient to perform the required repair and track work volume on sections playing a decisive role in mastering the shipping volume of the entire Russian railroad network. Calculations have shown that approximately 800 train-sections with an operating length of 32,000 kilometers are on this stretch; this is 37 percent of the network. The above-mentioned fund should be indexed for price changes. This measure is not an infringement upon the railroads' independence but a concern for system-wide interests.

3. Concentrate attention on reducing personal expenditures. The main reserve here, as has already been pointed out, is concealed in the widespread repeated use of old materials and the extending of the service life of superstructure elements through renovations and an increase in the quality of routine maintenance. In order to implement these measures more successfully, the railroads must develop a system of incentives for collectives, in particular, those of track subdivisions providing for the passage of above-norm tonnages, depending on local conditions.

4. The railroads, on whose balance sheets are 260 vehicle viaducts with a total length of 31 kilometers, are suffering unwarranted expenditures in an amount of 70 million rubles. It is necessary to transfer them to the balance sheets of local organizations or levy fees as, for example, dam owners are doing for the passage of motor transport over them. Approximately 2 billion rubles are going to maintain more than 10,000 general-use crossings. Local taxes should partially compensate for these expenditures.

5. The main administration and the institutes has begun work connected with dividing all lines on the system into classes depending on the allowable speed and freight density. It is assumed that norms for maintaining track, which correspond to the permissible speed, an optimum schedule for repair work, a system for routine maintenance, and the equipping of enterprises with equipment will be established within the framework of each class. According to expert estimates, track maintenance will permit the operating expense requirement to be reduced

15-20 percent, considering the division of lines into classes and the use of resource-savings technologies.

6. As the last thing, an alternative in case of a considerable shortage of money should be examined. It will be necessary to close little used station track and sidings and, in a number of cases, even main tracks. According to data of the Institute for Over-all Transport Problems, two-way lines with an overall length of approximately 6,000 kilometers, which could be converted to one-way without a substantial decrease in the amounts of traffic, are operating on the network. In the majority of cases, wooden ties are used on these lines for the rail base. Thus, this alone would decrease the length of track with wooden ties by 3,000 kilometers and the material removed from the closed tracks could be used both for repairing the remaining track and for other lines.

Concerning the Management Structure

The cost of the track facility's fixed capital is about 50 percent of all transport's assets. That is why, under the conditions of the economic reforms, the most important problem that must be solved is the management of the line enterprises' production and economic activity. The dual subordination of enterprises, especially track subdivisions (to the service and the division of a railroad), leads to the fragmentation of assets and a reduction in responsibility and does not contribute to the track workers' interest in the end results of their labor.

A new structure, which would permit the delegation of more rights and responsibilities in economic activity directly to each labor collective, is required and, through a system of internal cost-accounting relations and stimulating levers, the establishment of conditions for improving the condition of the track based on the efficient use of material and financial resources. This structure could be an association of track facilities (within the framework of the track service) with the direct subordination of all enterprises to it. The financing of this association must be carried out according to stable settlement prices for the maintenance of each kilometer of track. The main administration also thinks it advisable to construct management on the basis of an economic settlement for the entire branch—from the enterprise to the Lines Main Administration, inclusive.

The following structure is assumed:

All track facility enterprises are included in the association within the framework of the existing track service;

At the railroad level, the association organizes the management of an enterprise based on complete cost-accounting principles;

The Lines Main Administration organizes the work of the associations based on economic methods for managing the branch and the interest of all links in the final results.

Such a structure will provide an opportunity to pursue a single production, technical and economic policy; deal with production reserves better; maneuver financial and material resources; use machinery and devices effectively; train highly skilled personnel; and solve social questions.

Concerning the introduction of new management forms. Production associations for repairing track machines, for repairing and maintaining track on the October railroad, for repairing track on the North Caucasus, and for selling crushed-stone ballast on the South Urals were organized at the end of the Eighties in the track facilities. The Volga mainline's PMS-152 and a number of protective afforestation divisions and industrial enterprises converted to a leasing contract. Their work experience has shown the considerable effectiveness of the new forms for management activity.

Production and economic indicators have improved quite a bit at the North Caucasus Railroad's Krivenkovskiy Crushed-Stone Plant, where a leasing contract has been introduced. During 1991, the output of products grew by 18 percent, costs decreased 25 percent, expenditures per one ruble of product went down by 33 percent, and the balance sheet profit rose. In achieving this, the number of industrial and production personnel decreased by 40 percent.

Labor productivity in PMS-152 increased by 42 percent and the output per one hour of "window" increased 1.4-fold during 1990-1991. Work volumes and, correspondingly, profits grew. Social tasks are being successfully solved with the profits. The Ministry of Railways Collegium has recommended that the railroad convert track machine stations and track facility industrial enterprises to a lease. However, the railroads are slowing down the introduction of the new system.

A process of privatization is taking place in the country. In track facilities, protective afforestation divisions, industrial enterprises, track machine stations, and track railroad workshops could be privatized. It is advisable to carry out privatization through a lease which would permit the capital of the collectives to be accumulated for the subsequent purchase of state property. It is necessary to carry out the privatization of protective afforestation divisions and track railroad workshops during the first stage and, as experience is accumulated, the privatization of industrial enterprises and track machine stations during the second stage.

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Dividing Up the Railcar Fleet

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[Interview with A. Dachevskiy, chief of the Odessa Railroad railcar fleet service, by A. Sobko, journalist: "The Division of the Railcar Fleet: What do the Specialists Say About This"]

[Text] Whatever they might say, with the collapse of the Union and the formation of independent states the critical need to divide the railcar fleet has become imminent. The problem is not a simple one and the very process of distribution is painful. The fact is that cars were assigned to individual railroads by specific classification and types. For example, only tank cars have been attributed to the Odessa road and other types of freight cars to the remaining railroads of Ukraine and the other republics.

How will the division of the railcar fleet proceed? How are they approaching this problem on the Odessa Railroad? Journalist A. Sobko talks about this with A. Dachevskiy, chief of the railcar fleet service.

[Sobko] Anatoliy Kirillovich, at the beginning of this year a Council for Railroad Transport was created in place of the all-union Ministry of Railways and a Board of Directors formed for day-to-day management. Most likely proposals are now coming from there?

[Dachevskiy] Yes, the general policy for the division of the railcar fleet is being developed by the Board of Directors. Its make-up includes representatives of the railroads of all the countries of the Commonwealth as well as plenipotentiaries from Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. "Ukrzalyznitsya" represents Ukraine. So that the approach is quite democratic—each has the right to express his ideas. At the sessions of the council which took place recently in Moscow and in Kiev the talk was about guaranteeing passenger and freight traffic in the service between states. Each party submitted proposals on the basis of which the All-Russian Scientific Research Railroad Transport Institute has developed regulations on the preparation for the redeployment of the railcar and container fleet. We have received them in Odessa. They are now being discussed in the localities. We will send our comments and suggestions to Moscow.

[Sobko] What are the criteria being proposed for carrying out the division of the railcar fleet?

[Dachevskiy] Two stages are contemplated. The first—according to the numbers, dates of construction, and type of cars. The second stage coincides with the regular planned repairs. The repair will be carried out by the owner-states during the next two years.

[Sobko] And how specifically will the process of transferring the rolling stock look?

[Dachevskiy] A transfer of cars will be organized at each railroad junction with a neighboring state. Specialists from each side will determine their technical and commercial status. The cars entered on the books, although they will become the property of the individual owners, will travel about the entire territory of the former Union as before. That is, the system of joint operation is to be based on principles of divided responsibility: the railroads of the owner states guarantee the depot and capital repair while the user railroads are obligated to faithfully

observe the rules of technical operation and to perform all operations of the between-repair servicing of the railcar fleet.

[Sobko] But if the owner of the cars is unable to repair them?

[Dachevskiy] As a rule each one is obligated to engage in the repair of its own fleet but if it can't it can make arrangements with neighbors. The problem will be not only with repair but also with the replenishment of the railcar fleet. Ukraine is in a more advantageous position in this respect. You see, we have the Kryukovskiy Railcar-Building Plant and the Dnepropetrovsk plant in operation. However, one needs to take care of the railcars, both passenger and freight. If we even now don't properly learn this, it would seem, simple truth, our affairs will be in a bad way.

Private Firms Help Guard Rail Freight

934A0022A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 15 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by T. Zyкова, Moscow: "The Firm Guarantees"]

[Text] It is no secret that there is no limit today on our railroads. Criminals frequently rob passengers right out in the open. And we're not even talking about ownerless freight cars. Bandit groups shoot at the cars and smash the seals. The Ministry of Railways has, of course, its own armed security service with well-organized communications and developed work methods. However, the firms that make use of the services of the railroad more and more frequently prefer to turn not to the Ministry of Railways but to private security agencies.

"The state security (gosokhrana) is basically not reliable," explains Aleksey Ozerov, a spokesman for the Minsk trading firm Ekho. "Who is on its work force? As a rule retirees who have gotten used to dozing sweetly in heated freight cars to the clicking of the wheels. And again, when contracts are concluded with the state services, a lot of all kinds of "buts" are found in case of which the latter can evade responsibility. It's different in private agencies. They work in alliance with the insurance firms and guarantee 100 percent compensation for a loss. Moreover, there are lads there, choice, and this is at one's disposal."

"It's true," confirms Nikolay Krayushchenko, marketing director of the Bayard joint-stock company which works on numerous security problems, including the transporting and guarding of freight. "In order for one to land a job with us, one needs to pass several screening rounds. First a psychologist-physiognomist talks with the candidates, after which, as a rule, three out of four are eliminated. Then—psychological testing: for the stamina for a 13-hour working day, a lack of inclination to shady transactions and adventurism, the ability to keep one's word and to submit to a code of honor. The candidate must have a knowledge of mathematics and be able to solve logical tasks. However, even if two rounds have

been successfully passed, the beginner gets on staff only after a six months trial. High wages, various social privileges, and compulsory life insurance (100,000 rubles) create the incentives for effective professional work. Our people are dispatched to a road with the distinctly deliberate thought: to protect the property entrusted to them to the last."

Recently the Bayard joint-stock company concluded a long-term agreement with the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). They are detailing 15 persons with several Caucasian sheep-dogs to protect a 30-car train in this case. An unalterable rule is to be executed in the process: at each short stop the guard is to be lined up alongside the cars.

Bayard has many steady clients. In the application they frequently directly specify who is to be assigned to guard the freight.

And will you really resist the excellent service: some firm, let's assume, telephones Bayard and courteously receives an affirmative answer to the very first questions, do you have your own transport and warehouses and do you do loading and unloading.

"We are actively going out into the railroad services market," continues Krayushchenko. "Because in the end this is tens of new cities, hundreds of new clients, and huge prospects. Of course, it's not so simple to penetrate this market. The Ministry of Railways is a monopolist and doesn't regard competitors with favor. The roads have even developed their own game rules. For example, during hauls they try at the marshalling stations to drive cars with commercial freight into a siding."

Here's what the NZ [emergency reserve supplies] guards carry with themselves: for unforeseen expenses—peaceful negotiations—a couple of cases of vodka. Otherwise... the train marshallers swear that they will shove a car so... The firemen threaten to make people get off the train altogether... because they have discovered a kettle. And how can one be without hot water for 15-20 days?

Improving Kaliningrad Transport Complex

934A0022B Moscow GUDOK in Russian 15 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by A. Krylova, special GUDOK correspondent: "Kaliningrad: How to Untie the Knot"]

[Text] The person who lives near the sea well knows how much the word port, short as an outward breath, takes in—ships standing at moorings, the polyglot speech of sailors, gantry cranes, and the alluring smells of cargoes from various regions of the earth. But a port is also an enterprise with a strict rhythm of work and its own complex life.

We are walking past ships motionless at their moorings with a sweet woman, engineer of the labor organization and wages department of the Kaliningrad Maritime

Trade Port Valentina Antonovna Yushmanova. Her emotional account enlivens and fills the entire surroundings with meaning.

"As soon as the oblast declared Yantar a free economic zone foreign ships began to call at our port: Swedish, German, Polish, Cuban. Here's the 'Coral Sea,'" she rapidly translates the name of a ship under an unfamiliar flag that is nearest to us. "This is profitable for the port—they pay in foreign exchange..."

We pause automatically to observe the unloading of grain. A grab bucket rises out of the hold. A mechanical arm has unfolded and carried up to a special chute a substantial "handful" of wheat which has started to flow directly into the hatch of a grain carrier.

Pardon me railroad workers, but there was neither spilled grain nor a frightened flock of birds impatiently awaiting their usual feeding around. No matter how closely you looked you didn't see either trash or spilled cargo around. Perhaps a carelessly discarded pair of blocks by which they hold the gantry cranes attracted attention.

A fork-lift truck drove up, hooked up a couple of cars, and towed them to the gates.

"Before we had our own diesel engine," Valentina Antonovna explains. "Then they decided that the cars can be rearranged with the help of a powerful loader and the remaining work turned over to a station locomotive—thus cheaper..."

We move on to where the gantry cranes are running smoothly. A rotation of the crane arm—and a cargo platform is slowly lowered into the hold. In a few minutes the cable already pulls it up with a cargo—84 sacks at a time. Again a rotation of the arm and sugar is on the way to the loader. A fast Toyota hurries with these sacks to the railcar.

"How is it going?" we address Aleksandr Kurennoy, the dockers brigade leader.

"Our technology has been perfected, all operations are polished. If it weren't for the hold-up with the delivery of railcars... Yesterday we stood idle about six hours because of this..."

"Productivity in the complex is very high," confirms Yushmanova. "Up to 80 railcars are processed during a shift."

Another brigade leader, Viktor Kozinets, talks about the shortage of railcars. One can understand the resentment of the port workers: there's more than enough work, they didn't even give a summer vacation this year, and now—idle time... This is now our railroad problem. What will the station people say about it?

The shunting station office, more correctly part of it, has been stuck in an old red brick building constructed by the Germans already. A few small rooms crammed to

overflowing with desks: the goods office is here and both the acceptance and transfer officers and the switchmen huddle together. There's no room for people. It's uncomfortable.

Vladimir Alekseyevich Grib, deputy station chief, was quartered in a poky little room near the entrance:

"I've only just returned from Moscow. I had to decline half of the cargoes announced," thus he continued without a pause the subject begun in the port. "No, we fulfill all the orders accepted, only our resources today lag significantly behind the demand. The amount of work can and needs to be increased, but we're in bad shape with mechanization at the station. We change the switches over by hand. And what is more our latter-day business men are as yet barely making a passing grade—they dispatch cargoes not thinking that there might not be a ship in port which could carry their good further. Some 120 closed cars with carbamide arrived even before my leave. I'm already back at work but they still stand not unloaded."

"Our station needs, oh how it needs, to be reconstructed," he continues passionately. "It would seem, in Russia's present condition, when Kaliningrad has been left as the only non-freezing port on the Baltic, that this ought to be done so as to expand our resources, but no, as yet there are only conversations."

"And what do the leaders of the Kaliningrad Maritime Trade Port think apropos of this?"

"The problem of the Kalinigrad transport complex is not new," says Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Gritsen, the port's chief engineer. "Only they've thought of it rather late. Previously all the funds were directed to the development of the ports in our former Baltic republics. An enormous grain complex was constructed in Tallin port, a modern container terminal in Riga, a splendid ferry crossing in Klaypeda. And what about Russia? One can speak only about the St. Petersburg port project, only the winter is not for it, the gulf freezes. We can ensure work the year round. Our annual freight turnover is four million tonnes, but even now we can process two times more. However, the snag is in the undeveloped state of the railroad system."

The Mosgiprotrans institute has developed a program for the development of the maritime ports of Russia and the railroad approaches to them but money is needed to implement it, and lots of it. Where to get it from? Neither the port nor the railroad workers has any. We have enough only just for operational expenses. Of course, we ourselves are trying to do something to increase productivity. For example, we have commissioned a complex for the processing of ships by the horizontal loading and unloading method. Lifting cranes are not needed in it and the work goes faster and cheaper.

"But is the port collective interested in the development of its own enterprise?"

"All Russia ought to be interested in this." Vasily Aleksandrovich Vareniya, the port's chief economist, enters into the conversation. "And in that case the funds must be found: either from the budget or loans on a preferential basis. And perhaps the transport complex can be freed from taxes?"

Another side—the regional administration—is interested in the development of the transport complex. Stanislav Borisovich Nesterov, deputy chairman of the oblast industry and communications committee agrees with this:

"Recently Yu. Matochkin, head of the oblast administration, and I visited Moscow. We submitted a project for the development of the transport complex to the government. It provides for the reconstruction of the railroad station, the port, the entire railroad network from Kibertay [sic] to Mamonova (this will be a direct road to Poland), reconstruction of the tracks on the Koroviy peninsula where the canal connects with the gulf. Furthermore, the airport system needs to be developed in order to convert it to international class. Then it will be possible to take not only our airplanes but also those of foreign firms. The development of the motor vehicle network is being proposed, including continuation of the construction of the autobahn to the border, which the Rusoban firm is already engaged in. Money is needed for everything. And a great deal—2.4 billion rubles."

"But, as B. Kharchenko, president of the Baltic Maritime Steamship Company joint-stock company, noted in his interview with the St. Petersburg newspaper NASHA PRAVDA, Russia paid \$2.7 billion last year alone for the use of ports in our former Baltic republics, to say nothing of the fact that, in addition to an enormous amount of money, they are demanding the right to keep 5.6 percent of all the oil and petroleum products being transported for themselves. This means that it is far more advantageous to invest this for us large amount of money in the development of Russian ports on the Baltic."

"Who is arguing? Of course, in today's conditions one, possibly, will have to scramble out of it oneself. Let's say by creating a joint-stock company and attracting private capital."

"And still I don't sense confidence in your words. Perhaps all this is related to the instability of the status of Kaliningrad Oblast and to the anxiety which people are experiencing in connection with the problem of the 'northern territories'?"

"Of course, this always was a sore subject for our oblast. They hand over the islands to Japan and who will guarantee that the city will remain Kaliningrad and that the question as to whether it should again become Koenigsburg will not come up. Everything depends precisely on that."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Shanibov Arrest Effect on Local Political Situation

934C0007D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Natalya Pachegina: "72 Hours of the President's Captivity: This Could Have Serious Consequences for the Leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria"]

[Text] The pickets outside the House of Soviets in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria set up three days ago in connection with the arrest of Musa Shanibov, president of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, spread out around the city 48 hours after the moment of his detention by the republic internal affairs authorities (although the local populace is firmly convinced that Musa's arrest is the work of the group of Russian investigators) and is now standing in front of the building of the republic Public Prosecutor's Office and the MVD and the Television and Radio Committee building. The central artery, Lenin Street, of course, has been closed off. Representatives of the Caucasus peoples who live in the republic are continuing to arrive from the districts. True, the Kabardino-Balkaria Public Prosecutor's Office, which our NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent called, believes that life in the capital is proceeding normally: Transportation and communications are working without a hitch, the stores of full of customers, and there are no pickets outside government buildings.

Yesterday those assembled outside the House of Soviets were addressed the whole day by deputies of the republic and Russia. They included Yuriy Kalmykov, chairman of the International Association of the Circassian People, who does not, as is known, see in Shanibov's social and political activity actions falling within the sphere of articles of the criminal code. The three appeals within 24 hours of the deputies of the Kabardino-Balkaria Supreme Soviet to Valeriy Kokov, president of the republic, requesting information on the details of the fate of the detainee came to nothing, it was said in the headquarters of the Congress of the Kabardin People. Kokov merely promised three times not to let any harm come to Shanibov. During a meeting with representatives of the Adyge Khase and the International Circassian Association public organizations and deputies of Kabardino-Balkaria and the Russian Federation, Khachim Shogenov, minister of internal affairs of the republic and perfidious former friend of the captive, promised to organize a meeting with Shanibov, finally acknowledging that the president of the KGNK [Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus] had been arrested, although he did not specify by whom—the republic or Russian Public Prosecutor's Office. The meeting did not take place, but the minister handed over a letter of the detained Shanibov, in which the latter appealed to his sympathizers and fellow countrymen "to remain calm and avoid clashes in the region." Shanibov

gave no information about himself, our NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent was told by Khaudi Sheriyev, representative of the Congress of the Kabardin People. It seemed to them in the Congress even that the letter passed on from the place of confinement, although in Musa's hand, had manifestly been written under duress. The president's supporters were astonished by the unusually meek style, which is wholly untypical of the leader of the mountain peoples.

Eduard Denisov, prosecutor general of the republic, appeared on local television on Thursday evening and told the audience that he had instituted criminal proceedings in respect to the fact of the taking hostage of an investigator of the Russian Public Prosecutor's Office (he was not named). The latter, according to the prosecutor, had fallen victim to criminals in the performance of his duty, namely, a search of the apartment of detained KGNK President Shanibov.

Meanwhile new points have appeared in the protests of the demonstrators, which had for two days been confined to the demand for a change in the preventive detention of the president of the KGNK: The representatives of national public organizations, members of the Kabardino-Balkaria Supreme Soviet, and deputies of the republic and the Russian Federation are demanding air time. The opposition—as the champions of liberty for Musa Shanibov call themselves—is sure that the concentration of Russian army formations on republic territory and activity which is, in their view, unduly assertive for "visitors" (the Russian investigators) are the result of the venality and unscrupulousness of the Kabardino-Balkaria leadership.

Eleven in the morning today marked three full days that the president of the KGNK has been in custody. After this length of time, he should be charged.

A resolution was adopted yesterday at a republic meeting in Nalchik on the immediate release and termination of the criminal persecution of the president and the leadership of the KGNK. It demanded that the Kabardino-Balkaria leadership order the resignation of Prosecutor General Eduard Denisov and pronounce him persona non grata in the republic. It was demanded of Valeriy Kokov, president of Kabardino-Balkaria, who seems to the demonstrators the most to blame in the current situation, that he withdraw from Kabardino-Balkaria within three days the Special Militia Detachment units which arrived at his request. That the guarding of the state border and the upholding of public order be entrusted to military subunits of the republic and the national guard which is being formed. And that national organizations of Kabardino-Balkaria organize the collection of signatures for the annulment of the Federal Treaty with Russia.

Russia-Chechnya Talks Unproductive

934C0051A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
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[Article by A. Ganelin: "Dinner Most Constructive Activity During Chechnya Meeting With Russia"]

[Text] The bodyguards to Yuriy Fedorovich Yarov, the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, carried a flat red portfolio everywhere after their boss during his trip to Chechnya.

"What is in it?" I asked. In an almost imperceptible movement, the security service officer released one of the handles of the portfolio. The latter, having come open, had become an armored shield. The entire time that I was a part of Yarov's group in the Chechenskaya Republic at the meeting with the Chechenskaya parliament, I thought of that portfolio. It seemed that the members of the Chechen parliament also saw the Russians' visit as a threat to their republic's independence, and had shut themselves off from the Russians' "imperialist ambitions" beforehand with an invisible shield.

Yuriy Fedorovich went to Grozny on the invitation of the chairman of the ChR [Chechenskaya Republic] parliament on an unofficial visit to strengthen mutual relations. Relations between the Russian Federation and Chechnya had indeed run quite deep since the latter had announced its withdrawal from the Federation. Russia had shut itself off from Chechnya with a real shield: military units were placed at the border to prevent the transport of weapons and the passage of armed bands. Following an airplane hi-jacking Aeroflot discontinued its flights to Grozny. This was not because the hi-jacker had not been handed over, but that he was practically made into a national hero in Chechnya. Trains also started to circumvent the region because of attacks and robberies by armed bands.

...When the Chechenskaya Republic withdrew from the Russian Federation, the Ingush people decided to remain within it. After a law concerning the formation of the Ingushskaya Republic was adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet, the question arose as to whether to conduct elections to government bodies there. How could elections take place, however, if the borders of the Ingushskaya Republic had not been determined with the participation of not only Northern Ossetia, but Chechnya as well? In general, there were already enough problems, and the Russian parliament was anticipating how and with what they would be received in the Chechenskaya Republic.

They were not received altogether, however. No one was awaiting us in the ChR parliament. Everything was somehow too unofficial. Then, so as to avoid getting soaked by the rain, we went as guests to the home of Isya Aliroyev, a Russian Federation deputy who was part of the group.

After a short while, representatives of the Chechenskaya parliament appeared in Aliroyev's home and began explaining in a quite nervous fashion why they had not come to meet the group. The Chechen minister of security had apparently decided that the presence of two Ingush militia colonels from Nazranya was posing a threat to the security of the Chechenskaya Republic. He began to explain exactly who these men were and what they were doing in Grozny, having suggested that they leave the sovereign territory.

Following this, everyone went to the village of Chishki, where the meeting was to take place in a resort. In a large room, the sign hanging on the doors of which read "Chamber No. 17," members of the Chechenskaya and Russian parliaments sat at opposite sides of the table from one another. Once again the representatives of the sovereign republic began to explain that they had met with the representatives of another sovereign republic on their border with Northern Ossetia. Yuriy Fedorovich Yarov took an interest in this: What border were they talking about if the Ingushskaya Republic is in between the Chechenskaya Republic and Northern Ossetia?

After arguing about the borders, Magomed Gushakayev, the deputy chairman of the parliament, suggested to Yarov that he regard their initial conversation as just a warm-up. In the corridor, ChR ministry of security workers were carrying on their own warm up with the policemen from Nazranya. Among the ministry workers was a man with shoulders of such breadth, that if measured in centimeters, they would in all likelihood equal the height of the average man. He was the chief of the president's national security service, Salman Khasimikov, a repeat world champion in wrestling, and as I was told, a champion in ketch as well. The champion was demanding in a very lively fashion that the militia colonels leave the territory of the Chechenskaya Republic.

...Meanwhile, the members of the Chechen parliament continued their unofficial meeting with the Russians.

- If you want a half step, take a half step, and we will also take a half step. Together, however, we will arrive at the truth, that it is necessary to sign the Federation Treaty. Until Russia recognizes you, no one will recognize you, not one other country, affirmed Yuriy Fedorovich.

- The Israeli state has developed for 40 years without being recognized, said Magomed Akhmetovich.

- And you will develop for forty years without being recognized. Does that appeal to you? We can live in a peaceable manner without recognizing the Chechenskaya Republic, but this is not what you, or we want. Therefore, we are thinking here that you have some constructive proposals...

The most constructive proposal heard that day was the suggestion to go to dinner. At the table the diplomatic verbal firing continued upon the guests.

...- We will imitate neither Eastern, nor Western countries. We will not become like Peter I, who imitated the Germans. We do not need the Germans. We have enough Russians, was said of the members of the Chechenskaya Republic parliament.

...The following morning the parliament chairman did not arrive. Yarov spent one hour in a meeting with the deputy chairman of the ChR parliament, Bek Mezhdov, at which it was decided that the negotiations needed some new impetus. Where the question of demarcation of state territories was concerned, the commission that will be handling this issue was advised to draw upon international experience giving preference to liquid borders. As far as a trip to a factory to meet with Russians working in the republic was concerned, it had been scheduled to take place at 1700 hrs. It was impossible to do it earlier.

- I had forewarned them that I had to leave earlier, Yuriy Fedorovich stated indignantly. Those in charge remained inflexible, however, having stated that they could not change the schedule. And with that we left. It later turned out that the members of the Chechenskaya Republic parliament gave Yarov's assistant a statement concerning their borders with Ingushetia. The statement protested the development of any type of representation in Ingushetia on the part of the Russian Federation VS [Supreme Soviet], informing them that until bodies of power could be created in Ingushetia, the jurisdiction of the Chechenskaya Republic would extend to Ingushetia, and that Chechen-Ingush borders would be established in agreement with those of 1934.

...It seems to me that if meetings with Chechnya continue to be conducted in the same type of atmosphere in the future, Aeroflot planes will not start flying to Grozny again any time soon.

Results of Zaslavskiy Rayon-Level Economic Experiment Questioned

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[Article by Tina Dzokayeva, director of the Russian Foundation for Protecting Citizens' Rights Economic Research Center: "The Economy: Political Economy From Ilya, or the ORMPPA Phenomenon"]

[Text] Two years ago, Ilya Zaslavskiy wrote a letter to Boris Yeltsin. "In order to test the program for leading the country out of crisis," he wrote, "I propose to conduct a political and economic experiment in Moscow's Oktyabr Rayon." The proposal was adopted. And what is the situation today? The father of the "new political economy" has long since left the company of the chairmen of the Oktyabr Rayon Soviet. He has gone on to higher office, in the municipal administration. He is a rich man: He rides around in a Toyota and goes to America for medical treatment. So was the experiment a success?

Privatized Soviet Executive Committee.

With the victory of the democratic forces, the capital's Oktyabr Rayon became a site of pilgrimage for commercial enterprises. There they could be registered easily, freely, and without bureaucratic bias. As I later learned, one-third of them submitted registration documents that were utterly incomplete. Zaslavskiy declared his fiefdom to be the center of a new civilization that Russian cities large and small were urged to emulate.

One of Ilya Iosifovich's first innovations was to sell licenses for legal addresses. Any person who so desired could obtain one by paying 5,000 rubles. In practice, this took the form of a brisk trade in "dead souls": Say you want to start up your own firm—you pay the money and obtain a fictitious address. As a result, one legal address alone—36 Lenin Prospekt—became the registered address of more than 1,000 enterprises!

But the piece de resistance of the carefully thought-out plan was the creation of the Oktyabr Rayon Municipal Property Administration (the ORMPPA). A few initial drafts of its charter have been preserved. They make it clear just how convenient formulas were chosen, how some phrases were crossed out, and how names were shuffled. One version lists the founders as G. Popov and I. Zaslavskiy, but later these big names disappear. The charter vaguely states: "The administration is confirmed by the Oktyabr Rayon Soviet Executive Committee."

In confirming the decision to register the ORMPPA, the executive committee left the door open for the real owner, resolving: "To ask the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies to join the makeup of the administration's founders." And until that time, "to charge the Oktyabr Rayon Soviet Executive Committee with carrying out the functions of the council of founders." Since then, no documents that directly mention the Moscow Soviet's having joined the founders have been found. But the founders council was soon expanded all the same—by adding ORMPPA's collective itself, including its typists and cleaning ladies.

The collective's share in the capital fund was given as five percent (1,284 rubles, approximately 30 of our "wooden" rubles per person). The remaining 95 percent consisted in the residual value of two buildings (on Cossack Lane No. 1 and Cossack Lane No. 2), appraised at 24,000.

The administration highly valued its rights. And in listing them in the charter, it invariably added the word "primary." "Primary developer in the rayon." "Primary balance keeper of rayon property." "Primary owner, user, and administrator of rayon property." In this way, all the functions of rayon administration were transferred to the economically independent firm. In other words, ORMPPA became nothing less than a "privatized Soviet executive committee."

Asserting that all these actions were designed to implement the principle of "independence," Zaslavskiy set

about trying to institutionalize ORMPA, sending his letter to Yeltsin. The reply was signed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, who at the time was deputy chairman of the parliament: "This question can be resolved with the concurrence of the Moscow Soviet; no decision by the Supreme Soviet is required on this matter."

That's all the Moscow Soviet leadership needed. In January 1991, the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee adopted its celebrated decision No. 138, "On the Municipal Property of the Moscow Soviet and on Denationalization of Trade and Public Catering Enterprises." This document would later become the legal justification for all of ORMPA's "innovative" dealings.

'Innovation' Technology.

One that vitally important document appeared in Oktyabr Rayon, immediate efforts got under way to create a mechanism to confer a monopoly on the ownership and disposal of municipal property. To this end, preplanned groups of small and joint enterprises with a single center in the form of ORMPA were set up. The administration's accounts simultaneously became the accounts of these subsidiary firms. This made it possible to spend the money as the enterprises pleased. For example, a contract that ORMPA concluded through one of these groups of enterprises with the SOVTEK joint venture contained the following clause: "The sides agree to set aside part of the aforementioned sum (\$24,500 US) in SOVTEK's foreign currency account, to be used for business trips by officials of the Oktyabr Rayon Municipal Property Administration."

But the main purpose of these groups was to carry out the organized sale of tracts of land in the rayon. For illustration, let us examine one of them that is represented by the Kosmopolis-1 Limited Partnership.

The partnership was created on May 15, 1991. The founders were ORMPA, the Kosmopolis Soviet-American joint venture, and a small business known as Invest-Servis. Percentages in the capital fund were as follows: the joint venture—61 percent, ORMPA—34 percent, and the small business—five percent. The initial amount in the capital fund was 100,000 rubles, with a subsequent anticipated increase to 30 million, with the ratio of the participants' shares remaining unchanged. The ways in which contributions to the capital fund were to be made was specified: ORMPA was to make its contribution in the form of the "right to lease territory" and the book value of buildings and facilities; the joint venture would contribute in the form of the "conceptual project development," and the small enterprise would do so by handling the authorization documentation for the construction of facilities. Needless to say, in making their contributions, the participants "lose the right of individual ownership of material facilities contributed to the capital fund." (This applies only to ORMPA's contributions: It alone contributed "material facilities" to the capital fund.)

The contract was concluded in a very thorough manner: The partnership's members could withdraw from it only after 50 years. Information about its activities was to remain strictly confidential. Muscovites had no right to know what would happen on an enormous area of 200 hectares of no little importance to Moscow's appearance and encompassing the Pushkin Embankment, the Crimean Rampart, Oktyabr Square, Shabolovka Street, Ordzhonikidze Street, and Gagarin Square. What was the company with a monopoly on urban development plans—the Soviet-American joint venture—planning to build on this gigantic expanse? The contract made no mention of this.

One has to mention the special role assigned to the small enterprise in this group. According to the charter, it specialized in handling authorization documents for design work and obtaining the necessary clearances for leasing tracts of land. In actual fact, it engaged in outright trickery. Under the guise of so-called "preliminary design work (geological, ecological, and sociological studies of territories allocated for development), Invest-Servis, like a highly efficient pump, squeezed several million rubles out of the rayon budget. The mechanics were simple. Drawings in the Moscow Engineering and Design Office were copied turned over in packages to the ORMPA in the guise of reports on the enterprise's work. Nor did anyone conduct any sociological studies: Do you think they were stupid enough to divulge their plans to residents?

There were also operations of another sort. After obtaining "Central Committee" Residential Building No. 26 on Dmitrov Street from the Moscow Soviet and promising to house large families in it, ORMPA turned it over to Inter-Servis for commercial use. The small enterprise, in turn, sold some of the apartments through an exchange, and began filling the rest of them with residents driven out of buildings intended for foreign firms.

Meanwhile, the rayon budget deficit amounted to 5 million rubles in 1991. At the same time, ORMPA distributed more than 10 million to its units. According to a report sent to the Moscow government, the administration's official income for the year stood at 25 million rubles, of which the rayon received not a single kopek.

White-Stone Moscow for a Song.

The Moscow Soviet was unusually generous. With a wave of its hand, it issued another resolution placing at the disposal of our "privatized Soviet executive committee" 925 buildings with a total area of 419,181 square meters and a book value of 23 billion rubles, along with hundreds of hectares of land. Henceforth all the mighty administration's actions took place under the cover of not just the Moscow Soviet, but also the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee. Without divulging its secrets to the latter, ORMPA became the center of privatization in the rayon and in practice put into effect a mechanism of property relations based on book values and long-term leasing with subsequent buyout. It

selected investors at its own discretion. It was a super-monopoly accountable to no one!

Search your memory. At the time, there wasn't even a hint of any parliamentary or government decisions on denationalization, not even of the Moscow Soviet's resolution on such procedures. Incidentally, this was subsequently confirmed publicly by N. Gonchar, the current head of the Moscow Soviet.

Nor did the "new political economy" prove original in its approach to distributing the choice morsels. It used an old and time-tested method—favoritism. Consider the text of a message from then Moscow Soviet Deputy Chairman S. Stankevich to I. Zaslavskiy:

"Dear Ilya Iosifovich!

"The bearer of this letter is the talented broadcast journalist Sasha Ukhov, whom you know well. Ukhov, together with the team at the Press Club, is creating the Independent Producers Television Association, of which the Moscow Soviet will serve as a founder. The firm has been registered and is beginning to work for the good of democracy. Our nonresidential buildings administration has located a building for the IPTA's studio in your rayon. Do you have any objections? The independent television company will have an easier time getting established in your rayon and will always help you. S.B. Stankevich."

Meanwhile, ORMPA continued its frontal assault on the tenants of nonresidential buildings. It drove out mainly cultural and research institutions, child-care facilities, sports organizations, and the last refuges of veterans—the "red corners." Lease agreements were torn up without discussion or negotiation. Even such a patron of the arts as Sergey Stankevich "was unable" to stop his first commercial passion—the Moscow Business Bank—when it drove out the Literary Museum on Lenin Prospekt, accompanying this orgy with a shower of money transfers on ORMPA.

The ways in which ORMPA was "compensated" for sales based on residual value varied. For example, Mr. Sterligov, the proprietor of the not-known Alisa exchange, rewarded the administration for its services by transferring a whole 10 million rubles "for the formulation of a rayon urban development concept and research work to study the rayon's territory." On the condition, it's true, that in the event the exchange were to be expelled from the buildings it had received, Mr. Sterligov would take the aforementioned sum back.

The contracts with commercial enterprises were of one type: long-term leases for 15 to 99 years. Often without any lease payments and with the right to sublease. Some buildings renovated by these firms were supposed to be filled with people on the rayon's apartment waiting list. With the stipulation that these "lucky" people could become the owners of their apartments only by paying the proprietors for them. It's not hard to guess at what price.

Here are several concrete examples.

5 Kadashevskiy Lane No. 3 (Buildings Nos. 2 and 5). The Fonon Interneshil Firm and the Restoration and Construction Company (RCC). Reconstruction with subsequent purchase and ownership. The lease payment is not charged until reconstruction is finished and ceases after purchase. **Dmitrov Street, Building No. 42.** The Orion-Universal firm. Lease of tract of land for 99 years. Construction of a house on the tract of land, to be owned by Orion. **10 Crimea Cul-de-Sac.** The Feniks Cooperative. Lease on the building for 25 years. No lease fee is charged. Right of sublease and automatic lease agreement extension for unrestricted period of time. If we were to published the entire list, it would fill half of a newspaper page.

On a map of Oktyabr Rayon in the Russian Foundation for Protecting Citizens Rights, there is not a single residential area: Colored markers showing the spheres of influence of various commercial firms have turned it into an unbroken multicolored carpet. The land has been distributed generously—dozens and hundreds of hectares.

Muscovites remember well the scandal that occurred during the ceremonial start of work to implement the KNIT-Kaluga Outpost project. At the most important moment, a woman who served as a Deputy to the rayon Soviet ran out of the crowd of onlookers and covered the site where the first stone was to be laid with her body. At the time, officials tried to portray the incident as an impulsive act by a person who was unable to grasp the grandiosity of the deal and its importance to Muscovites. Pharisees! It's just that the woman saw no other way to protect the city from being plundered.

And that the project is a plunderous one is beyond doubt: Sixty hectares, including Gagarin Square, were handed over to a French firm for 99 years for the purely symbolic fee of \$10 a year! And even that pittance won't be collected for the first 22 years. The contract also has a clause saying that the "sides pledge not to revise the terms of the lease contract." In other words, no matter who comes to power down the road, it will be impossible to put a stop to this glaring injustice. I've never heard a lease being granted on such favorable terms in all the world.

In a message dated July 30, 1991, ORMPA chief Yu. Gusev informed G. Popov and Yu. Lukin that his firm held several million dollars in the capital funds of a number of joint enterprises. After which the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee adopted yet another resolution transferring buildings at 64 addresses and a total of 134.5 hectares of land to the administration's balance sheet as well.

ORMPA Leaves in Order To Stay.

After obtaining the rayon's property, creating dozens of commercial structures, and casting its net over many of the world's countries, ORMPA has clearly begun to feel

cramped by the patronage of administrative agencies. Efforts to "liberate" it got under way on June 15, 1991, when top administration and executive committee officials, seemingly offended by constant "attacks" from Deputies, pointedly proclaimed their total independence. (A day before this, on June 14, these same people, while still employees of the Soviet executive committee, approved enough contracts to provide a comfortable existence for their grandchildren and great grandchildren.)

In January 1992, not even Yu. Luzhkov could take any more, and he issued an order liquidating the ORMPA. At this, eyewitnesses report, Yu. Gusev became quite enraged and sent a telegram to the Moscow Procuracy denouncing the actions of his chief founder. He claimed that his human rights had been violated and that the collective's will had been ignored. Then the heads of the Central and Southwest Prefectures entered the fray, each trying to prove first rights to become ORMPA's successor. However, the unsinkable administration found a way out: Retaining its "earned" property, capital, and infrastructure, it hurriedly transformed itself in a joint-stock company, thereby getting off with a slap on the wrist.

What more can be said? The Procuracy as well as other competent agencies are perfectly well informed about all the details of this story. We will not infringe on their right to have the final say on what has taken place. But there are still nagging doubts: Intoxicated by the air of freedom, haven't we been wrapped around someone's finger yet again?

Locals Oppose Korean Autonomy in Maritime Kray

934C0046A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 38, 20-27 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by Yelena Matveyeva]

[Text] The authorities of Russia's maritime Territory have resolutely rejected the idea of the Association of Ethnic Koreans in the CIS for an independent Korean economic zone in the south of the Maritime Territory.

The Association's leaders are on record to have proposed one year ago that ethnic Koreans which had been banished by Stalin during the 1930s from their homeland in the Maritime Territory return there. The local population didn't pay attention to the idea then, but now after the first Korean families from Central Asia have arrived in the Khasan District they are worried. Ethnic Koreans also come to the Far East to visit friends and relations or just to tour the country. They say hundreds of Korean families from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and other parts of the CIS would like to move to the Maritime Territory for good.

The idea is supported by business circles and the government of south Korea who pledged their financial backing in the creation of a "free Korean national

economic zone" in the Russian Far East. South Korea "is in no way interested in a stream of emigration to Korea from Russia under the pressure of economic and social hardships", writes the vice-President of the Association Ho Yun Pe to the head of the Maritime Territory administration, Vladimir Kuznetsov.

The desire of those people to return to where once was their homeland is only too understandable. Besides Russia's Far East is a peaceful place today. It has never seen any ethnic conflicts, the local population living peacefully side by side with settlers from Western regions who came there in the 19th century. Well intentioned as the Association's idea is the people of four regions in the Maritime Territory have unanimously said No to a mass resettlement of Koreans (in a recent poll). They brought forward rather solid reasons.

There is no free land, housing is hard to get, and there's an acute shortage of food. The Territory's administration has a plan (which is already being acted upon) of pulling out of the crisis. The arrival of new people may disrupt the reform. The Ussuri Cossacks who have been granted the right to use part of the lands in the south of the Maritime Territory have stated that they would defend their land with weapons if there is an uncontrolled resettlement of Koreans and a forceful seizure of their land.

Even those Koreans who still live in the Territory are less than enthusiastic about ethnic Koreans from Central Asia. They say many are criminals. Some of them head organized crime rings in Central Asia and Kazakhstan who seek contacts with local and South Korean criminal groups. People in the Far East don't think that the idea of a Korean economic zone meshes with the current political and economic situation there. This artificial zone would inevitably damage the local interest and cannot be viable. So it's hardly wise for the Koreans from Central Asia to leave their homes for the faraway place where no one is waiting for them. More so because the idea of a Korean autonomy has not been discussed by the government.

New Yeltsin Representative to St Petersburg Interviewed

934C0047A St. Petersburg SANKT
PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian
17 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Sergey Alekseyevich Tsypliyayev by Special Correspondent A. Rabkovskiy: "Defending a Common Sense Policy"; date and place not given]

[Text] As is well-known, by order of the President of Russia, S.A. Tsypliyayev has been appointed his representative for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. A former member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, upon expiration of his term as a deputy Tsypliyayev worked as a scientific secretary at GOI [State Order of Lenin Optical Institute] imeni Vavilov, and was an expert at the Russian Government's Center for Economic Reforms. Just how does

Tsypliyayev view the nature of his present activity? What in general is his concept of the essence and the destiny of this new institution of executive power? S.A. Tsypliyayev speaks about this with our special correspondent.

[Correspondent] Sergey Alekseyevich, talk of the necessity for strengthening the executive power structures in Russia is hardly new. However, whereas previously problems of establishing a strong vertical line of presidential authority were associated mainly with appointment from the Center of heads of regional administrations, now yet another principally new institution has appeared among us—the President's Representatives in the Localities....

[Tsypliyayev] It is apparent that the central authority is simply not capable of effectively governing the state, monitoring the situation in the localities, and taking adequate decisions without having its own "branches" [filial] in the regions. This is the role that the Presidential Representatives must play. They will act within the bounds of the authority which the President has delegated to them.

The Representative is directly subordinate to the President and answers to him. He represents the federal interests in his region.

[Correspondent] Just what is your real authority? Is it not limited to the functions of inspection [nadzor]?

[Tsypliyayev] It goes without saying, no. The Ukase of the President of 15 July 1992 outlined in sufficient detail the range of rights and obligations of the Presidential Representative. I will cite the most important ones.

The first is to observe how the laws, ukases and government decrees are carried out in the localities, and how in general the policy conducted by the federal executive authority is being implemented. Moreover, the task here does not consist of "catching" specific violators—that is the job of the procuracy. The Representative, you see, must objectively investigate why this or that act is not working, and thoroughly analyze the situation from all sides.

From the point of view of organizing the flow of information, in addition to direct contacts, feedback plays a very important role. This means preparing reports to the center on the state of affairs in the region, on the political and economic situation, and so on. Clearly, the Presidential Representative is obligated to make direct appeals to the executive authority for eliminating all violations which turn up. At the same time the Presidential Representative does not have the right to interfere in the operational activity of the local organs of power, or to point out what they are to do, and how, in the sphere of their own jurisdiction.

The second important task is to coordinate the activities of the federal organs: tax inspection, the ministry of security, all kinds of controlling services, and so on. These structures represent the "branches" [filial] of the central executive authority, but on the local level they

often operate in isolation. The Presidential Representative must invite their leaders to develop joint approaches, to exchange views on specific problems, and to seek optimal solutions. In principle it is a question of establishing a consultative collegium of the leaders of these services.

Finally, a third and very important function is—participation in cadre policy. Candidates for appointment as heads of administration of oblasts and oblast centers (for the time being these will not be elected positions) and leaders of all regional departments of the federal organs of power, must be coordinated with the Presidential Representative. This is a powerful political lever, which must be employed very wisely and precisely.

By summarizing at least these three principal tasks, one may draw one's conclusions on the purpose of introducing the institution of Presidential Representative in the Localities. He is designated, above all, to ensure the effectiveness of the federal executive authorities, to assist in overcoming, in our very complex times, regional tendencies to break away from the federation, and to insure the central executive authorities against the threat of self-isolation.

[Correspondent] Clearly it is impossible to form such a powerful institution out of nothing. On what basis, and what body of experience—foreign and domestic—did the President rely when he issued his Ukase?

[Tsypliyayev] One can find an analog, for instance, in France, where the prefectures have experienced a long period of development. There was a time when local self-rule was completely absent, and the prefect or, as he is now called, the commissar of the republic, had in essence complete authority in one department or another. After that, this authority was reduced, as they sought reasonable compromise, combining this state institution with the local authorities. They finally managed to achieve a certain rational balance between the prefectures and the mayors.

As far as our own history is concerned, here too there is of course an analogy, albeit a highly conventional one. Whereas the ispolkom was in charge of local interests in the region, the "will of the Center" was implemented through the party structures—the obkoms, gorkoms and so on. I am consciously abstracting myself right now from political and ideological features, but it was precisely this system that was our conduit for the policy of the Center. It is not surprising that a state institution would arise to represent the interests of society as a whole in the regions. This is a question of wise organization of society; life itself requires us to have something like this.

[Correspondent] Sergey Alekseyevich, you first presented yourself in politics as a parliamentarian. And now you have returned to politics in a completely different capacity. Where, in which role, do you feel the most confident? Do you, on the whole, consider your present role a political

one; or, on the other hand, does it seem to you to be more nearly an administrative, government-official role?

[Tsypliyayev] The post of Presidential Representative indisputably presumes the combination of political activity with the work of a government official. The representative is appointed by the President, is accountable to him, and answers for the conduct of his policy.

The nature of the activity here is altogether different from that of parliament. Yes, any deputy has the mandate of his electors, but beyond that he is practically independent. He is obliged to have his own position and to defend it publicly, correlating it, of course, with the opinion of the electors. And he is free in the choice of his companions-in-arms in the person of a certain group or parliamentary faction.

With the executive authorities everything is different. You can and must carry on discussion with your colleagues, express your opinion to the President, and even express to him your disagreement with certain aspects. But this is all part of the working procedure in the process of preparing decisions. But after that—you have to firmly conduct the political policy that was formulated. Such is the specific nature of executive authority.

Here is just one recent example. The U.S. deputy foreign trade secretary, while in France, stated that he supposedly warned Bush of the fact that it is not necessary to trade with Iraq. And literally two days after that, a message reached him thanking him for the work he had done and expressing best wishes [in his next job]...

I was independent as a deputy, but now I must become accustomed to other conditions and rules. At the same time, however, part of my work will be like the previous: that is—receiving citizens, finding out their problems, and looking into various statements and proposals. Without doing this it is impossible to understand just what is in fact going on, and how a specific Law or Ukase turns out for each of us.

A less-trivial activity is—the search for compromises between the local and federal authorities, between the city and the oblast. Conflict is inevitable here, and the task is not "to ensure unanimity." Rather, we must jointly seek and find wise and civilized ways out of these conflicts, without letting matters deteriorate to our mutual disadvantage.

[Correspondent] Do you already have a kind of tactical program of action? What do you see as the priority directions?

[Tsypliyayev] I would like to achieve a normal working rhythm as soon as possible. And in order to do this it is necessary to hold a whole series of meetings with a very large circle of people; with many, simply to become acquainted. And these are not only the senior officials, but also the representatives of the basic political powers, trade unions, employers, the corps of deputies, and so on.

Speaking about priorities, there are several: first of all, the privatization program demands increased attention, specifically, the issuing of vouchers; both the social feelings of the citizens and the authority of the government depend upon how this matter goes. Next is everything that involves the employment of the populace: creation of new jobs, and social programs for adapting the unemployed. For St. Petersburg, for example, conversion of defense industry is a vitally-important problem. Its success or failure will determine whether the citizens will have jobs or not.

Obviously, the question of the land will be exceptionally important. It is right now of peak interest to the city and the oblast. Here there are no easy solutions lying about on the surface.

On the whole, everything connected with property is becoming extremely critical: the disposition of our common property, and defending the rights of property owners. Thus far there are hardly any controls here.

Culture, and in particular, science in St. Petersburg are not "local" phenomena, nor are they Russian alone. These are questions of the possessions of all mankind, the world. Today this sphere must be supported at the federal level, no matter how hard this is.

Least of all do I want to "puff my cheeks" and devise hare-brained schemes. I shall defend to the limits of the authority given me by the President a policy of common sense, and self-limitation of state power in favor of the liberties and initiatives of the citizens.

St Petersburg Privatization Progress Viewed

934C0050A St. Petersburg SANKT
PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian
18 Sep 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "You Want To Buy a Store? Hurry Over to the Exchange"]

[Text] From May right down to the present day more than 200 of the city's enterprises have been sold to collectives and private persons in the process of privatization of state and municipal property. And this process will become more dynamic. In September alone 110 objects were planned for privatization on a competitive basis and about 40—at auctions. The same rate is expected in October and November; for that reason the St. Petersburg Property Fund is beginning to involve exchange structures. The Fund held five auctions last summer with the participation of the Agroindustrial Exchange. An auction will be held jointly with it on 23 September. And auctions to sell objects of privatization will be held on 16 and 30 September in Pavilion No 6 in Gavan, where the St. Petersburg Exchange is located. At a recent press conference its president Igor Klyuchnikov and vice president Vasilii Shigayev told about those capabilities which permit the exchange to participate actively in this process.

It must be said that recently the exchange has set up a number of structures necessary to do this, ones such as the St. Petersburg Exchange Bank and the exchange insurance company.

On the other hand, such organizations as the St. Petersburg Military-Industrial Corporation which was created recently are also included in privatization.

The press conference, organized by the way by a new public relations and information agency, Balt-Art, clearly showed that structures able to actively assist both the mayor's office and the Property Fund to raise the rate of privatization are being intensively formed in the city.

St Petersburg Winter Food Supply Said Sufficient

934C0050B St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian
23 Sep 92 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Gorshkov under the rubric "Soviet Day": "We're Going To Be Swimming in Oil, Vegetable Oil"]

[Text] "There will be no hunger in the city this coming winter and there is no reason for alarm. The question is merely how much are foodstuffs going to cost," asserted the deputy chairman of the mayor's committee on food, Stepanov. Yesterday he spoke at a meeting of the Small Soviet. But prices for food will depend on the bank credits allocated and may rise substantially in the event that interest rates are high.

At present the city has stores of food products to last until approximately the beginning of January. Even the smokers have not been forgotten: the day before yesterday a contract was signed for delivery to St. Petersburg of a million packs of cigarettes from Bulgaria at a price of 25-30 rubles, and beginning in October a new line to produce cigarettes will go into operation at the Factory imeni Uritskiy.

Stepanov cited the data on the changing level of consumption of different groups of foodstuffs in connection with changing prices. Thus, these days Petersburgers are buying meat at 49 percent last year's level, butter—at 51 percent, eggs—at 92 percent, and dairy products—at about 45 percent. At the same time, however, consumption of macaroni products has risen by 110 percent, of margarine—by 130 percent, and of vegetable oil—by 150 percent. We will not be left without vegetable oil next year either: 12,000-14,000 tonnes are expected through the auspices of the European Economic Community.

Petersburg Residents Polled on Well Being, Support for Reforms

934C0050C St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian
23 Sep 92 p 2

[Report by Sergey Isayev: "Political Barometer"]

[Text] The regional sociological monitoring program of the St. Petersburg Sociological-Research Center (SPb-SNITs). A city-wide, representative telephone survey of the adult population of St. Petersburg, 10-15 September of this year, 1,057 respondents. Responses to the questions are given in percentages rounded off to whole numbers. Questions followed by an asterisk were asked with proposed alternative responses to them. The total number of responses can be less than 100 percent by the number of persons who "found it difficult to answer."

The contact telephone of SPbSNITs is 297-82-49 from 1100 to 1700 hours. The sponsors of the program are the newspaper SMENA and the Russian-American joint venture, Alcore Technologies, Inc.

1. Not Everything Is as Bad as It Seems to Some People

[Question] Did you have a better time this summer than during the summer last year, a similar time, or a worse time?*

[Responses]

Worse—45 percent.

Similar—39 percent.

Better—14 percent.

[Question] Compared to last year, did your life on the whole get better, get worse, or stay the same?*

[Responses]

Worse—69 percent.

Stayed the Same—17 percent.

Better—12 percent.

2. The Reformers Are Taking Some Blows

[Question] What is your opinion, should B Yeltsin resign today?

[Responses]

February

No—82 percent.

Yes—11 percent.

June

No—60 percent.

Yes—26 percent.

September

No—56 percent.

Yes—18 percent.

[Question] What is your opinion, should Ye. Gaydar's government resign today?

February:

No—46 percent;

Yes—12 percent.

May:

No—43 percent;

Yes—22 percent.

September:

No—39 percent;

Yes—28 percent.

3. The More You Argue, the Further You Get

[Question] What do you think, which of the postures listed below should Russia's leadership take in the territorial dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands?*

[Responses]

Do not surrender these islands under any pretext—49 percent;

Seek a mutually beneficial solution to this problem—34 percent;

Show good will and transfer the disputed islands to Japan free of charge—6 percent.

Summer, the most favorable period for conducting economic reform and the least appropriate for active political pressure on the reformers, is over.

We have all paused for a short breath and, as the results of the public opinion poll of the residents of our city show, things aren't so bad. Only 45 percent of the

Petersburgers had a worse time this summer than last, and only 5 percent mentioned a significant deterioration here as compared to last year. At first glance the responses to the question of summer recreation seem difficult to compare with the data on the changes in the life of the Petersburg population which occurred. But in fact on the one hand, 53 percent of the Petersburgers did not mention any deterioration in their lives during the summer period, and on the other, 69 percent confirmed the idea that their lives are worse than a year ago. But there is no paradox here. The whole point is our spiritual state. The positive emotions of summer somewhat reconciled us to reality, relaxed the nervous tension slightly, and made us look at what was happening more calmly and reasonably. That is why in the first case our evaluations are more positive and, to all appearances, correspond to the real state of affairs to a much greater degree than the responses to the second question.

At the present time social consciousness is still in the "summer" state. Will it survive the next wave of political passions and the warring political groupings' autumn "offensive" against common sense? For now there is substantially more reason for a positive response here than for pessimistic predictions. On the scales of common sense today are the 56 percent (as opposed to 18 percent) of the opinions of Petersburgers, those who opposed the resignation of the president of Russia, B. Yeltsin, and the 39 percent (as opposed to 28 percent) who believe the departure of Ye. Gaydar's government is not a good idea. And this is despite what we have lived through, and regardless of the constant burial song being sung for the reform and reformers by everyone who feels like it.

The September reading of the "political barometer" also established other signs of the social desire for stabilization of our life, rejection of the search for "saviors of the Fatherland," and an understanding of the impossibility of achieving quick economic results in today's conditions. But we will talk about this in the next installment of the "Barometer" on the pages of SMENA.

TURKMENISTAN

Reanimating the Petroleum Sector

934A0025A Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 12 Sep 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with A. Nurmamedov, deputy chairman, Committee on the Fuel-and-Energy Complex and Industry; B. Shamsiyev, candidate of economic sciences, docent, TPI; by N. Sosnina, editor, creative group on matters of economics, state, and law of the newspaper TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA; place and date not given: "Turkmenistan's Petroleum: Problems of Administration and Development: A Timely Interview"]

[Text] This sector is in urgent need of reanimation: That was the conclusion arrived at by the specialists who participated in a session devoted to the problems of reviving the oil industry. As S.A. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan, noted at this session, the sector has significantly fallen back from its previous position: The extraction of this strategically important raw material has declined from 16 million tonnes in 1975 to 5 million tonnes at present. And the importance of this industry within the structure of the national economy has also declined. This was brought about by a number of causes: the backwardness of prospecting and extraction technologies, the weakness of the material-and-technical base, etc.

According to the commonly shared opinion, however, this sector's difficult situation is likewise to be explained by the lack of improvement in its administration. Just what kind of administration should it have? This is the subject of the interview granted by A. Nurmamedov, deputy chairman, Committee on the Fuel-and-Energy Complex and Industry; and B. Shamsiyev, candidate of economic sciences and docent, TPI; to N. Sosnina, editor, creative group on economics, state, and law of the newspaper TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA.

[Sosnina] It's a well-known fact that Western Turkmenistan is the principal region for extracting petroleum. And it is there that the Turkmenneft Association operates, with its subdivisions and centers. Is that insufficient nowadays?

[Nurmamedov] It is insufficient, and here's why. A number of areas with good future prospects for hydrocarbon raw materials have been discovered by geologists not only in our country's western part, but also in the eastern portion of the Karakum region. That is to say, a considerably larger part of this republic's territory could turn out to have oil-bearing deposits. Under these conditions we need to have a fundamentally new approach to the strategy of developing this sector and a radical reorganization of its administrative system. It is not just a matter of the new scale of operations not being within the capacity of the local organization (although these dangers are not unfounded: the association is located in Nebitdag, whereas the administrative headquarters of the Karakum UBR [Drilling Operations Administration]

is situated in Bakhardok, some 500 kilometers away—and this fact makes it difficult to direct). No less serious is the problem of disconnectedness and poor coordination of oil exploration and prospecting operations.

[Sosnina] These operations are being conducted by three departments: the Turkmengaz Corporation, Turkmengeologiya, and Turkmenneft. On more than one occasion specialists, scientists, and workers in the field have argued against the absurdity of the multidepartmental approach to setting up exploration and prospecting operations.

[Nurmamedov] It is now high time to eliminate this expensive parallelism. What good is it, for example, to have drilling rigs of the Turkmengaz ChURB [expansion not given] and the Turkmengeologiya Farabskaya expedition operating side by side in the very same areas on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River, and—moreover—without any kind of coordination? By the way, the above-mentioned geological expedition is being supplied with fuel, reagents, and other materials from a base which is located at a distance of several hundred kilometers. Such duplication costs the national economy a great deal.

[Shamsiyev] It is an inherent part of further technological progress; disconnectness is the reverse side of the coin. Drilling for and extracting oil is engaged in by Turkmenneft, refining it—by the oil refineries in Krasnovodsk and Seydi, transportation—by the railroad and by the main pipeline administrations. And the petroleum products are sold by enterprises under Goskomneftreprodukt [State Committee for Petroleum Products]. Under a scheme whereby each collective would be responsible for a limited or restricted section, the vision of the future would be lost; it would be impossible to have a compact, balanced approach to solving the principal problem—increasing the volumes of oil and condensate, their optimal use, and the profitable sale of items—after, of course, satisfying the republic's own needs. Turkmenistan is suffering financial and physical damages precisely because oil is being extracted inefficiently, refined poorly and to an insufficiently depth, not thoroughly enough, and sold to customers unprofitably.

[Sosnina] Insufficient depth or thoroughness in refining raw materials is a trouble not only of the petrochemical industry....

[Shamsiyev] Yes, but we can hardly tolerate the fact that almost half of the Turkmen and Tyumen petroleum output consists of mazut [residual fuel oil], which is so cheap and for which there is no sales market in our republic; and so we practically have to give it away to foreign customers. The refineries are equipped with technology which does not allow us to thoroughly refine the crude oil. The light fractions are lost and go into the mazut. But even the expensive gasolines which are obtained, and which enter into the Gosneftreprodukt system, sometimes become items in dubious barter-type deals with CIS countries.

[Sosnina] Could you give us an example of such a deal?

[Shamsiyev] During the first six months of this year more than 140,000 tonnes of light petroleum products were shipped out as barter-type items to CIS countries at prices which were only one-third that of the world prices. As a result, we lost more than a billion rubles compared to what we could have made. Of course, it is still difficult to trade with our close neighbors at the high world prices. But we probably could have sold the gasolines abroad and with the hard currency earned thereby obtained more and better-quality items than those we receive by barter-type deals. We must place a firm barrier to stop such a drain; we should sell our gasolines only for hard currency, at prices at least as high as the world prices and—of course—in accordance with quality certificates. Otherwise, the state budget will fall short by several billions of rubles, as compared to what it could have been.

[Sosnina] As I have come to understand it, these are only some of the arguments in favor of creating a unified organ for administering all spheres of the oil industry.

[Nurmamedov] Upon the proposal made by S.A. Niyazov, a Ministry of Petroleum will be created. In contrast to departments involved in this sector and which are primarily concerned with solving current problems, the new ministry will have to specify a strategy and tactics for developing all the mutually interrelated production facilities, outline future prospects and work to achieve the main goal—transforming Turkmenistan into a strong oil power. Based on the example of many economically developed countries (though we also have our own experience—the Turkmengaz Corporation, which united previously separate organizations), the administration of the entire chain of moving oil—from the well to the customer—will be concentrated in the hands of the Ministry of Petroleum. We need to transfer to this ministry the entire structure of exploration, prospecting, extraction, transportation, and refining petroleum, as well as selling its products. The western association Turkmenneft will be retained—perhaps in some other form—but it will be retained. However, functional subdivisions will also be created on other territories as well.

[Sosnina] And what about the drilling operations?

[Nurmamedov] It probably makes sense to assign exploratory drilling to the new ministry, leaving the task of sinking operational well-shafts to Turkmengaz. Looking on ahead to widescale prospecting for oil and natural gas, it would be useful to include within the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry a portion of the material-and-technical centers of the Turkmengaz Corporation and the Turkmengeologiya PO [Production Association]. This would ensure the optimal utilization of materials, equipment, and personnel.

[Sosnina] You have been persistently predicting the discovery of new oil fields soon. Could you please clarify what specifically you have in mind—without, of course, giving out any strategic secrets—

[Nurmamedov] The following areas have been discovered: Uxhadzhi, Yashlar, Bayramaly, and Southern Yeloten. There is justification to assume the presence of oil on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River, for located literally right alongside it, in Uzbekistan, is the Kukta-mulak Oil Field with commercial reserves of 60 million tonnes. It has been calculated that the reserves of hydrocarbon raw material could increase several times over. However, to develop and master them by our usual methods and at our usual pace would mean only one thing—being at the tail-end of civilization and progress. We must introduce up-to-date and effective methods of prospecting for and exploiting these oil fields. For example, due to the lack of special equipment, we are not able to reach the Mesozoic strata and extract the deep-lying petroleum. We will have to reach a new technical level and “deepen” our oil refining; and we must re-outfit our refineries in order to accomplish this. For even at our young enterprise in Seydi the equipment is already obsolete, and we need the newest technologies with a greater yield of the light petroleum products. The new ministry will concern itself with and engage in renovation and modernization.

[Sosnina] But colossal sums of money will be required to obtain domestic and imported makes of machinery and materials for construction and installation projects. Where will the ministry obtain such sums of money?

[Shamsiyev] We do not have enough of our own money for all these things, of course. We must attract and involve foreign investors to cooperate with us under mutually advantageous conditions. Different variants of contracts are well-known. Kazakhstan's experience in developing the Tengiz Oil Field with foreign firms suggests ways to handle such matters. Involving independent experts in working out the contracts saved Kazakhstan several hundred million dollars. There are also other methods of attracting finances—for example, credit allocations or allotments. At this sector's generally high rate of profit, we can count on a rapid cost recovery of our outlays. Within five or six years—assuming an extraction rate of 10-15 and possibly more million tonnes a year, the oil men will be able to independently finance the development of industries and enterprises, transportation systems, and channel billions into the budget from the profits earned.

[Sosnina] Has Turkmenistan received proposals from foreign companies? And then, working with foreign businessmen is not such a simple matter.

[Shamsiyev] Proposals have been and are being received with regard to jointly developing the oil fields, including those in the western regions. A competitive or contest-type approach has been provided for selecting partners, taking into account their financial possibilities and international authority. And, of course, you are correct in stating that one cannot get by these days without intelligent marketing services, without reliable information and special research studies. Because, of course, what we are talking about is the selection of optimal models for

development. And we need high-class specialists. At the above-mentioned conference Saparmurat Atayevich particularly singled out the problem of training personnel for this sector. At the TPI [Turkmen Polytechnical Institute] we must open an industrial college with flexible curricula and instruction given in special programs. There will be new possibilities for training specialists abroad. And at the behest of the founders of the Turkmengaz, Turkmenneft, and other colleges, foreign scientists and businessmen will take part in the teaching process. It would likewise be extremely expedient to use practical, on-the-job workers from the oil industry for this purpose. We must bring the level of personnel training up to international standards.

[Sosnina] The role played by this sector's science will probably also change. Until quite recently—and even nowadays—its activity has been of a strictly applied nature

[Nurmamedov] At the above-mentioned conference the work done by the scientists was subjected to serious criticism. Noted here were the low level of scientific research studies in the oil industry, the lack of ties between fundamental, VUZ, and the sector's science, etc. In point of fact, the Turkmen NIPIneft [Scientific Research and Planning Institute for the Oil Industry] has been studying the problems connected with the western region and solving current problems with little concern for the future. Meanwhile, the sector has now been confronted with serious difficulties of a geological, technological, and economic nature, as well as the needs for fundamentally new developments for increasing the yield rate of oil-bearing strata. It's high time that we began using the technologies of extra-deep and horizontal drilling. Perhaps we should return to flooded strata and abandoned wells. People abroad have some interesting ideas and methods for "reanimating" and returning wells to commercial exploitation. We need help from scientists in setting up and fine-tuning new production facilities. For example, our republic has extracted more than 500,000 tonnes of gas condensate, which is basically being exported in its raw or crude form. Why shouldn't we—within one of the refineries—provide for and introduce the technology for turning this condensate into high-octane gasoline, the value of which would be several times higher than the raw material? In short, the scientists at the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences, VUZ's, and the Turkmen NIPIneft should radically revise their own tasks in the oil industry. Within the future Ministry of the Petroleum Industry we should obviously create a scientific-research center for studying and solving long-range and short-range scientific problems.

[Sosnina] The mutual relations between scientists in this sector and employers is a delicate matter and quite complex. Will we succeed in overcoming the dependence upon and subordination to the ministry on the part of an institute or a center? It's no secret that the goals of science and those of production often diverge. Scientists give recommendations on the optimal exploitation of oil

fields, whereas the production people are concerned only with increasing the yield—often contrary to the institute's forecasts.

[Shamsiyev] Everything depends upon who will head up the ministry and who will be working there. I would hope that well-educated people will come here—competent people who understand the present-day requirements and who value the opinions of scientists and specialists. The leading officials at all levels will have to think in nonstandard ways, creatively, and be genuine professionals. Initially we could arrange to have the retraining of personnel in foreign, oil-extracting countries; other ways of supporting and instructing specialists are also possible. One thing is for sure: If our souls ache for Turkmen petroleum, we must do everything in our power to develop this most important sector.

UZBEKISTAN

Karimov Asked To Investigate Imprisonment of People's Deputy

93US0013C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 3

[NEGA report: "Uzbekistan"]

[Text] A group of former USSR people's deputies have appealed to Islam Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in the form of a letter wherein they express concern over the arrest and trial of their former colleague—Pulaj Akhunov, a deputy from Uzbekistan to the former Soviet Union Supreme Soviet. His arrest—connected, as stated by staffers of the Internal Affairs Administration of the city of Shakhrikhan, with a violation of traffic rules—nevertheless took place in another city. No less strange, in the deputies' opinion, is the circumstance that Akhunov's arrest coincided with a meeting of representatives of public opposition organizations from Fergana Valley—a meeting in which Akhunov was actively participating. After being released from administrative arrest, which lasted for 20 days for Akhunov, this deputy was arrested again after three days. Now he is being charged with beating somebody up. And he has already been in jail for two months.

Electorate Vote To Recall Mirsaidov

93US0013B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 2

[Report by Semen Novoprudskiy: "Former Vice-President Returning"]

[Text] Without any special fuss, people in the Karadarin-skiy Electoral District No 31, located in Uzbekistan's Samarkand Oblast, have voted to recall Shukrullo Mirsaidov, republic-level people's deputy from this district, a former prime minister and vice-president of Uzbekistan. The presidium of this country's parliament took this into account and terminated Mirsaidov's powers as

a deputy ahead of schedule. Meanwhile, Mirsaidov, who back in January had resigned from the post of vice-president, voluntarily relinquished his office as a deputy in mid-August because of a disagreement with Uzbekistan's political leadership and—in particular—with that of President Islam Karimov. Shortly after this Mirsaidov quit politics. Now, however, it seems that he is returning. Moreover, Mirsaidov sent his statement—together with an explanation of his reason for relinquishing his official powers as a deputy—to the opposition newspaper ERK, inasmuch as the virtually complete ban on official publications from mentioning Mirsaidov's very name has simply compelled him to seek out contacts with the opposition.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Lauds Uzbekistan's Independence Route

93US0009A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
29 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with Sh.M. Yuldashev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan, by unidentified National Information Agency correspondent; place and date not given: "Independence Means Light, Independence Means the Future"]

[Text] [Question] Shaykat Mukhitdinovich, the way to the acquisition of independence is never easy. Please tell us how it took shape in Uzbekistan, what kind of work was performed?

[Yuldashev] There was in the heart of each citizen who is a patriot of his motherland a great dream. However many sacrifices there were on this path, however many difficult days our people had to endure! Many sons of the fatherland, fighters for freedom, were destroyed at the time of the tyranny, banished, and incarcerated in jail. We would not be wrong were we to say that the foundation of today's independence was laid over many years by the whole people. It was our good fortune to have been witnesses to and direct participants in these events.

But there is another side of the question also. For the accomplishment of certain tasks the objective prerequisites have to be created and personalities with willpower and courage are needed. Otherwise either the favorable opportunity is lost or all the sufferings are for nothing.

I believe that as of the latter half of 1989 conditions fully corresponding to the two requirements had taken shape in Uzbekistan. Let us recall. Still in the former Union, given the undivided sway of the CPSU Central Committee, the leadership of the republic decisively adopted a policy of defense of citizens of the republic unjustly accused in respect to the so-called "cotton affair," showed the whole world the obvious nature of the slander splashed over our people and embarked on the reconstruction of the oblasts, cities, and rayons formerly thoughtlessly amalgamated in accordance with directives from Moscow. Despite the strong resistance of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and M. Gorbachev personally, the republic was the first to institute the office of

president, and the Council of Ministers was converted into a Cabinet of Ministers, which was headed by the president directly. Also a courageous step toward independence in those times was the fact that the leadership of Uzbekistan put an end to the practice of interviews in Moscow with persons recommended for particular high office. As of the first half of 1990 approximately these questions were decided conclusively directly in the republic.

It is essential in this connection to also recall that the leadership of the republic made an objective, just evaluation of the activity of that great son of the Uzbek people, Sharaf Rashidov, and made known the unseemly actions of the numerous "assault-landing" forces sent from the center. At meetings of the State Council headed by M. Gorbachev only our president boldly raised questions concerning economic independence. I repeat once again that this took place at a time when Moscow's complete sway persisted. It is today that the "heroes" have become vociferous—as the folk say: "When the enemy runs, the number of brave ones increases."

[Question] We often hear today the opinion that the republic has achieved independence relatively peacefully, tranquilly, and easily. What is your view? How did the republic move toward independence?

[Yuldashev] The times when we have legitimately reached independence have in other republics coincided with a difficult situation of every conceivable conflict and tragedy and severance of economic and spiritual ties. It would be no exaggeration to say that all our difficulties and the problems of provision of the populace with food and clothing have increased tenfold. But all the changes, which are at first sight occurring without particular difficulty, are coming by no means easily.

Everyone knows that we purchase half the consumer goods and a large quantity of fuel, building materials, and other finished goods. You are, of course, informed about the work which is being performed to bring them into the republic in a sufficient amount and to organize their sale to the populace at restricted retail prices.

I would like in addition to this to cite two examples which are not so widely known. Just 10 percent of the most essential medical preparations are manufactured here, that is, 90 percent of them are purchased outside. Almost R3 billion and approximately \$60 million have been allocated in the present year alone for imports of medicines from overseas and their sale at restricted retail prices. Second, people are being paid their wages, pensions, and grants in good time. Some R7-8 billion are being delivered to the republic monthly from Russia—the money is being printed only there as yet. We have obtained in 2-2.5 years the same quantity of cash as in 1986-1990. When in Russia itself wages are not being paid to people for three to four months at a time, and for six months at a time in certain regions, it has not been at all simple to introduce order in this respect.

Our strength is that the policy being pursued in the republic is the right one. The social protection of the populace under the grim economic conditions, the preservation of an atmosphere of peace and harmony in society, assurance of the concerted work of the legislative and executive authorities—all this is producing positive results. The days of Uzbekistan's prosperity are not that far off. In short, we have made it through to these great days thanks to the wisdom and lofty spiritual qualities of our splendid people and as a result of the realization by the leadership of the republic of a purposive and consistent policy. We have prevented conflicts, bloodshed, and the division of society, as are occurring in certain regions. Not mentioning and not evaluating this would be at least dishonest, interpreting the peace and tranquility which have been established in the republic as a shortcoming even, all the more so. I am sure that this opinion is shared by the vast majority of citizens of our republic.

[Question] You are a candidate of political sciences and a politician. Are the economic and political reforms being accomplished easily, in your view, have mistakes been made here, and which precisely?

[Yuldashev] I would note first of all that only the Almighty is without shortcomings. The simple mortal, whoever he may be, is not insured against mistakes and shortcomings. And those who work, particularly so. And when we are accomplishing some things for the first time in our history, the possibility of mistakes being made here and shortcomings is natural. Consequently, we need to set aside all kinds of shallow talk and try to grasp the essence of the problem in its entirety. In such a great, historic period in the life of Uzbekistan, when our state's independence is being strengthened, this should be the main purpose of each honest citizen.

And from this viewpoint we need to pose squarely the question: Are Uzbekistan's first steps en route to independence correct or mistaken, what has already been achieved and how may the life of the people be evaluated?

The answer to these questions was given, I repeat, by the people themselves, having approved our domestic and foreign policy. Of course, no one means to say that Uzbekistan is a paradise, that all questions have been solved here, and that there are no problems. It is essential to negotiate an even longer and more arduous path in order that the republic become a truly independent and powerful state. In addition, some of our laws are not being fulfilled as yet in full measure, every conceivable new type of economic crime has appeared, instances of legal infractions in the trade system are not diminishing, and many goods are being taken out of the republic illegally. These problems were discussed openly in the speech of our president at the Supreme Soviet 10th Session. I can add two points here.

The first concerns the economy. Tell me, in what republic of the former Union have the economic reforms

produced a positive result and where do people live better than our people? It is well said: Place no value on the water which passes by you. In order to learn the real value of any one thing, it needs to be compared with others. And there is, particularly, no ideal state for a particular society or state since it is always in development, and it may only be evaluated objectively by having compared it with the situation in other countries.

And, as the conclusion, it may be said that life itself has confirmed the soundness of the path we have chosen and that the economic reform, which is being implemented consistently, without haste, in accordance with the principle of the priority of the interests of the citizens and people's social protection, has produced its first results. At the present time our government is engaged in thorough preparations for the privatization and denationalization of residential accommodations, trade and consumer service enterprises, and a number of enterprises producing consumer goods. Of course, this work needs to be accelerated. But undue haste could only harm the cause—make the life of the working people worse, and the wealth created over many years could end up in the hands of a variety of types of dishonest people.

The second concerns political reform. There have in a year been considerable changes in this sphere also. For the first time in our history the people elected the first president of Uzbekistan democratically, under multiparty conditions. Political parties and a number of public movements and unions have been registered on the basis of the new laws. The office of hakim has been instituted locally. The first documents pertaining to the terms of reference of the legislature, executive, and judiciary have been adopted. The corresponding laws and decrees on defense of the citizens' rights and liberties have been promulgated. The republic has acquired a national flag and coat of arms. Uzbekistan has become a member of the United Nations and a number of other representative international organizations. It has been recognized as a sovereign country by more than 20 states, with which we have established diplomatic relations, and embassies are opening in Tashkent one after the other... All this is an objective assessment of the changes occurring in our political life.

Such work would not have been performed had we not aspired in practice to the building of a democratic society and had we infringed on the individual's rights and liberties. The statements of some groups and persons to the effect that in Uzbekistan "there is no democracy," that "human rights are being flouted" and such like are puzzling, therefore. These statements may be regarded as throwing stones at oneself—these people are attempting to besmirch the honor of their own people in other countries and even to prevent the development of relations between the United States and Uzbekistan and also the ratification of the treaty concluded between members of parliament of Russia and our republic. Naturally such aspirations can evoke only anger in each honest citizen and scorn for people denigrating their native parts.

A person does not become a true democrat merely by incessantly repeating the word "democracy." As we know from folk wisdom, it is the thief himself who shouts "Stop thief!" the loudest. We should, therefore, treat with caution, I believe, those who are demonstratively parading for general view "their democracy" and taking advantage of the great acquisition of glasnost only for self-publicity.

Many of our bills have of late been comprehensively discussed among the deputies long prior to the session, and questions are examined repeatedly in committees and in the Presidium, and only after this are they put to the session. Precisely by virtue of the fact that such discussions take place recent sessions have been held in organized and productive fashion, and the Supreme Soviet has adopted a large number of important documents in a short space of time. But it is this—the clear-cut organization of work and the session's unswerving compliance with the standing orders approved by the Supreme Soviet—which is evoking the discontent of certain people. Can it be that the purpose of democracy is to ensure that an endless fuss over questions which have not been prepared and have not undergone preliminary discussion be raised spontaneously at the session and that, as a result, the adoption of prudent decisions is stymied?

Or, perhaps, the manifestation of democracy is when, not once participating in the work of committees, not attending pre-session meetings of people's deputies, and not submitting a single proposal for the bills to be examined by the session, one distributes leaflets, insults the people's elect, and calls on people for unlawful demonstrations, and at meetings of the session strikes a pose and says: "I have a question for the president"? We can see from the example of other republics that such actions not only disorganize the work of parliament but also introduce confusion to the life of society. We need, on the other hand, to know how to learn lessons—from both the tragic events which have occurred there and which are continuing.

To secure our independence we must strengthen the unity of society and peace and preserve like the apple of our eye the spirit of friendship and harmony which has been established in Uzbekistan. I would like in this connection to recall the words spoken by our president at the last session of the Supreme Soviet: "Today also there are many actions and ideas capable of uniting the people. These include that which is most great and noble—assurance of the independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan. If we unite around this idea, this goal, we will never come unstuck!"

[Question] The Supreme Soviet is the body which provides legislatively for legal support for official policy. You, as its leader, have answered, as it were, the question: Under what kind of system will we live?

[Yuldashev] This is a difficult question. Earlier we compared, in the main, only capitalism and socialism.

But these two systems cannot, I believe, be approached with an unambiguous evaluation. If we take the developed countries, the system which exists there is strikingly different from the capitalism which existed 150-200 years ago. For example, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, France, the United States, and other developed states have in recent years been paying great attention to people's social protection and to government support for individual most important sectors of science and production.

It needs to be candidly acknowledged that the ideas of socialism have become widespread in the world. In addition, the Socialist International movement was organized to perfect this system and unite all the world's socialists. This international organization is now headed by the well-known politician and illustrious statesman of Germany, Mr. Willy Brandt. It is at the same time essential to pay tribute to and recognize the positive influence of the developed market economy, multiparty conditions, and the ideas of democracy, which are inherent in capitalism and which have taken shape and stood the test of time. What I mean is that at this crucial and complex time we cannot allow ourselves to rush to extremes. It is time to rid ourselves of this disease. It is dishonorable seeing the past merely in the color black, the last 70 years included. At the same time it would be wrong to evaluate capitalism in accordance with the 100-year-old ideas of K. Marx and V. Lenin.

The scholars have still to have their say in this connection. We are currently on the threshold of the creation of an Uzbekistan model which takes account of our history, customs, and traditions and the multinational and social composition of our society and we intend on its basis to take the path of world development and occupy as quickly as possible a worthy place among the world's highly developed states. The guarantee of the achievement of our goals and aspirations is the fact that this work is headed by our esteemed president and the fact that it has the full support of our multinational people. Only time will tell what the society at which we arrive will be called. Its essence is the main issue.

[Question] The demands made of legislation and compliance with the laws have increased of late. Whereas some understand this as the manifestation of a "firm hand," others believe that only a society in which the law is predominant merits respect. What is your viewpoint?

[Yuldashev] An answer to this question, generally, was given in the Supreme Soviet Appeal to Political Parties, Public Movements, and Unions and the Entire People of Uzbekistan. I may in addition say the following. First, laws and decisions of the state authorities are subject to discussion only prior to their adoption, and following their adoption they must be executed unswervingly by each of us. State authorities designed, if necessary, to compel subordination to the law and to institute proceedings against lawbreakers are created for this. This is a perfectly natural phenomenon for each democratic

society, for only by ensuring respect for the constitution and the law does society preserve itself and defend its citizens.

One simple example. Imagine that rules of the road were all of a sudden abolished and that each driver and each pedestrian were to begin to act on the roads as he saw fit. What would happen in this case? It is not hard to imagine: In a short space of time thousands of people would have met with an accident, there would be injured and maimed, the situation concerning supplies in the national economy would be exacerbated, and so forth. Although everyone surely understands that the leadership of the life of society and the leadership of highway traffic are not comparable.

Second, the government's principal task is assurance of compliance with the laws enacted by parliament and the president's edicts. Naturally, the government makes full use of the powers granted it here. Unless there is stringency, order, and discipline, how can the tasks entrusted to it be performed? If approached from this viewpoint, it is necessary to increase exactingness even more, I believe. The application of a "firm hand," as you put it, in respect to persons and groups pursuing mercenary interests, careerists thinking of their own well-being, those encroaching on public property, and criminals and troublemakers disturbing the people's peaceful life—this is necessary for the sake of the sacred cause.

And third and finally, a principal reason for the tragic events which began, seemingly, with peaceful meetings and then grew into bloody clashes, which destroyed the fortunes of many thousands of people, in whatever republic they originated, has been primarily the ineptitude of the leadership and the failure to make opportune use of its legitimate rights. A state which really ensures human rights and liberties has absolutely no right, having granted freedom to 200-300 persons, to flout the rights and liberties of tens and hundreds of thousands of other citizens and put their lives in danger. We can see this in the example of the United States—one of the most developed democratic states—where strict measures to eliminate unrest are adopted immediately. This was the case, specifically, during the recent events in Los Angeles.

Inasmuch as we, having embarked confidently on the path of independence, have undertaken to build a democratic society, we must establish primarily the supremacy of the laws.

[Question] Shavkat Mukhitdinovich, let us dwell further on one facet of our subject concerning the citizens' rights and liberties. Tell us what, in your view, are the factors which could provide for a further strengthening of the stability of the situation in multinational Uzbekistan and a peaceful life of the representatives of different nationalities.

[Yuldashev] Each nation has its own national pride. And if disrespect for it and a wounding of the feeling of national dignity are permitted, it is obvious that nothing

good will come of this. The national harmony which we have achieved did not come about just today or yesterday—since time immemorial the Uzbek people have respected the sons and daughters of other peoples. We may now speak about the significance of the Great Silk Road, for this ancient caravan route directed different peoples toward a common goal. It served as a bridge linking East and West Turkestan. If the issue is seen from this standpoint, it is clear that national relations have been molded with us over millennia.

It is for this reason that the Uzbek people warmly took in during the Great Patriotic War all those who came to our parts from the devastated cities and shared with the evacuees table and roof at the grim time of trials. Is this not testimony to the friendliness and magnanimity and philanthropy of our people?

While expressing respect for the values of the Uzbek people, the recently adopted Citizenship Act of the Republic of Uzbekistan simultaneously created opportunities for the unrestricted acquisition of the citizenship of independent Uzbekistan by the sons of other peoples respecting our national values. National pride and respect for the traditions of one's people are not nationalism. Quite the opposite. I believe that a patriotism which does not include these concepts is a hollow sound. But the people say not without reason: "It takes two hands to clap." Consequently, since the representatives of other nationalities wish to live in our independent republic in friendship and harmony, they must consider our motherland their own and blend together their aspirations with our heartfelt impulses. The law guarantees people of all nations here opportunities for them to preserve their language and national culture.

[Question] What do you think, at a time when the economy is in a slump, measures are being adopted to improve the life of the people and satisfy their requirements more fully, is it expedient to conduct festivities requiring great material expenditure?

[Yuldashev] Despite all the difficulties and adversities which we are experiencing at this time, I believe that we should commemorate the first anniversary of independence. This is our duty to the memory of our ancestors, our duty and obligation in respect to the enshrinement in the minds of the younger generation of the entire significance of the independence which has been acquired. Today's difficulties are transitory, and the time of which the people are dreaming will necessarily come. This is not a run-of-the-mill holiday, not a routine celebration or public fete. Years and centuries will pass, but these splendid days will remain in the memory, will occupy a worthy place in the life of the people, and will with the years become increasingly significant.

I am sure that our people very much want to see Independence Day as a great festival, are awaiting it and are hoping that friendship, cooperation, and tranquillity will strengthen even more on this day.

[Question] Complex processes are occurring in Uzbekistan. What do you wish our people on the eve of the great holiday—the first anniversary of independence?

I have very many wishes and I undoubtedly simply cannot express them all here. From wishes for good health and family well-being through success in honest toil for the good of our independent republic. For this reason I confine myself on the eve of the great holiday to two wishes.

The first is that, whatever happens, we must keep our human dignity. At this complex time difficulties and problems could upset people's friendship, and we cannot allow an aspiration to material well-being to distance them from their near ones and dear ones and their parents. Precisely this is the main danger of the market economy. But under all conditions let us remember that we are all people and that lofty human qualities are a permanent value not subject to any market fluctuations.

The second wish is that each citizen who considers himself a true son of Uzbekistan, regardless of nationality, beliefs, and social position, think primarily about the prosperity of the motherland, peace and harmony, and its future. It is impossible to build a thriving secular state by empty talk and bawling. The Almighty gave people eyes so that they might look ahead. It would be expedient, relying in one's work on our rich history and taking advantage of acquired experience, to act more assertively in the name of the future and aspire to the creation of a democratic state based on the rule of law—an equal member of the world community of enlightened states.

I am convinced that we will achieve these goals. For the riches of Uzbekistan are immense on the earth and beneath the earth, and what is most important is that we have an industrious and humane people with great capabilities. No labor is begrudged for the good of this people.

We are living in a historical era when each of us should ask himself primarily: "What can I do for the independence of my Uzbekistan?" and try to answer it with practical deeds. Only then will our dreams come true and the republic flourish in peace and harmony and, consequently, a firm foundation for the prosperity and happiness of each person and each family be created.

Presidential Ukase on Forming Fund for State Property

93SD00094 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 Sep 92 p 1

[Ukase Issued by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan: "On Forming a Fund for State Property"]

[Text] In accordance with the Republic of Uzbekistan Law "On Destatization and Privatization," and in order to ensure this republic's property rights and state interests in the process of destatization and privatization, to

form market relations, as well as to mobilize funds from the transformation of state enterprises and other organizations to other forms of property ownership for the purpose of solving high-priority, general-state problems, and to provide social protection for the population, the following actions shall be taken:

1. A Fund for State Property ("Uzgosfond") shall be formed under the Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance, and it shall be granted the rights belonging to an organ of state administration.

2. Territorial administrations of the Uzgosfond shall be created under the Republic of Karakalpakstan Ministry of Finance, as well as oblast- and Tashkent city-level finance administrations.

3. The following tasks shall be assigned to the Fund for State Property:

- protecting the property rights and interests of the state;
- performing the functions of a holder of the portions belonging to the state (portions and shares of stock) in the capital of joint-stock companies, other business companies and societies, as well as leasing agreements of state enterprises and organizations submitted to it by the Republic of Uzbekistan Goskomimushchestvo [State Community on Property];
- exercising the powers of the state as a property owner at general meetings of shareholders (owners of shares of stock), councils, and boards of companies and societies;
- bearing the responsibility for the effective utilization of the state property entrusted to it;
- accumulating funds coming in from the destatization and privatization of state-owned facilities, payments for leasing state enterprises and organizations, and income derived from selling shares in joint-stock companies being newly established by the state;
- participating in the work of special commissions on assessing the value of state enterprises and organizations at the time when they are being turned over for leasing, purchase by a collective or a leaseholder, for sale, or for being converted into a joint-stock company, or other type of business company or society.

4. The Fund for State Property shall be granted the right to perform the following actions:

- delegate the right of administering those portions (portions, shares of stock) belonging to the state to other organs of the state administration, as well as to concerns, associations, corporations, unions, and other business-type associations;
- transfer a part of the dividends on shares of stock belonging to the state on a contractual basis to joint-stock companies so that they may develop such shares and solve social problems;
- acquire shares (shares of stock) in joint-stock companies or other business-type companies and societies;

- upon the decision of the government or an organ empowered by it, carry out operations with regard to selling shares belonging to the state, as well as with regard to exchanging them for shares of the special funds for destatization and privatization, and holding companies.

5. The Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance shall open a special account for accumulating assets coming in from the destatization and privatization of state property; it shall earmark them as special items in the incomes and revenues of republic- and local-level budgets, having ensured their effective utilization in the interests of the state and for the social protection of the population.

6. Within a month's time the Cabinet of Ministers under the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall adopt a decree on organizing the activity of the Fund for State Property under the Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance, and approve a statute regarding it.

[Signed] I. KARIMOV, president, Republic of Uzbekistan
Tashkent, 7 September 1992

Number of Joint Ventures With Foreign Partners Increasing

93US00134 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
1 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by L. Georgiyev: "Businessmen Are Betting on Independence"]

[Text] There is a voluminous and extremely interesting book in the Currency and Economic Administration of this republic's Ministry of Finance. It contains entries recording the state registration of joint ventures. Each one of them can be perceived as a vividly clear story about the development of business cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and scores of foreign countries which have recognized its sovereignty and which have decided—on the basis of mutually advantageous contracts—to facilitate the emergence of its market economy.

The dates standing on the pages of this book are characteristic. Until comparatively recently only a few pages would be filled over the course of a year. But in recent times the entries have been coming in with unprecedented speed.

The geography of the entries also tells us a great deal. Thus, for example, in the last quarter firms and other commercial associations from Turkey figure most frequently in them.

Together with a group of Tashkent entrepreneurs, Turkish businessmen created and registered in the Ministry of Finance a small firm entitled "Turkestan." Its goal is to produce a wide assortment of consumer goods. As noted in the application which was submitted, the partners also intend to engage in building hotels, motels, and camping facilities. In Tashkent Oblast the Urtaaulskoye Leasing Enterprise and the Turkish firm entitled

"Genne Inshaat, LTD" have decided to engage in the production of items for machine building.

Among the partners are countries from almost all continents. The types of joint ventures are diverse and varied. A number of American firms have chosen the Uzbekzolto Production Association as their partner and are investing funds in the gold-mining industry.

The firm "Net Services" from the United States has become a co-owner of the "Istikbol" Joint Enterprise in Tashkent Oblast. It engages in the production and sale of garments made of cotton or woolen cloth.

The Bulgarian firm "Microprocessor Technology and Telecommunications" has become a partner of the Tashkent Production Association entitled "Algoritm." At the "Sogdiana" Joint Venture both parties are developing the production of computer equipment. The Indian firm "Matkhurson" and the Tashkent Radioelectronic Apparatus Plant have combined their efforts in order to produce telephone equipment.

The registration of contracts providing for investments in Uzbekistan's economy have been executed in the Ministry of Finance by businessmen from South Korea, Canada, Austria, Great Britain, Afghanistan, Singapore, Greece, and other countries.

The number of joint ventures entered in the registration book has already approached 400.

During the last few months alone more than 50 such enterprises have been entered here.

Crop Harvest Progress Reported

92US0847A Tashkent OZBEKISTON OVOZI in Uzbek
8 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Sh. Mirhabibov: "It's What Is in the Granary That Counts, Not in the Field"]

[Text] As is known, an independent country must be in control of its own foodstuffs, particularly its grain. This is a requirement of life. This has been undertaken seriously in our sunny country. Each year, the sowing of grain in more fields is a felicitous event, because it is necessary to gradually limit the amount of grain previously imported. With this aim, this year an abundant crop has been raised in our fields. Specifically, 844,200 hectares of barley and wheat were sown; wheat comprising 582,100 of these. According to plan 1,230,400 tonnes will be harvested.

This year, conditions for grain growers have been very difficult. Since the wet weather came in spring and summer, the crop ripened later than usual. Generally, in a normal year grain in all fields would have been harvested by now. But this year the harvest is delayed.

The nice part is that 8890 hectares of field grain are being harvested daily. So far, 732,600 hectares of grain have been harvested in our republic. This is 86.8 percent

of all grain. Over 1,192,300 tonnes of grain have been gathered. The yield so far has been 1.63 tonnes per hectare.

This year, roughly 5,345 combines had to be put in the fields throughout the republic. On the same day 1,579 combines were at work. Per combine 5.6 hectares of grain are being harvested.

Right now there is a great harvest caravan - with those of Kashkadarya in the lead. They have neared the finish line. This year, 275,500 hectares of grain were raised throughout the province. So far, 253,400 hectares have been harvested. The yield is 1.4 tonnes per hectare. In all 355,000 tonnes have been put into the granaries.

As for the annual plan, it was the Khorazmians who were the first to fulfil it. The graingrowers of the provinces of Karakalpakstan, Andijon, Bukhara, and Fergana likewise have surpassed their plans. In these provinces the yields were good too. Those from Andijon harvested 3.65 tonnes from each hectare of land, those from Namangan, who are nearing the finish, 3.24 tonnes, and those from Fergana 2.8 tonnes.

Throughout our republic this year 135,200 tonnes of seed grain needs to be collected. So far, 45,743 tonnes of wheat seed and 30,183 tonnes of barley seed have been set aside. This constitutes 80 percent of the annual plan.

However, among our people there is the saying "It's what is in the granary that counts, not what is piled in the field."

The provinces of Andijon, Namangan, Bukhara, Fergana, and Sirdarya have met their duty in this regard. However, the grain growers of other provinces, despite having the grain cut and heaped in the fields, have neglected to deliver the produce to the state granary. Right now, grain growers in Jizzakh, where 135,100 tonnes of grain have been harvested, have delivered a total of 71,000 tonnes to the state granary. Only 66 percent of the plan has been fulfilled. As for those in the provinces of Surkhondarya, they have more than 111,300 tonnes in their possession, but instead of the 54,000 tonnes called for in the plan, they have delivered just over 28,000 tonnes to the state. In other words, only 52 percent of the plan.

The grain growers of these same provinces lag behind the others in the speed of their harvest. For example, in the province of Jizzakh, of 150,200 hectares a total of 116,600 have been harvested. As for Surkhondarya, the grain in 53,300 of the 64,800 hectares has been harvested. This comprises 82 percent of the plan. This is because existing implements are not being utilized in a fruitful way. In the province of Jizzakh 381 of 625 implements were sent to the fields. In the province of Samarkand the situation is the same. Let us just take the rayon of Nurobod. Right now, every combine is harvesting four to five hectares of grain per day. If the harvest continues at this rate, gathering in the crops could take another month. Might not the ripening heads

be eventually ruined? Become no more than bird food? There is serious cause for consideration in this regard.

In our republic, the final and decisive stage of the harvest continues. Certainly it's hard for the grain growers. Nevertheless, machine operators, laborers, and drivers must expend all their efforts to harvest the crop down to the last bushel. Only thus will the abundant crop which has ripened in the field be delivered to the granary. This, in the end, becomes the lot of our people, because this year 500,000 tonnes of grain must enter the state granary. That so far only 384,000 tonnes of grain have been delivered to the granaries is painful. This is nearly 77 percent of the annual plan. In other words, we must raise the zeal and determination still more.

Another thing; the giving, by the decree of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, of 100 kilograms of wheat to people has not been carried out as desired on certain kolkhozes. In our opinion, the time has come to expand private farms and increase the growing of grain on them. For example, a resident of the village of Faizobod in the province of Asaka, Aminjon Inomov, planted grain on a private plot set aside for him, and raised over a half tonne of top quality grain. He planted corn in areas not used for crops. There are many like him in the republic.

It is also a happy event that grain is being planted in kolkhozes and sovkhoses not designated for grain growing. They are getting three to four tonnes of crops from irrigated land. They are supplying their own people with grain and flour. Taking an example from this is the order of the day.

Minister for Social Welfare Discusses Problems With Programs, Pensions

*92US0848D Tashkent OZBEKISTON OVOZI in Uzbek
18 Aug 92 p 3*

[Article by A. Akbarov: "Whose Services Are Better?"]

[Text] In the above-titled article the author notes the difficult situation and economic problems which have arisen in the communications system. In particular, discussing problems arising in distributing assistance payments, he comes to the conclusion that the main culprit in this development is the Ministry of Social Security.

After publication of the article, the chief director of pensions and assistance payments for the Ministry of Social Security, A. Akbarov, visited the editorial board. Below, he explains the real situation:

It is a fact that the market economy is laying many serious and complicated problems before all of us. In its turn, this is having a negative effect on the social security system. This is because all measures in the sphere of social security which have been put into operation arise from a budget; they are dependent upon it.

Quite a few offices, institutes, and enterprises have raised prices in a monopolistic way. They intend to improve their own economic positions.

In particular, in December of 1991 the Ministry of Communications, using the excuse of making the transition to a market economy, doubled the fees for distributing pensions and assistance payments to 4.15 percent without consulting us. In 1991 the fees paid to the communications system rose three and a half times due to the increase in the amount of the pension. According to estimates, this fee is rising 20 to 22-fold in 1992.

True, it is necessary to improve the economic situation. However, we feel that it is not right to resolve the problem at somebody else's expense. In our opinion, the transition to a market economy is not a question of raising prices, but rather one of reducing operational expenses and raising productivity. For this reason it is necessary to create conditions of fair competition.

Pension reform requires the establishment of a pension fund and transferring expenses connected with the paying and distribution of pensions and assistance payments to the books of the fund. In other words, all expenses related to the preparation of documents and the disbursal of money should be met out of the money invested for pensions and assistance payments.

The repeated raising of fees by the Ministry of Communications when the money invested is not sufficient to cover the pensions and assistance payments, and when there is borrowing from the republic's budget, leads to a very difficult situation for the system.

According to our calculations, it is possible to define a reduction of fees connected with distributing pensions and assistance payments from what was mentioned above, that is, a reduction of 2.4 percent of the amount distributed.

Proposals concerning these calculations and not raising fees were submitted to the Ministry of Communications then, but nobody at the ministry paid any attention. Later, we found it necessary to distribute pensions and assistance payments by our own means using small state enterprises.

Today throughout our republic the distribution of scores of pensions and assistance payments is working by means of an experiment with small enterprises. They, acting independently, are conducting affairs on the basis of agreements made with the social security networks.

The preliminary experience of the activities of the small enterprises showed that their productivity is four times that of the Communications enterprises, that expenses were one-half, and that the number of pensioners who could not receive their pensions for whatever reason was one-third. Most importantly, communication between pensioners and the social security departments was strengthened so that complaints of being unable to receive pensions were limited.

We want to point out that social support and competition are separate issues. That is to say that in the field of social support one can consider foregoing superficial and cheap service to support enterprises which provide more valuable service and work with them, thinking that to do otherwise would be only a waste of government money. So when small enterprises are opened, those from Communications were nominated for work there.

In neighboring republics, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and others the services of the Communications networks have been bypassed and small enterprises are being set up to disburse pensions.

As the result of opening small enterprises and the ability of their postal systems to compete, the Ministry of Communications has been forced to reduce its fees from 4.15 percent to three percent. Such a level cannot excite us, however. In our opinion it should be in the neighborhood of 1.5 to two percent.

In conclusion, the aim of setting up small enterprises is to achieve the capacity to pay pensions on time and with less cost, as well as to learn their needs and wishes and to fulfill them.

Ukase Increasing Pensions, Stipends, Salaries of Workers

935D0007A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
27 Aug 92 p 1

["Ukase of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Increasing the Amounts of Pensions, Stipends, and Salaries of Workers of Budget-Financed Organizations Beginning 1 September 1992"]

[Text] In accordance with the celebration of the first anniversary of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan:

1. To establish in republic territory the minimum amount of salary and labor pension as 1,250 rubles [R] per month.

To introduce, beginning 1 September 1992, differentiated amounts of labor pension depending on the length of labor tenure of citizens and on their merits, proceeding from the minimum amount established by this ukase.

2. To establish pension amounts for participants and disabled of the Great Patriotic War, proceeding from a minimum in the amount of R1,600, and bringing pensions of Group III disabled of the Great Patriotic War up to the level of the minimum salary.

3. To increase the salaries of workers of budget-financed institutions and organizations by 25 percent.

4. To establish the nontaxable minimum income level of citizens in the amount of R1,250 per month.

Taking into account the overall increase in average salary for all categories of workers, to establish the minimum income tax rate (12 percent) for salaries up to R3,250 per month

5. To increase by a factor of 1.5 stipends for students at institutions of higher education, technical schools, and occupational-technical institutions where food and clothing are not provided, eliminating in this regard the existing supplemental monthly food-allowance payments. To retain the 50 percent discounts on the cost of lunches in student cafeterias and dining halls.

6. Ministries, departments, associations, concerns, enterprises, and farms of the republic will effect further increases in the salaries of workers, taking into account the minimum levels established by this ukase, while ensuring appropriate growth in labor productivity and increases in physical volume of production (work and services)

7. To consider Points 4, 5, and 6, and Point 3 as regards monthly supplemental food-allowance payments, of the Ukase of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 27 June 1992, No. 433, as no longer being valid.

8. The Cabinet of Ministers of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan will adopt a resolution within one week's time on providing for the organizational implementation of this ukase.

9. To assign supervision of the execution of this ukase to the Cabinet of Ministers of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I
KARIMOV
City of Tashkent, 25 August 1992

Academy of Sciences President on Changes Within Academy

92US0848B Tashkent OZBEKISTON ADABIYOTI VA
SANATI in Uzbek 14 Aug 92 p 1

[Interview with Mahmud Salohiddinov, president, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, by correspondent Bahodir Abdullayev, date and place unknown: "The World Is Lit up by a Scholar"]

[Text]

[Correspondent] Mahmud Salohiddinovich, our hearts have been lit by the light of independence. In these happy days what kind of changes are there in the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences and in the world of science in general?

[Salohiddinovich] We have gotten the right to conduct independent work in all spheres of our activity. Before, we could not do anything without coming to an agreement with the center, with the former USSR Academy of Sciences and through it the state committee for science and technology. Even to resolve issues concerning only

ourselves and our republic, we had to get Moscow's permission. We have many scholars who created wonderful schools and who were famous in the world. They also had quite a few students. Prior to independence, it was mandatory to get permission from the All-Union Academy of Sciences to open a doctoral position in our institutes. The leadership of our academy applied to Moscow several times with regard to this issue and also submitted clear proposals. The legitimacy of opening doctoral positions in 25 areas was proven with evidence. However, permission was given to open only six or seven doctoral positions. Today, thanks to independence, we are able to open our own institutes, our own doctoral positions, and to prepare scientific cadres.

Here is another example: It is known that scientific personnel draw their salary according to the level and the category of the institute where they work. We have 17 institutes of the second rank, and two or three of the fourth rank. Naturally, with the passing of time, the form of their work and its level increased. As a result, it is necessary to review this rank. How many times we had appealed to the center asking them to resolve this problem! But we could not get a positive answer. Now we are eliminating the problem ourselves.

[Correspondent] The USSR has split apart, at the same time, its structures, including the integration of the sciences, have broken down. Has this affected the work of the academy?

[Salohiddinovich] Science knows no boundaries. One does not say "This is Uzbekistan's science, or Russia's science, or Turkey's." In particular, fundamental issues in a field have importance on a world scale. It is necessary to seek ways of solving them in relation to the extent of the scientific capacity of each country. We are strengthening our links with scholars in cooperation with foreign countries and independent countries and seeking means of resolving issues of immediate concern. Science in our independent country cannot develop at the world level in isolation from them. Science cannot flourish without personal contacts, without partnership, and without integration.

It is time to confirm that the president of Uzbekistan has a thorough and deep knowledge of the questions of science. When he worked on the state planning commission, he established strong ties with our Academy. He was thereby knowledgeable on the many directions of science and was current on the scientific research of our scholars. Our president therefore issues quite a few decrees aimed at resolving scientific issues, at the social support of our scholars, and at strengthening their material circumstances. As a result, conditions have been created for preserving the existing scientific well-being. Since January of 1992, the salaries of our scientific personnel and scientists have more than tripled. In particular, great attention has been given to young specialists. We are doing all we can to improve their living conditions and economic situation. The recently issued decree to strengthen the sciences with the help of the

state and to develop efforts at innovation had the same goal. We do not pay the 30 percent value tax. This has laid a strong foundation for the successful implementation of our plan for the future and for giving our scientific personnel social support.

I am unable to remember any hard currency previously being appropriated for our Academy or for our scientific research institutes. Recently, according to the decision of the Council of Ministers, 1.7 million dollars was appropriated for resolving problems in three scientific research institutes. Of this sum, \$300,000 will be spent to purchase scientific literature published abroad. Recently such books had not been reaching us because of the lack of funds.

The issue of establishing contacts with foreign scholars has also been solved. In the years of stagnation some of us gained token inclusion in the delegations sent abroad at the whim of Moscow. Now however, we are sending our independent delegations abroad. I have been in several countries as a member of delegations headed by our president, and have seen that our Uzbekistan and its people were viewed with interest and respect, that there was great interest in many aspects of our cultural and political life, our Academy, and our scholars. As a result, scientific and practical links with foreign colleagues are becoming stronger by the day. In 1991, 63 scholars had been sent to 24 foreign countries on working trips lasting from seven days to eight months to carry out scientific research. That year, in all, 152 people visited foreign countries. In the years 1991-1992 more of our young scholars were sent to scientific schools and universities in countries like America, Canada, Germany, and Belgium. These palaces of science will, at their expense, keep some of them for two or three years to educate them. The inquiries carried out in partnership with leading specialists of the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, the PRC and India could be termed the most fruitful research. A contract was signed with the University of Washington for preparing specialists and conducting research. Noteworthy is the work of Uzbek physicists with their colleagues in Germany and Canada, and French archaeologists with their Uzbek counterparts. The Academy's research in such fields as the creation of new types of radioactive isotopes and radio immune composition in high energy physics and several areas of mathematics, the chemistry of plant material, eastern studies and cultural heritage, and antiquities has been acknowledged in both the CIS and abroad.

[Correspondent] What fruit is the money being spent out of the budget on science bearing in today's conditions?

[Salohiddinovich] Only fundamental scientific inquiry and practical research directed toward developing the economy of our republic is being funded out of the budget. At the same time, the republic's president and government are doing everything possible to supply funds for the large issues facing us. It is necessary to add that at the present time one ruble spent on science returns no less than two rubles. In the near future, it will be possible to surpass this severalfold because we, thinking of the future, give great importance to developing the fundamental sciences. The results of our research can be productively utilized in the economy. Let's consider the "Kuyosh" installation which has been under construction in Parkent for years. Construction on this installation was begun as a result of the zeal of the late scholar S. Azirnov. It was put into service one year after his death. Now, pure ceramic material which has no metal in its composition is being obtained there. It is being used in the economy, for the first time in the medical field, in particular, in producing sterilizers. At the same time, technology for drying fruits and vegetables is being created.

At the institute for the chemistry of plant materials formed by the academician Sobir Yunusov, the principles for obtaining sugar from the stevia [transliteration] plant are being worked out. The juice of this plant is over 200 times sweeter than sugar obtained from the davlaki [transliteration]. Two hectares of land have been set aside in Qibray for planting and raising it. There is such a field in Chinoz.

In summary, it is certain that the research in progress will bear fruit in the future.

[Correspondent] On the eve of the national celebration are there any requests you would like to pass on to our readers?

[Salohiddinovich] Thanks to our people who have finally reached the anxiously and long-awaited day. Our national capability is being restored, we are engendering respect for our people of learning who have raised the honor of our science to the world level. The independence celebration is connected with another holiday which is to be noted in science and among our scholars, intellectuals, and all of our people. We are earnestly celebrating the 80th anniversary of the birth of the great man of learning of our time, Habib Abdullayev. In 1993, the 50th anniversary of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences will be celebrated. We are making great efforts to see that these years are properly hailed. We should not forget ourselves even in difficult days. It is necessary to remember the individuals who made our people's fame a legend.

ESTONIA

New Parliament Offers Talent, Variety

93UN0047A Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 2-8 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by Tarmu Tammerk and Edward Lucas]

[Text] Estonia's new legislature contains some of the brightest and best Estonians in public life, as well as some of the most eccentric and controversial.

Writers

The now-disbanded Supreme Council (SC) may have contained more writers, but the new Riigikogu certainly holds the country's best.

Jaan Kaplinski (PF) A strong unorthodox thinker, recently under fire from right-wingers for 'betraying' Estonia with his warnings of 'brown plagues' and fascism (mostly in the Finnish press). Advocates reconciliation towards the Russian population.

Jaan Kross (Moderates) Author of historical novels. Like Kaplinski, nearly won a Nobel Prize for literature. Has entered politics late in life citing the need for 'balance' between right and left. Many regret that Fatherland opted not to back him as a non-partisan candidate for president.

Paul-Eerik Rummo (Fatherland) Probably Estonia's leading poet, his books were often banned in the occupation era. Tipped to be minister of culture.

Arvo Valton (Fatherland) Historical novelist; Rein Veidemann (PF) Literary critic, ex SC deputy.

Journalists

A near-violent clash is expected between two members of the numerous journalistic fraternity in parliament. Toomas Alatalu (Safe Home) and Vambola Poder (Royalist) are both foreign policy commentators, who in the past defended the CPSU against attacks by 'imperialist circles'. The reason for the notorious enmity: Mr Poder was in charge of issuing licences for live appearances on radio and TV, which for some reason, were sometimes withheld for Mr Alatalu.

Fringes

Estonian politics is certainly not going to be dull during the next few years, especially among the wilder fringes of the spectrum.

Tunne Kelam (ENIP) Leader of the Congress of Estonia [see story below] but now one of the falling stars of Estonian politics. Having led a fluctuating band of supporters into, and then out of the political wilderness, he may find the obscurity of backbench life hard.

Vardo Rumessen (ENIP) One of the country's well-known pianists, who has neglected music for politics.

One of the most unrestrained and emotional figures on the right wing. A favourite bogey-man of Russian propagandists. Behind the Congress of Estonia ID card scheme.

Juri Toomepau (Estonian Citizen) Ran the most aggressive, lavish and strongly personal campaign of the election. An eccentric member of an eccentric grouping.

Kalle Kulbok (Royalist) Estonia's most dedicated monarchist and professional eccentric. As a (Green) member of Tartu City Council removed a sign reading *Distro* on the grounds that it violated the country's language law. Dresses in an anachronistic cape and hood. Favourite colour: black. Guaranteed to enliven any occasion.

New Faces

Priit Amla (Royalist) Deadly serious in real life, but one of the country's most biting anti-communist humourists. Likely to lend some weight to the Royalist presence in parliament.

Mart Niklus (Estonian Citizen) One of a handful of political prisoners in parliament, released only in 1987.

Women

With just 13 female members out of 101 deputies, Estonia lags far behind Scandinavian legislatures, but scores six times better than the US Senate.

Marjo Lauristin (Moderate) Counts abroad as probably Estonia's most impressive politician, but, like most candidates with a political track record, she polled disappointingly.

Valve Kirsipuu (Moderate) One of the most popular women politicians in the country, she presents a widely-watched economics radio talk show and is the country's leading consumer rights campaigner.

Siiri Oviir (PF) former Social Affairs Minister.

To Watch

Jaanus Raidal (ENIP) Estonia's municipal *Wunderkind* who has threatened half-seriously to declare secession from central government in order to gain more freedom of action in his southern Estonian fiefdom of Otepää.

Old Friends

Ulo Nugis (Fatherland) Once a mainstream Ruutel supporter, ex-Communist and industrial boss, surprisingly converted to the right-wing cause just months before the election.

Tiit Made (Entrepreneurs) Victor in a libel action against EESTI EKSPRESS, which accused him of KGB work during his stint as a Soviet diplomat. Heading a one-man band, he would like a high price from the governing coalition for his support, although nobody is hurrying to embrace him.

Edgar Savisaar (PF) The former prime minister has been remarkably quiet since his party's disappointing showing.

Illar Hallaste (Fatherland) Ex SC member, leading protestant clergyman, although sometimes accused of lacking Christian charity towards his opponents.

Mati Hint (PF) Noted Estonian linguist, drafter of the language law. An early and prominent member of the independence movement, in parliament for the first time.

Rein Jarlik Quietly-spoken rustic-minded pioneering researcher into Stalinist crimes. The only Green in the Riigikogu, following the Greens' marginalisation from their early position in the heart of the independence struggle.

Kaido Kama (Fatherland) A possible candidate for prime minister. Never seen wearing a suit during his entire two-year membership of the SC. A slow-speaking thorough-minded farmer from southern Estonia, and expert on property reform, not noted for his flexibility.

Absent Friends

Not a single communist, even under the sanitised 'Left Opportunity' banner, managed to be elected. Ex-CP chief Vaino Valjas, once the most popular politician in the country, polled well, but not well enough. Other casualties of the democratic process include the much-criticised defence minister, Ulo Uluots, finance minister Rein Miller and environment minister Tonis Kaasik.

The Riigikogu, Estonia's New Parliament:

1. Juhan Aare—SH
2. Juri Adams—ENIP
3. Priit Aimala—R
4. Sulev Alajoe—F
5. Toomas Alatalu—SH
6. Olav Anton—PF
7. Tiit Arge—F
8. Rein Arjukese—ENIP
9. Lembit Arro—SH
10. Tiina Benno—EC
11. Jaanus Betlem—F
12. Lauri Einer—F
13. Ants Erm—ENIP
14. Ignar Fjuk—PF
15. Epp Haabsaar—ENIP
16. Illar Hallaste—F
17. Rein Hanson—SH
18. Andres Heinapuu—F
19. Rein Helme—EC
20. Jaak Herodes—M
21. Mati Hint—PF
22. Liia Hanni—M
23. Karin Jaani—F
24. Arvo Junti—PF
25. Tõnu Juul—F

26. Rein Jarlik—G
27. Kalle Jurgenson—F
28. Toivo Jurgenson—F
29. Vambo Kaal—M
30. Aivar Kala—F
31. Kaido Kama—F
32. Indrek Kannik—F
33. Jaan Kaplinski—PF
34. Tunne Kelam—ENIP
35. Avo Kiir—ENIP
36. Rein Kikerpill—R
37. Krista Kilvet—PF
38. Valve Kirsipuu—M
39. Heiki Kranich—F
40. Jaan Kross—M
41. Kalev Kukk—PF
42. Tõnu-Reid Kukk—SH
43. Kalle Kulbok—R
44. Tõnu Korda—R
45. Tiit Kabin—F
46. Anis Kaarma—SH
47. Lembit Kuuts—R
48. Ulo Laanoja—M
49. Mart Laar—F
50. Marju Lauristin—M
51. Katrin Linde—EC
52. Peeter Lõnnis—SH
53. Juri Luik—F
54. Ants-Enno Lohmus—PF
55. Tiit Made—EP
56. Uno Mereste—M
57. Paul-Olev Mõtskula—EC
58. Ilmar Mandmets—SH
59. Aap Neljas—F
60. Viktor Nõutsoo—ENIP
61. Mart-Olav Niklus—EC
62. Ulo Nugis—F
63. Mart Nutt—F
64. Siiri Oviir—PF
65. Ralf Parve
66. Vambola Poder—R
67. Juri Pold—F
68. Mihkel Põhja—M
69. Matti Pats—F
70. Kalev Raave—SH
71. Jaanus Raidal—ENIP
72. Ivar Raig—M
73. Kuno Raude—SH
74. Heiki Raudia—F
75. K. Jaak Roosaare—ENIP
76. Vardo Rumessen—ENIP
77. Paul-Eerik Rummo—F
78. Juri Ratsep—PF
79. Vello Saatpalu—M
80. Edgar Savisaar—PF
81. Riivo Sinijärvi—SH
82. Tiit Sinisaar—F
83. Arvo Sirendi—SH
84. Edgar Spruit—SH
85. Aime Sugis—EC
86. Andres Tarand—M

- 87. Enn Tarto—F
- 88. Kirill Teiter—R
- 89. Tonu Tepandi—R
- 90. Juri Toomepuu—EC
- 91. Olli Toomik—PF
- 92. Liina Tonisson—PF
- 93. Tolvo Uustalo—EC
- 94. Lauri Vahtre—F
- 95. Arvo Vallikivi (Valton)—F
- 96. Andra Veidemann—PF
- 97. Rein Veidemann—PF
- 98. Trivimi Velliste—F
- 99. Heido Vitsur—SH
- 100. Ulo Vooglaide—SH
- 101. Raoul Uksvarav—SH

Abbreviations:

- SH—Safe Home
- ENIP—Estonian National Independence Party
- R—Royalists
- F—Fatherland
- PF—Popular Front
- EC—Estonian Citizen
- M—Morerates
- G—Greens

Russian Representative in Narva Interviewed

93UN0048A Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 2-8 Oct 92 p 11

[First part interview with Yuri Mishin, chairman of the Union of Russian Citizens in Narva, by Erik Kalda; second part by Rein Sikk, of RAHVA HAAL: "We are not leaving"]

[Text]

[Kalda] You are the person in Narva one can turn to get Russian citizenship. On whose authority are you acting?

[Mishin] I have a document issued by the Russian Embassy in Estonia empowering me to accept applications for Russian citizenship. Under Russian legislation an application is all it takes to become a citizen. In Narva we now have approximately 1,300 Russian citizens.... But people come from other northeastern towns as well, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamae.

[Kalda] Why do people apply for Russian citizenship?

[Mishin] The primary reason is the feeling of insecurity, people feel they are left without the protection of the state without a citizenship. Many feel they are part of Russia and they would choose Russian citizenship even if Estonian citizenship was granted automatically to everyone. Then there are people who plan to leave for Russia and citizenship gives them certain rights.

[Kalda] You have said getting Estonian citizenship should be made easier for Narva residents.

[Mishin] I think all non-Estonians born in Estonia should get Estonian citizenship under a simplified procedure. Another group who should be allowed to become citizens are the elderly people for whom it is extremely difficult to learn Estonian. Many Russians came to Narva 30 to 40 years ago and have given the best years of their life to Narva. For people like this it is a real shock to find they have suddenly become foreigners in a land they regarded as their home.

[Kalda] What do you mean by the "special status" of Narva?

[Mishin] Narva has over 7,000 Estonian citizens, 1,300 Russian citizens and about 80,000 stateless persons. These people have to live together in peace and they have to have equal rights regardless of nationality or citizenship... Disruption of links with Russia has put Narva in a very difficult economic situation. Only customs-free trade could bring us out of the crisis. Then there is the demographic aspect to be considered: 96 per cent of Narva residents are non-Estonians and this cannot be disregarded, in matters such as the official language, for instance

The majority of Narva residents have relatives and friends in Russia, and closing the border is a big blow to them. The border in Narva should be "transparent."

The Estonian governmental commission set up to look into our problems has so far done nothing to bring us out of the crisis.

I have never said Russian citizens should have to vote in Estonian parliamentary elections. But we must have a say in the work of local bodies: we live here and do not plan to leave. We do not have to suffer from not being Estonian citizens.

[Kalda] What will happen if the Narva city council decides to hold a referendum on the status of Narva?

[Mishin] If petitioning in support of the referendum shows that the majority of residents wish Narva to be a free town where nobody's rights would be restricted ... then such a referendum will be held. We do not seek conflicts with anyone over this issue and we are going to coordinate it with the new Estonian parliament. But when the parliament refuses us we have to turn to the international community for support.

[Kalda] Could the situation in Narva develop into an armed conflict like in the "trans-Dniester" republic in Moldavia?

[Mishin] Nobody can rule this out. We must work hand in hand with the Estonian authorities to prevent it. We do not want a "trans-Dniester"-type bloodshed in our beautiful town. But one day it may just happen that the townspeople will not listen to the city council any more. There are people here who are prepared to have an open conflict. The only way to avoid it is through talks, compromises, getting Narva a special status.

Are Russians' Rights Violated?

Nikolai, a welder: "Personally, I have not experienced any violations, but in general there are probably violations. They speak about it on TV, and write about it in the newspapers."

An elderly gentleman with a walking stick: "Of course they violate our rights all the time. For example, we are not allowed to vote or organize meetings. There are very few interviews, nobody is interested in our problems. Nobody asks how the pensioners and teachers make ends meet. But yet the pensions are small and the prices increase. We have been humiliated and insulted in plain view of the whole of Europe."

Lena, a factory worker: "Yes, there are violations of human rights. There are mostly Russians in our city and almost all of them work at the factory. We used to be subordinate to Moscow, but now, under Estonian rule, nobody wants to help us. And they pay no wages."

Galya, a pensioner: "I am a Russian and nobody violates my rights here."

Yevgeny, a teacher: "There have been no violations of human rights so far, but the way things are going, it just might start soon. For example, why can't we elect a person of our nationality to the State Assembly? And who are we here, anyway? We are neither Estonian nor Russian citizens. We have no guaranteed rights. Our status should be determined."

Ira, a housepainter: "Human rights are violated when we are not allowed to live free."

Andrei, a fitter: "My human rights are being violated when I am not allowed to vote. I have lived here since 1945, now my son is 43 and grandson is two years old. And I have no place to go if I should have to leave."

"I have never had any trouble with the Estonians. I have an Estonian neighbour and we consider ourselves almost a single family. I have not learned the language because I work at the factory and I don't need it there. There is no sense in insulting us with these elections. Give us the same rights as you have, and let's live as friends. Let's build up Estonia together. After all, the Estonian Corps liberated my birthplace."

Petya, an electrical engineer: "I've lived here since 1950 and have never noticed any violations. All people deserve respect. Naturally I should know Estonian. And I would have learned it, if Sillamae had not been surrounded by a barbed wire fence. You know—a forbidden zone. I am against all that! And there is a sign at the post office—"CCCP"—nobody cares to remove it. Who needs it? A socialist empire."

National Police Chief Amann on Crime Problem

92UN2189A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
26 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Elisabeth Holte: "Mafia Hunters"]

[Text] *Estonians who want to become rich quickly and a little too brutally. The Mafia and "loose" Russian soldiers. Explosive crime in a society in upheaval. Naive and mostly drunken foreigners whose pockets are picked every night. That is the job for the correct and reserved Igor Amann, who became Estonia's new chief of police last February.*

Police Chief Amann—a member of the militia since 1967 and a legal adviser for the past 10 years—will now try to deal with crime out of control. Because Estonia in so many ways is hanging over the gorge by a thread between the old and the new. On a daily basis the violence is not noticeable in the picturesque old Tallinn if one is careful. However, Amann knows crime is present—as do the thousands of people who are blackmailed, who have their homes broken into, or who are robbed on the street.

In the fall twilight the narrow streets at the Toompea height in Tallinn is not a place to wander alone—it is almost as if one expects to see Orson "The Third Man" Welles come creeping out from the shadows between the run-down stone houses.

As it turns out, the place where the action is, is near the police headquarters in the narrow Pagari Street; in the house where the local KGB had their headquarters last year. As we round the corner, we find ourselves in the middle of a gang of black-masked men from the counterterrorist police employing heavy fists to bring a drug dealer into the station. Walking up the semidarkened stairwell we must balance between ladders and falling plaster—the building is being refurbished, and Amann will soon move into the offices that had belonged to the last KGB chief, Rein Sillar. One Pagari is an address the Estonians remember with little happiness.

So, with our head full of thoughts of the Mafia and hungry for a juicy story about recent raids, we try to pump Igor Amann. The police chief, however, is a rational and not very loose-tongued man, who prefers to talk about how the growth of crime has to be seen in connection with political and sociological changes. In how societal changes affect people's behavior

"One of the reasons for the increasing crime is the reorganization of the court system and the ineffectiveness of the previous system which is now crumbling," he says. "Our body of law must be rebuilt, and this is a time-consuming process; this in addition to people's difficult financial situation. Our society is developing in a different way from before. Previously everybody was—more or less—poor. Now people see that some of them are becoming rich. Then they also want to become rich."

and they take shortcuts," Amann adds. That is why burglaries have become such a widespread problem.

He pulls out of his briefcase the hard facts about what is happening in these times when the police do not even have sufficient money for complete uniforms, let alone walkie-talkies and other useful field material. Just in the period from last year to this, crime has increased by 38.8 percent—19,823 registered crimes during the first eight months of last year, and correspondingly 26,823 crimes this year. As much as 80 percent of these are burglaries, picked pockets, and other crimes of gain. Two percent were serious infractions against persons—among them 134 murders so far this year, he says. Foreigners are still for the most part safe as long as they keep fairly sober and avoid making too many new friends at night—the murders most often take place as a final settlement in a bitter, weary society.

Having an inadequate legal system, few weapons, poor communications equipment, and lacking most everything else, Eesti Politsei is now trying to create order in a society where the KGB has deep roots and there is profound distrust. The market is flooded with old military weapons, nobody knows how far up the ladder in society corruption is still taking place, and nobody knows what Moscow's plans for Estonia *really* are, even though the country now has been free for one year. In addition there is the Mafia—the organized crime, as Amann calls it, consisting of Russians, Estonians, and Finns,—and others who are using Estonia as a suitably chaotic center for their activities. With ties back to the war in Afghanistan drug abuse is on the rise—8,000 addicts today, especially hashish.

That is why Amann is now at work forging Estonia's new police force, along with Commissar Henn Kask, chief of the antiterrorist police unit, and Kalev Prillop, the chief of the criminal police, as well as the ordinary police, the border police, and the economic police. But special emphasis is placed on Kask's security forces—the boys with the black masks, armed with Remingtons and Kalashnikovs who are employed for special operations and who also delivered Estonia's supply of new kroons to the banks when the country got its own convertible currency. British and Finnish instructors have been here, and Kask stays in close touch with the Finns; but the best training the men receive is in the field, according to Kask.

One does not have to stay in Tallinn for a long time before hearing about burglaries and frisky militia men who shoot at people's car tires on the road between Tallinn and St. Petersburg. About the extensive black-mail. About hot-blooded foreign men on the prowl who have been robbed. Because prostitution is flourishing—at the grey skyscraper hotel, Viru, girls as young as 14 and 15 work as prostitutes—the age of consent of 18 exists only on paper. So many men have passed away suddenly along with their wallets having disappeared, that the Finnish-run Hotel Palace in Tallinn, the best in the city, will not let the prostitutes leave the hotel until

the partygoing men themselves have called the front desk giving the green light to signal that everything is under control.

Need for Patent Law Emphasized

92UN2179D Tallinn ARIPAEV in Estonian 13 Aug 92
p 3

[Article by Jaak Ostrat: "Lawlessness Should Be Curbed"]

[Text] After the State Patent Office was created in March of this year, we expected it to disclose its views on the future of Estonia's patent system, the underlying principles for future laws, etc. Such information is vital for the development of entrepreneurship.

A Secretive Patent Office

Instead, the opposite happened. The Patent Office started being secretive about its activity from the very beginning. Neither entrepreneurs nor specialists have been getting the necessary information on these matters. Such secrecy could hardly add to the quality of legal regulations to be worked out by the Patent Office. And the result—with no official information available, all possible rumors will start circulating, and that also in foreign countries.

However, there is a "justification" that has been offered for this secrecy. Two members of the Patent Office management team have told the media that their office is involved in a struggle to prevent Estonia's intellectual property from getting within the reach of the European Patent Office and Russia, since both of these have shown a strong and continuing interest in taking over Estonia's industrial property. This is why it is supposedly not possible for the Patent Office to disclose its activity prematurely.

In conflict with Europe and Russia

It is hard to imagine a more ill-conceived statement, or one that could be more unpleasant in its consequences. It would take a whole article to analyze just that, but I would merely like to point out that the infantile accusations made, attributing unfriendliness, if not outright enmity toward Estonia, to the mighty international patent organization (our future partner for cooperation), and to a super-state, could precipitate an international scandal on the highest level. What would be the response of our government if the administrative committee of the European Patent Convention and the government of Russia would officially demand an explanation?

Resolving scandals is a job best left to diplomats. Our job is to see to it that Estonia will finally get its laws covering industrial property. Especially the trademark law, because the legal protection of symbols identifying the entrepreneur constitutes the first significant step toward regulating relations dealing with industrial property and toward curbing unethical competition.

New Trademark Law

For the trademark law to function effectively, it will have to meet the following criteria:

1. Considering Estonia's reality, it would have to be coordinated closely with the corresponding international conventions and agreements. Such coordination would have to:

a) prove to the world that Estonia has created the legal basis for entering international cooperation and is not planning to be encapsulated within its national boundaries;

b) guarantee that in future attempts at cooperation the state's internal legislation would not turn out to be an inhibiting factor (even though I dare predict that in relations with other small, and significantly more developed states than ours, the benefits derived from this cooperation will accrue more to foreign applicants in Estonia than to Estonian applicants abroad. But this is by no means fatal.)

2. We should rely on results that developed industrial countries have already achieved in standardizing the concepts for the legal protection of trademarks. Most of the results are already on a level to be confirmed by international agreements, and the degree to which we rely on them determines, by and large, how well our law is going to be understood in other states. But what is to be done with the 30,000 or so trademarks registered in the Soviet Union and valid, to this day, also in Estonia, many of them belonging to Estonian entrepreneurs?

But What About the Previous Trademarks?

We could, of course, declare them invalid, one and all. This, however, would be a violation of property rights (since it would be tantamount to expropriating material property), and this is how it will be perceived by the world. The greatest damage, of course, would be done to Estonian entrepreneurs and the image of the state.

The other option would be to keep all these trademarks valid until the Soviet Union's registration period expires. This legally clean solution, however, could cause serious difficulties to our Patent Office and undermine the development of our business ventures.

The most acceptable solution, in my opinion, would be one that gives the holders of Soviet Union trademarks a certain time period (six or 12 months, for example) to re-register their trademarks in Estonia. If the holder of the trademark takes advantage of this opportunity, the trademark will remain valid without interruption; if not, the trademark will no longer be valid here. Clearly, this will be used primarily by our entrepreneurs and foreign firms; entrepreneurs of the former Soviet Union would probably not bother to take that extra step.

It is of utmost importance (primarily to Estonian entrepreneurs) that re-registration not interrupt the validity of the trademark. Let me give you an example: In Estonia

we have Flora, in Finland Kemiflora. Should the validity of the trademark be interrupted in the process of re-registration, it is conceivable that the application for the Kemiflora trademark is received at the patent office before the application to re-register Flora. What this would mean to Flora, should be clear to everyone. This is not only a hypothetical question, since it is common knowledge that there are dozens upon dozens of trademark applications from foreign firms ready to be filed by Estonian patent specialists. One way or another, Estonia needs its own law for industrial property. Business without a law for industrial property is like traffic without rules—everything unethical is permitted. Or, putting it another way—like life in the Wild West before the time of sheriffs.

Russian Colonel: Few Troops Left at Tondi Base

92UN2049A Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 7 Aug 92 p 8

[Article by Mert Kubu: "An Army in Dissolution: Russian Soldiers in Estonia Fearful and Unloved"]

[Text] Colonel Anatoly Mikailovich Chernenko, 43 years old, is in charge of a motorized rifle unit stationed in Tallinn. He feels that life has become more difficult for him as an officer since Estonia became independent. Everyone wants him to pack up and go home.

Actually, Col. Chernenko should be commanding 2,000 men, half a brigade. The colonel will not say how many there are in the enormous, sorely run-down base in Tondi.

"A sufficient number to maintain high battle-readiness," he said diplomatically, while laughing surreptitiously.

Sly Dog

But the colonel is a sly dog. He is not speaking the truth. On the return trip from the colonel's headquarters to the front gate, the real truth was revealed by a soldier, Sergei, who accompanied us:

"We are so few here that we hardly have enough people to do guard duty and cleaning. We work constantly. Where before 80 men slept in our barracks, today there is, at most, eight. There are only about 150 men left today. There are so few of us that we no longer do training exercises. We have not even been allowed to visit the town in a group."

Col. Chernenko is in charge of the Matrosov unit. For those who are unacquainted with the name Matrosov, he was one of those Soviet heroes who was said to have cast himself in front of German machine guns in order to save his compatriots.

Unsolved Problem

Why does the Matrosov unit not pack up and go home?

"There are many problems that have to be solved first. We must know where we are going. We have to have quarters in the new location. We have children in school," the colonel explained.

Indeed, he has gotten a wink from above concerning the meeting of the Russian foreign affairs minister with his Baltic counterparts in Moscow indicating that things are brewing and that the call to go home could come at any moment.

The colonel has a wife who works at the military bank and a son in the 10th grade. The other son is grown and lives in Tallinn, taking a correspondence course from a school in Russia. The colonel was born in Siberia. He has done service in East Germany, the last four years in Estonia.

Portrait of Lenin

In the staff building at the base in Tondi hangs the Russian flag. In the foyer stands a soldier on guard duty in front of the brigade's old, red Soviet banner. In the colonel's office a large portrait of Lenin hangs on the wall.

"Many of Lenin's theories are still valid today. One cannot change in a second what was valid for decades. Therefore his picture is still hanging here," said Col. Chernenko.

The former Soviet troops are alleged to be in dissolution. The officers and corps are said to be selling everything that will bring a price. Discipline has disintegrated. What comment does the colonel have to that?

"Excellent Discipline"

"Black market? I know nothing about that. Discipline problem? Not here," said Anatoly Mikailovich Chernenko.

How is the morale among the soldiers holding up? Living and working in an almost enemy country where everyone wants to be rid of you—is that fulfilling?

"No, that is understandably a problem. Earlier we had open house certain days of the year. People could come and visit, see how we lived. Now the soldiers can only visit Tallinn as a group, with an officer in charge. They cannot even go and buy ice cream on their own. And just the thought of meeting girls in a group with an officer..."

The colonel made a despairing gesture.

As to whether we might, in parting, photograph him under the portrait of Lenin? No, absolutely no pictures. Here a strict prohibition against picture-taking was in force, declared Anatoly Mikailovich emphatically.

Estonian Environmental Legislation Reviewed

93WN0006A Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English No 30, 17-23 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Ildar Nizemetdinov]

[Text] An extraordinary session of the Estonian parliament was held on 8 September at the request of 37 deputies who were briefed by the Prime Minister and the President of the Bank of Estonia on the present economic situation. The aim of the session, however remained unclear and Head of State Viit Vahi even suggested that some of the deputies were seeking to use the session as a stage for their pre-election campaigns. More than half of the deputies of the Estonian Supreme Council (SC) are running for election to the National Assembly.

Environmental Legislation

While the Estonian parliamentarians gear up for elections, we will take the opportunity to survey the country's environmental protection legislation. A number of deputies entered politics riding the wave of the environmental movement. As is well known, the Estonian "singing revolution" began with a battle against ministries which wanted to start phosphorous mining in Estonia.

The law *On Environmental Protection in Estonia*, which came into effect on 15 March 1990, determines the responsibilities of the Supreme Council, national government and local government bodies concerning nature protection.

The SC formulates the general environmental protection policy of the country and the directions of ecological activity. Local governments conclude contracts for the use of natural resources and organize the protection of landscapes and ecosystems. According to the law, the state must protect unique environmental areas, endangered species, and territories of special scientific or aesthetic value.

The law determines conditions for using land, soil, and different bodies of water. A special section of the law provides for monitoring the quality of the environment.

The law declares that information on nature protection must be accessible, and that state bodies must inform the population about accidents causing environmental pollution. Every citizen has a right to receive information about projects, plans and activities having an influence on his or her ecological surroundings.

The law also defines administrative and criminal liabilities for the violation of environmental protection laws. Finally, the law states that if Estonian law differs from international law, Estonia will observe the law which has the strictest requirements.

In March 1991, a special law about the National Park of Lahemaa, one of the most interesting nature complexes

in Estonia, was passed. The law protects the land, islands and water located there, permitting only scientific activities on this territory.

Special taxes are levied in Estonia for using mineral building materials, peat, oil and water. Other taxes apply for pollution, waste storage and logging. The tax system is designed as an economic incentive against pollution. A permit from the Ministry of the Environment is necessary to use natural resources for a profit.

In May 1991, the Estonian Supreme Council passed a resolution *On the Chief Inspector of Environmental Protection in the Republic of Estonia*. The Chief Inspector is appointed by the Supreme Council for a seven-year term. This official is empowered to stop pollution exceeding norms or other activities harmful to nature. The inspector can even block resolutions of ministries and local government bodies which do not observe norms on environmental protection and resource utilization.

Although the normative basis for environmental protection in Estonia is quite thorough, the country lacks the necessary resources for building waste treatment facilities.

LATVIA

1992 First-Half Economic Performance Statistics

92UN2061A Riga ATMODA ATPUTAI in Latvian
29 Jul 92 p 25

[Article by P. Leiskalns "Statistical Overview: First Half of 1992"]

[Text] In enterprises in the state sector of the national economy, the average monthly wages in May of this year reached 3,590 rubles. In the third quarter, the average income of state enterprise workers exceeded 4,000 rubles. The highest salaries were found in enterprises, where certain branches had created a monopoly situation during the soviet period. For instance, in the enterprise "Krasmetali", in the first five months of this year, the production volume decreased by 64%, as compared with the same period in 1991, while the salary reached 8,709 rubles. At the Olaine chemical-pharmaceutical plant, production fell by 19%, but the average monthly wages went up to 8,212 rubles. At the Riga tobacco factory, production fell by 23%, but the mean salary went up to 10,604 rubles.

*The combined index for goods and services, in comparison with December 1991, was 156.4% in January, 217% in February, 298.5% in March, 334.6% in April, 372.4% in May, and 413% in June.

*Trade in retail goods equalled 17,583 million rubles in the first six months of 1992, and, in comparison with the same period of last year, actual prices increased 3.7 times, but the comparative prices decreased by 46%.

*In payments for services rendered, the volume in the first six months of this year reached 2,334.4 million rubles, and in comparison with the first half of 1991, comparative prices decreased by 68%.

*The total industrial production volume in Latvia in the first half of 1992, in comparison with the first half of last year, declined by 30.9%. In comparison with the first half of 1991, the production volume decreased in all branches, with the exception of the heating industry. The production volume has decreased in 430 enterprises and owner-controlled companies, or 70% of the total. The greatest losses, by reduction of production volume of goods, were sustained by the machine building, metalworking, and foodstuffs industries.

The sharp decline in production was mainly due to the restricted availability of raw material and material resources. Because of this, forced work stoppages occurred in June in 111 state enterprises and owner-controlled companies created from the former. In June, at the VEF production association, 242.8 million rubles worth of goods were not produced; in the Jaunciems paper factory—56 million rubles worth; in "Rigas Manufaktura"—107 million rubles worth; at the autoelectrical appliance plant—5.3 million rubles worth, etc.

Because of forced work stoppages, the losses sustained in industrial production amounted to 8.6 billion rubles, or 13.8% of the total industrial production volume. Furthermore, forced work stoppages due to the lack of material resources caused the loss of 1.4 million man-days of work time, which has been calculated to equal about 32.7 million rubles of workers' wages. Looking at the data overall, it can be concluded that, during the past few months, 11.4 thousand workers employed by industry have not worked a single day, i.e. they are the covertly unemployed.

*Lay-offs of workers are continuing in state enterprises, institutions, and organizations. In the first six months of 1992, 28.8 thousand people have visited the state employment services. It is recognized that 8,700 people are unemployed, of which, 6,900 people have the right to receive unemployment benefits.

Alongside the problem of obtaining raw materials, serious problems have emerged in many enterprises with finding a market in which to sell their finished products. As a result, the store of finished products continues to grow in warehouses. At the end of June of this year, goods stored as unsold finished products in warehouses belonging to state enterprise plants and owner-controlled companies created from them, when valued at actual wholesale prices, amounted to 9 billion rubles, or 82.25% of the June production volume. The largest stores of unsold finished products have collected in the machine building and metal working enterprises—3.3 billion rubles in value; light manufacturing—1.8 billion rubles, and in the foodstuffs industry—1.1 billion rubles in value. Taking these three branches together, they account for 69% of all finished products currently stored

in industrial enterprise warehouses. In terms of volume, the largest stores of finished products stored in warehouses belong to the "Rigas Tekstils" production association, the RAF joint stock company, the VEF production association, the Daugavpils chemical fiber plant, the Alfa joint stock company, the firm "Lauma", the coach building plant, the varnish and paint plant, the enterprise "Rigas Audums", and the Daugavpils cable factory. These ten enterprises account for one third of all unsold finished products in manufacturing.

*Privatization continues in agricultural enterprises and fishing collectives. As of July 1, 1992, 644 statutory companies have been registered, including 10 joint stock companies, 453 stock corporations, 174 limited-liability corporations, and 3 cooperative organizations.

*Land is continuing to be granted to the users of the land, in accordance with their requests. As of June 1 of this year, through resolutions passed by authorities in the rural districts, the total land area granted in Latvia is 2.8 million hectares, or 47% of all areas of land used by agricultural enterprises, farms and forestry enterprises; which includes 44.5 thousand individual farms that have been granted 678.3 thousand hectares, or 17% of the "land" used by agricultural enterprises and farms.

*In the Republic, in comparison with the prior year, there has been an increase in the land area sown with grain, sugar beets, potatoes and vegetables. According to earlier data, the area sown with winter and summer grain is 711.7 thousand hectares in size, sugar beets—25.9 thousand hectares, flax—7.7 thousand hectares, potatoes—96.5 hectares, vegetables—19.6 hectares. However, it is expected that, due to the dry spell, the areas actually harvested will be much smaller than the areas that were sown.

*In comparing the first half of 1992 with the first half of last year, animal product production has decreased: meat—by 11%, milk—by 10%, eggs—by 8%.

*The revenue of the Republic's state budget for the first 5 months of this year amounted to 6,578 million rubles, or 90.1% of what was anticipated for the first half of the year; expenses were 5,859 million rubles, or 80% of what was anticipated for the first half of the year. Revenue exceeded expenses by 719 million rubles. Revenue for the local budgets from January 1, 1992 until May 31, 1992, was 4,606 million and exceeded expenses by 1,062 million rubles.

*From January 1 to June 30 of this year, Latvia has exported 3,800 tons of meat products.

*The high level of prices in commerce significantly affects the volume of food products sold. In June, 3,200 tons of meat were sold (about 1.2 kg per inhabitant of the Republic), or 8.4% less than for this May; 673 tons of butter, or 6% more than in May; 781 tons of cheese—9% more than in May, but 7.4% less than in April.

Although consumption of vodka declined in March and April because of the high prices, it increased in May and June by 50% and 75%, respectively, in comparison with April. Over the half-year period, the residents purchased vodka, and products made from vodka and liquor for 1,770 million rubles, and all types of alcoholic beverages for 2,825 million rubles (1,058 rubles per inhabitant), or 1,135 decaliters of absolute alcohol (4.3 liters per inhabitant).

*A critical situation has arisen with regard to enterprises settling debts amongst themselves. Bills that were not paid on time for payments to suppliers and into accounts for budgetary purposes as of June 1st of this year amounted to 20.5 billion rubles, or 36.9 times more than at the beginning of the year.

Prepared by P. LEISKALNS from data from the State Statistical Committee

Political Power of Major Parliamentary Factions Assessed

92UN2102A Riga LAUKU AVIZE in Latvian
28 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by E. Licitis, Parliament correspondent for LAUKU AVIZE: "Supreme Council: What Are We Sitting Here For?"]

[Text] Let me tell you—I really wonder about our administration and deputies. In the United States presidential elections, Mr. Bush and Mr. Clinton have already managed to make promises about everything, starting with a cake for the table of every supportive Yankee, and ending with the promise to support the rights of some sexual minority, or another. In our Parliament, as I have observed recently, one well-appointed gentleman after another climbs up on the podium, and among other things, very convincing says something like this: "... if we can't resolve anything, then what are we sitting here for? Why don't we just go home?" Or: "... no matter what we decide, nothing will change, anyway". But deputy Z. Ziedins just invited the LAUKU AVIZE (LA) correspondent to finally pitch in to get these deputies out of the upper house—tell us our time has passed.

But, others, not such forthright servants of the state, are taking up a different tune. Look! Overall, the deputies are good and want to do good, but those "printing press jackals", in other words, reporters, are turning the people's heads, making them wrongly suspect that the deputies are no good.

With the approaching Saeima elections, the deputies of Parliament are looking more closely into how they could become the groom of every wedding and the dearly departed in every funeral. Theoretically, everyone is doing what's right for himself. But deputy Felss told a parable about the relationship between the bank and the administration—one wants to convince everyone he is riding on the white horse, while the other guy is on a

black one. And this modern-day desire to convince everyone that the other guy is the rider on the black horse, or even better, a black hog, is become widespread.

However, in the overall picture, the citizens are seeing that everything is in hot brine, that the good white horses have dropped dead. Prices are rising, speculators are taking hold, non-ferrous metal is being stolen, etc. The farmer still can't be paid for his product, which was consumed a long time ago. The manufacturer is knocked out by the resolution, passed according to the wishes of the bank, which sets different exchange rates for rubles from different CIS countries. And so forth and so on.

In my opinion, you see, they, including Parliament, wanted to run the economic machine as follows—in a flash, the bad old meat store manager will be replaced by a new meat store manager, one who is loyal to the Latvian People's Front (LPF). In just the same manner, new managers, "loyal to the LPF", have been placed throughout the whole system, but by doing this, the SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED. It turns out that it is not at all convenient and pleasant to change it. I feel that this Supreme Council will not change the system in any way, even if it wanted to. The deputies have no idea on how to do that.

In such a case, it would be helpful to stir up the "brine" from time to time. For instance a "fault-finding mission" could be carried out against the administration. The threat of the "return of the strong arm" could be raised. The parties could start scuffling amongst themselves in the cramped waiting room of the Saeima elections. And when the elections draw very near, it is obviously that the parties will all but slay each other.

At present, it looks certain that the tone in Parliament is being set by the "Satversme" faction" (about 30 deputies). The small group's rather fearless, bulldog-like grip can be admired—it stood up to the large LPF faction, when the latter had about 100 deputies, and it influences the present-day LPF members, whose number has decreased by half. They have allowed others to occupy the place of honor (J. Vaidots, O. Batarevskis), while the "mighty" of the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNIM), A. Kiršteins, E. Cilinskis, and, to some degree, E. Berklaivs, have become true drivers of "Satversme". Like magicians, "Satversme" pulls out one shiny ace after another—Abrene, "the KGB agent matter", the irrational behavior by the administration, whatever. It is important for the faction to SAY things that the majority of voters could sympathize with. The fact remains that "saying" is not the same as "solving".

At present, "Satversme" has cleverly gotten hold of a very effective prod, with which it readily scares its LPF faction colleagues: "What, you're not voting with us, but with the Interfront members?" "What, you don't want Abrene back?" And so on. And the LPF deputies are overly timid. They don't even dare to raise objections in such situations as when, for instance, in connection with

the Saeima election bill, almost all of "Satversme's" members voted arm in arm with the "Equal rights" contingent.

"Satversme" knows well how to point out that the Godmanis administration has led us into such a despicable situation. Even "Satversme's" own economic initiatives are limited to the new initiative to overturn the Godmanis administration. Maybe Z. Ziedins is only interested in entrepreneurs, and S. Raznis—in practical farmers' matters. But I would say that the overly virtuous policies of the "Satversme" leaders are corrupt politics and power plays.

The largest Supreme Council faction, the LPF faction, has about 50 deputies, and it is noteworthy for the fact that it almost never adopts any specific resolution nor has it any specific direction. Look, we consider the LPF faction to be DEMOCRATIC. At meetings, the LPF members usually unite—to support or not to support "Satversme's" radical proposals, or even more frequently, not to agree on anything. This faction's "collective leader", "Club 21", has already been compared to a "Masonic lodge" by deputy V. Dozorcevs. Well, the events in the nation at this moment can be observed just fine from the lodge. The LPF faction also has A. Gorbunovs and I. Godmanis, and when they were politely invited, they were unable to turn down "presenting lectures" at "Club 21". The actual leaders of the LPF faction are others, such as I. Berzins, A. Pantelejevs, and it unites members with a variety of political views, and even some farmers. Yet, I can't remember when the LPF faction has raised any "country" problems—those are probably too commonplace. The faction resolves economic problems very simply—it invites its member, I. Godmanis, listens to what he has to say—and leaves all the rest up the Prime Minister.

The "Equal rights" faction has shrivelled to 19 men and one lady, and attempts to be as quiet as a mouse in Parliament, tip-toeing around on the soft floor coverings. Now, they already threw out fifteen of those crazies, and the Master's finger might point at us as well. While there are producers—manufacturers—in the faction, its leader, L. Kurdjumovs, is quite an active participant in the agricultural commission.

The rest of deputies keep together in "group formations" or act as "lone wolves". Understandably, the first of interest to us is the so-called "Rural faction". Evidently, nothing worthwhile has come of them, since our farmers can't go along with one another. Thus, we should just be thankful that the Grube farmers' commission is able to utter anything in a half-whisper under the domes of Parliament, getting completely drowned out by the shouting of the politicians. Possibly, the Democratic Center will establish its faction sooner, with J. Skapars, J. Celmins, and V. Seleckis at the forefront, collecting the 20 members needed, one sand grain at a time. This evolving party - faction - has already managed in its

documents to promise to represent everyone, including the farmers. How and when they will start to do this, only the dear Lord knows.

But that's how all parties start off now—just let us at the controls. And then what are we going to have here? That, you see, is the question that our honorable politicians have not been able to answer for more than two years now. Of course there will be rivers of milk with shorelines made of fruit pudding—but where will you get the milk, and how will you mix the pudding? That, dear citizen, is for you to figure out.

Kalnins Details Republic's Investment, Credit Situation

92UN2075A Riga DIENAS BIZNESS in Latvian
17 Aug 92 pp 8-9

[Article by Arnis Kalnins, economic reform minister: "Credits: For and Against"]

[Text] Increasingly the role of foreign credit utilization in developing Latvia's economy is being discussed. These possibilities are opening up with Latvia's gradual acceptance into various international financial institutions. At the last of those, in Washington on August 11, economic reform minister Arnis Kalnins signed documents for Latvia's entrance into the World Bank.

In addition Latvia has been accepted as a member of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank (ERDB) and documents have been signed for admittance to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD—World Bank). Experts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank came to favorable conclusions about the pace of Latvia's economic reform and financial policies as the basis for receiving loans from individual countries, banks, funds and firms.

A Heavy Debt Burden Is Not Desirable

One must be very cautious in taking on credit. It is not desirable for Latvia to carry a heavy debt burden, as has happened to many of the countries of the world. And it is more evil still if, in accepting credits, there is no clear plan for repayment.

All conditional credit may be divided as follows:

- credit for discreet projects (in energy, communications) economically significant to all Latvia's economy, the scale of which may be expressed in many hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars;
- credit for small- and mid-sized projects (for reconstruction) in the range of \$3-5 to \$10-15 million. This includes all small loans, especially seed money for small and medium sized new private companies;
- credit to cover extraordinary expenditures (fuel, gas, crude oil, grain, medicaments);

—stabilization credits, which would strengthen and guarantee the introduction and functioning of national currency (resolved jointly with the IMF).

Speaking of the first two types of credits, the definitive question is about the possibility of repaying them over time.

Credit Depends on the Ability to Repay

Aspiring to investments may depend upon repayment, selling one's products (services) for freely convertible currency on the world market. According to this principle, individual economic branches may be ordered as follows:

- the timber, wood and paper industry complex, including forestry, all require technical acquisitions. Here there might be a concessions option—cutting timber and paying stump money in hard currency without export duty;
- production of construction materials;
- the service sector, port management and transit services, tourism;
- branches (necessities) which are presently satisfied by imports, but which could partially be covered with domestic products henceforth. For example, the needs of textile production with flax and wool; groceries with cooking oils, sugar, sweeteners, refreshing drinks and wine; medicaments; durable consumer goods—bicycles, refrigerators, and other articles of production renewal and start-ups;
- branches which do not utilize local raw materials, but which could quickly begin producing goods and competing favorably in the world market. To do that it is necessary to have a special, complex state export incentives program. A constituent part of this program could already be supplied by EkRM [Foreign Trade Ministry] and with the participation of specialists from other ministries reasonable, concrete credit directions, in volume and effectiveness (repayment) more than 60 projects in various Latvian economic branches.

Lending Possibilities in Daugavpils Are Being Seriously Considered

Not a single enterprise is seriously working on credit services. For example, the Daugavpils chemical fiber factory, whose annual production is about 70 million cubic meters of nylon cord fabric, 10,000 tonnes of rubberized nylon fibers for technical articles and fisheries, 11,000 tonnes of textile fibers, 3,000 tonnes of chemical fibers and other products.

The chief raw material is caprolactum, which requires about 65 thousand tonnes (6500 tonnes are regenerated from remnants of initial production). The purchase price of one of those tonnes in 1991 was 2,700-2,800 rubles. We may expect that soon the price will grow to 40,000

rubles or more (the current price for one tonne of imported caprolactum is \$1,400). Increases in the price of utilized electric energy have been taken into account.

The factory's specialists, in cooperation with experts, have completed an export market study, determined demand in the domestic market, a search for financial sources, and evaluation of current and anticipated price.

Goals of an Action Plan

In working out their plan of action they were guided by these goals:

- retaining stable production volume (also workload), assuring resources under risky conditions;
- retaining stable sales of products in CIS territories and making gradual gains in new external markets. Market capacity for industrial articles and consumer goods will be sufficiently evaluated as well as production possibilities;
- earnings are necessary for modernizing and developing production, and for obtaining a freely convertible currency;
- a morally and physically exhausted system must be replaced by world-class appropriate technology (for which small loans are anticipated).

Here a self-financing model of currency is anticipated, viewing long-term credit of currency as the most rational financing form. This type of financing form is able to achieve quick modernization of production's high competitive capacity, in such a way ensuring the elimination of debt and savings of freely convertible currency. Production of chemical fibers is energy intensive. Setting up an import system would enable us to economize by 10-33 percent in energy consumption, both in the technological process and on the lighting bill. Furthermore, it is expected that two steam turbines (there is excess steam) to drive electric generators will be erected, which would be able to cover 150 million kilowatts (of a total consumption for the factory of 800 million kilowatts).

A New Technological and Economical Foundation

A new technological and economical foundation has been worked out for Brocens's new cement factory. The factory, working with a dry method, 1.1 million tonnes of cement would be produced annually. To construct it requires initially 195 million Deutsch marks [DM], of which DM82 million would be in convertible currency, but subsequently DM87 and 37 million are needed (for a total of DM119 million).

Working with the dry method would actually reduce fuel consumption. The annual production of cement by the wet method is 820 thousand tonnes annually, and Latvia loses DM12.8 million for fuel payments alone, and buying the missing cement for DM10.8, so by not building the factory the state pays out about DM23

million. In five years this sum reaches the Brocens factory project's share of freely convertible currency.

If a factory were built with the capacity to produce 1.5 million tonnes of cement annually, that would give Latvia the opportunity to export 300-400 thousand tonnes of cement for prices which will be competitive in the Western market, since an accessible market and outlay of production is the most important thing.

Some Branches Need No Credits

The Council of ministers in one of its decrees set rules for claiming credit and how to supervise its method of repayment.

The economic reform ministry has developed a production (project) list and desirable new constructions and shell completion list, which should not need to obtain foreign government credits, but could be developed as mixed capital enterprises. That might be a natural gas underground storage facility and gas line reconstruction and expansion, modernization and expansion of communications networks, reconstruction of the Liepaja metallurgical factory, or overhaul of several large factories.

We must search for the best credit terms. There is talk about the IBRD, which extends credit for 15-20 years, in addition in the first 3-5 years only interest must be paid, which the IBRD sets at 7-8 percent annually. In future years principle must also be repaid, along with its respective interest.

Poverty Criterion—\$500 per Year

Countries which have annual per capita national income of less than \$500 are considered poor (India, China, Bangladesh), and are offered assistance by a specialized IBRD structure—the International Development Association. Latvia does not qualify as such a country.

Sometimes the opinion is advanced that IMF and IBRD assistance has little effect. The universalism of the IMF's "international economic recipe" (in finance, price, credit policies), in the "Polish" or "Latin American" options will not by themselves create an escape from a crisis situation. The most successful assistance from the IMF and IBRD view are Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Ten to twelve years ago Turkey's economy was on the edge of catastrophe: an unbearable foreign debt burden, industrial growth near zero, unemployment, and political instability on top of that. Now Turkey is one of the few states that annually increases exports by 20 percent. A negative example is Argentina, which had its WB assistance suspended two years ago.

\$40 million in Credits

At this moment the economic reform ministry, together with the industry and finance ministries, is preparing a project for \$40 million in credit from the IBRD. That might take place in October or November, but the groundwork for obtaining this credit is being laid now. It

will be used chiefly for purchasing crude oil, chemical plant protection and veterinary medicine instruments, medicaments, and purchase of medical materials.

Awards of credit will be based on open competition, examining the requirements for respective production methods of suppliers from several foreign countries, both West and East. The right to receive the credits will go to those who bid the lowest price. We would get most crude oil from the East, because our ports are not equipped to receive this product from the West.

In developing a list of goods to be imported we are striving to get oriented to avoid acquiring ordinary goods.

For example, we are weighing the question of whether no longer to produce pharmaceutical products in Latvia and whether to increase acquisitions of raw materials necessary for these needs.

Limits on Grain Purchases

Grain purchases on credit will also be limited so that more credit instruments can be used for investment. Purchase of machines for sugar beet seed processing, systems for baby food production, and complete analysis of milk quality are foreseen. We must strive to use credit for those needs which make production cheaper, thus saving hard currency.

A credit request is being prepared in the energy field of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank. There is talk of electric stations, underground gas storage facilities, and necessary spare parts for boiler houses, water treatment, systems for receiving oil products and expansion of storage capacity, acquisition (or beginning production in Latvia) of gas and heat consumption meters and so forth. The purchase of licenses must also be seen as a very important direction for using credits, so that home producers could make scarce (or expensive monopoly-priced) goods and articles—water, gas, heat consumption meters—for Latvia and for the markets in surrounding countries.

Possible Credit From Taiwan

Taiwan's business circles, with the support of their foreign ministry, have proposed the following terms: credit extended for 20 years with 4-5 percent paid off annually. Repayment usually begins in the fifth year after it is received. There will be no special terms offered here, so that from the credit received materials are acquired, systems directly from Taiwanese enterprises. Taiwan's bankers and enterprises currently have \$83 billion in foreign reserves, but bank deposits exceed \$300 billion.

Investments with credit must work in several directions, taking into account the concrete situation. Enterprises, which import systems on credit could form their own debt to the state. Thus, they could offer their system as

collateral, escaping the national currency exchange rate, but form their debt through the finance ministry using their property as security.

Loans May Be Sold At Auction

Investment credits may be sold in closed auctions, the income obtained further invested in the Latvian state investment bank mediation projects, which would pay appropriate returns in the future.

Utilization of credit might not be efficient if we cling to the normative state division by ministries, but by orienting only to "packets" of concrete projects.

Commercial banks may participate in the distribution of credit with their projects also. Their chief assignment would be supplementary attachment of their essential private capital: for every one dollar of foreign and financial investment, they must bring in \$10 of private capital.

International financial institutions are not really so rich. In some instances even the IMF borrows to finance special projects, especially from Japan.

Latvia is increasingly concluding international agreements for mutual protection of investments, multilateral international tax agreements (to avoid double imposition of taxes), etc.

Controversy Over Former KGB Officers Continues

92UN20844 Riga SAIME in Latvian No.12 Jul 92
pp 1, 3

[Article by Dainis Lemsonoks: "KGB Employees: In PILSONIS or In 'Bags'"]

[Text] Recently, in almost all post-Communist European states a bigger or smaller ruckus has arisen around lists of former secret police informants. They are published in newspapers. Many prominent politicians lose their seats, and the good names of significant and honorable persons suffer heavily in society. Also, in neighboring Lithuania, leafing through the KGB's leftover papers, interesting documents have been found, which, like a sharpened axe, are hanging over the heads of several parliamentary deputies. The political careers of both former prime minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and Virgilijus Cepaitis, one of Lithuania's nationalist leader Landsbergis's closest advisors (one he was called "the number two man in Lithuania") are ruined.

It is interesting indeed that Latvia is ruled by complete silence in this matter, except for a few intriguing articles in the former ATMODA, including also the RL [Republic of Latvia] SC [Supreme Council] deputy chairman Andrejs Krastins's name. The latter was offended and publicly threatened to sue Mrs. Veidmane's newspaper AA [ATMODA ATPUTE] in court. Oddly, this affair has gone quiet. Although "bags" of LSSR KGB documents certainly remain securely guarded in the hands of the RL SC.

The political battle is, of course, proceeding full force. Pretenders to Saeima [parliamentary] seats are forming their groups and fighting with one another. It seems that now would be the time to dump the slop from the bucket of the corner house [KGB headquarters in Riga] onto competitors' heads. Still, there is nothing.

Why is that? Why are we worse than the Lithuanians and other Europeans? We asked SC deputy Juris Bojars, the only legal former KGB employee in the parliament, about that. Because of that the LDLP [Latvian Democratic Labor Party] leader is half-seriously honored by his colleagues as a great expert in Chekha matters (and with the new hunting law they are preparing to forbid him the opportunity to examine his beloved hobby). It seems that Mr. Bojars has come to loathe greatly his fame as an "expert", because he curtly sent me off to Vilis Seleckis, chairman of the commission on the LSSR KGB "inheritance". For himself, Mr. Bojars added that revealing existing information in the control of the SC, quite probably disturbs its keepers and other people's personal interests.

Deputy Vilis Seleckis for his part explained the situation thus:

"There are no documents in the hands of Latvian society or the SC that could give rise to certain prosecution. Taking over the LSSR KGB papers, it has become clear to me (I want to note that I became involved in this task by chance) why that is not possible.

"In our hands is a KGB file cabinet. If one or another person's surname is found in it, that is not proveable with certainty. Such registration cards could possibly be written about anyone. Even a real Chekha informant could say without fear that he knows nothing and is innocent.

"There is also the agent registration journal, in which each agent's code name, date of recruitment, and recruiter's surname is recorded, but there is no record of the agent himself. Yes, certain information from these documents can be obtained, but there is no incontrovertible evidence. With them only suspicions can be aroused. The real documents are in Moscow. The RL SC defense and interior commission, under the leadership of Peteris Simpsons, is trying to get them back from Russia's government, but you know yourself what kind of relationships we have with our eastern neighbor.

"That is why there is no definite information, nor any unmasking. If the KGB wants to protect its informers they will do it. Those who have faithfully served will continue to serve. The incident with Cepaitis and Prunskiene you mentioned might just as well have been spun out by the Chekha or somebody else in the Lithuanian organization for revenge for faithlessness or refusal to serve—such a twist is also a possibility.

"Having taken over KGB property, our commission with that has actually completed its work. The defense commission is working on a law which should determine

responsibility for cooperation with the KGB. Information could also be obtained from former KGB staff employees—they of course remember their people. Work has dragged on here, which causes us to wonder also why, given that there is no shortage of documents, this exhaustion can be blamed also on a sufficiently powerful counterforce both in the parliament and in the government."

KGB Employees: In PILSONIS or In 'Bags'

While deputies contemplate whether or not to make public the "Chekha's" staff employees and non-staff "authors" lists, the periodical PILSONIS is the first publication in the republic to start doing just that. This correspondent (Dzintars Vasjukovics) invited its editor, Janis Kucinskis, to a conversation.

[Vasjukovics] Please tell us in a few words about the lists which were published in the last five supplementary issues of PILSONIS.

[Kucinskis] Those are the KGB staff employee lists. Actually they are the same people who form the core of the current state interior minister Ziedonis Ceveris developing his own "information service." We do not doubt that this service will also include new names. It must be recalled that some of the old Chekhists have already left Latvia or have taken positions elsewhere in state structures. But the experienced, professional Chekha employees are forming the core of the "information service."

[Vasjukovics] What time period in Chekha operations are included in the published personnel list?

[Kucinskis] It is possible to publish KGB staff employee lists from 1945 on.

[Vasjukovics] Here beside every surname I see also the Chekhist's address. If it is not a secret, how did you obtain such precise information?

[Kucinskis] That is not a secret. In the published lists one can read KGB Communists' and candidates' surnames. In this structure, more than in others, only Communists were able to win trust. But those who had not yet become members had to be candidates for a time.

PILSONIS has obtained the Party's files thanks to the competition among the several state secret services and their mutual hostility. We also could publish the home phone numbers of many Chekhists. Of course we have not done that. One wonders if these people would like their evening peace disturbed by late-night phone calls.

[Vasjukovics] Right now only Chekhists in Riga figure in the lists....

[Kucinskis] For the time being, yes. I am convinced that the time will come when the inhabitants of every raion will be allowed to know "the bear people" in their community. And then we will gladly offer these lists to the raion's press.

[Vasjukevics] What is the ethnic composition of the KGB staff employees?

[Kucinskis] About five-sevenths are Russian. In contrast among "stoolies" the vast majority are eponymous peoples. I really believe that the "stoolies" are even more dangerous than professional Chekists. They can be blackmailed, "pushed" into responsible state posts, even in the parliament.

[Vasjukevics] Often the thought has been expressed that "stoolie" lists should not be released publicly, the argument goes, because they might have been forged at the last moment or prepared especially to be false....

[Kucinskis] Such a thought was expounded in the newspaper DIENA. Later it was reprinted in the West by BRIVA LATVIJA. It is possible to forge anything, but they can also be examined. As if in response the Chekha gave out information on traveling to foreign countries. Beginning with the most positive—"certainly permit" and ending with the most negative—"certainly not permitted."

[Vasjukevics] Could you give us an example?

[Kucinskis] Several years ago [former chairman of the Popular Front of Latvia] Dainis Ivans, someone well known to everyone, participated in Australia's Latvian Song Festival. Even then, both the local Australian newspapers and the police cautioned that some people required special attention. Among those was also Mr. Ivans.

[Vasjukevics] It is understandable that in these times, when many former functionaries' hands are again reaching for power, these kinds of revelations are not to everyone's liking....

[Kucinskis] Yes, for example former interior minister Aloizs Vaznis. He denied his cooperation with the KGB, saying that his only contacts were in carrying out his official duties. I cannot say how direct this cooperation was, but the name of Aloizs Vaznis appears in the Chekha files.

Latvian Environmental Legislation Reviewed

93W'N0006B Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English No 30, 17-23 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Hze Arklina]

[Text] The Latvian Supreme Council (SC) had a quiet week as the Swedish royal couple visited the country and 24 members of parliament attended a week-long seminar in Germany.

On 9 September, the SC established a commission which will inspect and control of the government's work in the struggle against organized crime and corruption. Seven deputies have been assigned to report to the parliament on their work by 15 October. The first task of the commission is to define the current obligations of

Latvia's defense structures and to determine what changes should be made in legislation governing this area.

The SC also adopted a decision defining the procedure which local governments must follow when taking former Soviet military objects into their jurisdiction. The Council of Ministers must decide what will be done with the objects within ten days from the time of acquisition, i.e., whether they will be sold, privatized or destroyed.

If the Latvian government decides to take an object under its jurisdiction, it must guarantee the security of this object. In the past, it has taken months for the Council of Ministers to decide the fate of an object, during which time the local self-governments would be forced to finance the guarding of the objects out of their own budgets.

The SC decision, however, does not solve the problems connected with military objects which have been sold to private firms. Deals between the ex-Soviet army and private firms which were concluded after 24 August 1991 will not be recognized as valid. This position was also accepted by the leadership of the Russian army's Northwest Armed Forces Group (the former Baltic Military District) during discussions last week with Latvian representatives.

Laws on Nature

Nature protection organizations and legislation were analogous to that of the USSR during the period from 1945 to 1990. Beginning in 1990, the SC of the Republic of Latvia and the Latvia Council of Ministers passed several normative acts regulating the use of natural resources: *On the Environmental Protection Committee of the Republic of Latvia*, *On Environmental Protection*, *On State Environmental Impact Assessments*, *On Natural Resource Taxes*, and *On Environmental Committee Inspectorate Regulation*.

The law *On the Environmental Protection Committee of the Republic of Latvia*, passed on 20 June 1990, states that the Environmental Protection Committee (EPC) is Latvia's executive and oversight organ for all questions deemed to be within its competence regarding environmental protection and use of natural resources.

The EPC is subordinated to the Supreme Council and is charged with: formulating and implementing a unified policy for environmental protection and resource use together with government agencies; performing state environmental impact assessments and establishing environmental protection requirements; overseeing environmental protection and natural resource use throughout the nation's territory, the continental shelf, and the area of the Baltic Sea which is in the Latvian economic zone.

The law *On Environmental Protection*, passed on 6 August 1991, aims to ensure a favorable environment for

present and future generations, harmonize ecological and economic interests, unify territorial, national and international environmental protection and conservation interests, implement scientific and technical knowledge in the protection of the environment, ensure complete and open information about the state of the environment, further the observance of *environmental protection* legislation and to establish accountability for violations of environmental laws.

The goals of the law *On Natural Resource Taxes*, passed on 12 December 1990, are to limit pollution and the wasteful use of natural resources, and to collect funds for environmental protection endeavors. The taxes are derived from charges for the use of natural resources, payments for the release of effluents into the atmosphere within normative limits, and sanctions for effluent releases and resource use exceeding limits.

LITHUANIA

Political Parties, Movements Hold Pre-Election Meetings

93UN0088A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
15 Sep 92 p 2

[Roundup of reports by ELTA, S. Sileikyte, and V. Kuznetsov: "In the Political Parties and Public Movements"]

[Text]

Congress of the Lithuanian Workers' Alliance

The Fifth Congress of the Lithuanian Workers' Alliance [SRL] has taken place in Vilnius in the Palace of the Community of Trade Unions. Its agenda included organizational questions: approval of the program, charter, structure, and attributes of the SRL. The Lithuanian Workers' Alliance is a trade union organization that unites its members to protect socioeconomic and legal interests and develop the workers' movement. Since it is a nonpolitical organization, the SRL will not be participating in the upcoming elections to the Seimas but it will offer support for those political forces that really do safeguard the interests of the workers.

The congress was opened and the report on the work done was presented by chairman of the Lithuanian Workers' Alliance, Aldona Balsiene.

Representatives of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, and Polish Solidarity independent trade unions participated in the work of the congress.

Those attending the forum were welcomed by Prime Minister Aleksandras Abisala. He responded to several of the questions raised in the report and proposed that the SRL empower its representatives to hold talks about conditions for a wage freeze. These will not be tripartite talks since at this time the government is also an

employer, the premier said. It will be an agreement that will help to avoid the strikes taking place in Poland.

State Controller Kazimieras Uoka, honorary chairman of the Lithuanian Workers' Alliance, spoke at the congress.

For National Agreement

On Saturday the congress of the Community of East Lithuania took place in Vilnius. The election program of this sociopolitical organization was discussed, and the list of candidates who will be nominated for the Seimas was confirmed.

Before the congress we asked the chairman of the community council, A. Lepinis, to talk in more detail about the activity of the organization that he leads.

"The Community of East Lithuania," A. Lepinis said, "was created only six months ago under the aegis of Sajudis. We consider our main task to be national agreement and uniting people of different nationalities for common work, namely, affirming the statehood of Lithuania. The Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Tatar communities, the Polish St. Zita Union, and the Latvian Club are already working within the community.

"As is known, it is precisely in East Lithuania that many more people of non-Lithuanian nationality reside, and this is why our organization took the name of the Community of East Lithuania. But we believe that our aims can also be close to the citizens of other parts of Lithuania, and so at the congress it appears that the name will be changed. This will make it possible to expand the numbers of our members considerably."

The congress did consider this question and it was decided to rename the organization the Community of Lithuania.

An election program was adopted at the congress in which members of the community express themselves in favor of strengthening Lithuania's sovereignty, national agreement, tolerance in weltanschauung issues, social guarantees for citizens, preservation of historical monuments, good-neighbor relations with neighboring states, a clean environment, and a healthy way of life.

A list of 26 community candidates was approved at the congress who will be nominated for single-mandate districts, and also a list of candidates for multi-mandate districts, which includes present parliamentary deputies such as Juozas Dringelis, Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Vidmantas Pavilionis, Rimantas Klimas, and others.

"Labor, Harmony, Morality"

A total of 455 delegates gathered on Saturday in Vilnius for the Second Congress of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [DPTL]. The central question was the party's preparation for the upcoming elections on 25 October to the Seimas of the Lithuanian Republic.

DPTL Chairman and Deputy of the republic Supreme Council A. Brazauskas presented the report. He dealt in detail with the disposition of political forces on the eve of the elections, and set forth the main tasks for the party and its strategy and tactics during this period. After analyzing the situation in the economy and describing it as critical, the speaker outlined the essence of the approach to the reforms: consistent, well-considered strengthening of market relations, organically combining privatization with greater production efficiency, rational tax and price policies, and social protection. Here it is necessary to create favorable conditions for entrepreneurial activity, foreign investment, and accumulation of funds to provide social guarantees. The DPTL will support economic reform that guarantees a socially oriented market, agreement among all national communities, and a balanced policy between West and East.

Following the discussion the congress approved the election program under the slogan "Labor, Harmony, Morality." In it, as a constructive, democratic opposition the DPTL has formulated its own goals and the ways to achieve them in the sphere of politics, economics, and culture. The program also notes that rebirth of an independent, economically developed, and democratic state is possible only in a society in which violence is not used in the political struggle. The DPTL is therefore ready to support an act of national reconciliation of all political forces in the republic.

The lists of candidates for posts of deputies in the Seimas were reviewed and approved at the congress. A total of 72 people will participate in the struggle under the proportional system, and 63 for single-mandate districts. The majority of candidates entered on the party lists also plan to run in the districts. The candidates include A. Brazauskas, V. Bubnis, J. Vulavas, V. Velikonis, J. Vesialka, M. Visakevicius, B. Genzelis, G. Kirkilas, V. Petrevicius, J. Pozela, S. Sondeckis, M. Stakvilevicius, B. Rupeika, C. Jursenas, and other people well known in the republic. The DPTL candidates also include members of the Forum for Future Lithuania and the Farmers' Union.

Democratic Party Chairman Details Election Program

93UN0016A Vilnius. ATGIMIMAS in Lithuanian
14 Sep 92 p 11

[Interview with Saulius Peceliunas, chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Party, by Irena Babkauskienė: "Elections - Lithuanian Democratic Party." Words in boldface, as published.]

[Text]

—In the fall of 1988, a group of Sąjodis activists and Povilas Peceliunas, who had returned from enforced exile, united a group of people with a goal of founding a party that would create an alternative to the then ruling Lithuanian Communist Party (LKP).

—On February 5, 1989, the founding conference of the Lithuanian Democratic Party (LDP) took place. An official announcement about the creation of the LDP was made at the celebration of 16 February.

—A Council and its presidium were elected and a program was adopted at the founding congress of the party on 29-30 July, 1989, in Vilnius. It emphasized that: "The chief goal of the LDP is to restore a free, independent and democratic state of Lithuania."

—The second congress of the LDP took place on 29-30 September in Vilnius. The leadership of the LDP was elected. Saulius Peceliunas became its chairman.

—The Democratic Party has more than 500 members; its organizations are most active in Vilnius, Kaunas, Silale, Kelme, Telsiai, Alytus, Klaipeda.

—The LDP newspaper VASARIO 16 (16 February) is being published since December 1988.

—An extraordinary LDP convention took place on 30 August of this year, in Vilnius. It discussed the preparations for the Seimas elections, adopted an electoral program and confirmed a slate of candidates for the Seimas deputies. LDP chairman, Supreme S. Council deputy Saulius Peceliunas, answers the "A" questions.

[Babkauskienė] Mr. Chairman, both the statements of the individual party members in various public meetings and in the pages of your party press are creating the impression that the most characteristic LDP feature is a fierce, actually fierce, anti-communism. Supreme Council Deputy R. Gajauskaite (although she is not a member of the LDP) wrote in this year's 15th issue of the LDP newspaper VASARIO 16: "So far there are only two forces in Lithuania: the communists who have rebaptized themselves and those who are fighting against them." Can one say that your party "is fighting against them?"

[Peceliunas] I do not think so. Let us see where we live and what is the greatest danger?

The ghost of communism has not vanished, it may return any day. We know what will happen if it will return. We are not fighting but are emphasizing the danger of that return perhaps more than the others. The only force that can return that ghost is the Communist party. It is not important how it has rebaptized itself.

One cannot tolerate deception, fascism or communism. There can be no tolerance for such things.

And we have enough reason to doubt the sincerity of the Communist party. They had formed a commission, which was charged with examining all the criminals and crimes of their party. But that commission accomplished nothing. There are no conclusions. Let us take a criminal like Raslanas who is known to everybody. No, not even such individuals are criminals to them. How then should we look at such a party? Of course, on the other hand, we have always said that as long as there are at least three

people in Lithuania who profess the communist ideology, they have the right to have their own organization. Naturally, we shall debate with them and will try to prove our truths.

[Babkauskienė] The 6th article of the LSSR Constitution was changed at LDP's initiative—as a result, the soldiers of the Soviet army who are not permanent inhabitants of the republic cannot take part in the elections to the Supreme Council and the local councils. Does the LDP have many supporters in Lithuania at present?

[Peceliūnas] We have collected one half million signatures of people who were against the participation of the soldiers of a foreign army in the elections to the organs of the Lithuanian government. Therefore we can safely say that at least one half million of Lithuania's inhabitants were supporting our party's political program. Of course, now, in the elections to the Seimas, we will have a possibility to ascertain again how many supporters we have.

[Babkauskienė] Will the LDP take part in the elections with a joint Sąjūdis coalition program and slate of candidates?

[Peceliūnas] It is too early for me to answer this question, because everything may change after several weeks. The elections are a game. We must know that the opponent is watching to see who is going to join whom and how. To tell them in advance how it will really happen would amount to a tactical loss.

LDP has its electoral program, its list of candidates (24 candidates were confirmed at the congress). You will ask, of course, how many candidates we will propose in the multi-mandate electoral districts and how many will run in the single-mandate ones.

[Babkauskienė] And you, naturally, will not tell me either...

[Peceliūnas] You are right, I would not like to. Negotiations are on with the Christian Democrats, the Nationalists and Sąjūdis. We do not want to see the candidates of political forces that are close to us competing in the same district.

The better we shall succeed in coordinating our positions, the fewer slates of candidates we shall present to the voters, the greater chance we will have to win.

[Babkauskienė] The Democratic Party had two deputies in the Supreme Council—S. Peceliūnas and A. Miskinis. Prognostications are, of course, difficult, but how many deputies do you hope to have in the Seimas?

[Peceliūnas] We do not seek to have many of our people in the Seimas. It is better to have 5 or 8, but such individuals who can work, whom we can trust, and whose positions will not raise doubts among the voters.

The selection of candidates was very strict. In addition to various questionnaires, our candidates even signed

pledges: if the party should decide that this individual must, say, resign, he has to obey. This way we tried to avoid situations that used to occur in this Supreme Council; a deputy, elected as representing one organization, suddenly declares in the middle of his term that he has nothing to do with that organization and begins to support quite a different program.

[Babkauskienė] What is the LDP electoral program? What will the party members strive for, once they have gotten into the Seimas?

[Peceliūnas] The chief task of the Seimas is to adopt the foundation of an independent, law based state, the Constitution and the laws, as well as to put them into practice. We are in favor of the restoration of a presidency the institution of a president who is elected by universal vote. We also support the adoption of a desovietization law.

We will seek a start of the search for those who carried out the genocide of the Lithuanian people and the empowerment of the institution for legal prosecution. We will demand a prompt and complete withdrawal of Russia's army from Lithuania and the fulfillment of the Lithuanian people's will be the Russian government in compensating for the damage inflicted by the Soviet occupation. We will favor a combination of a professional army and volunteers. We will seek guarantees for the Lithuanian rights in Poland, Russia and Belarus. We must urgently bring about a reform of the legal system, adopt a new law of the fundamentals of local government by clearly defining the authority of the government and of the local governments, and confirm the new administrative division of Lithuania. We will seek to modernize the economy, to focus it on the world's markets, and to develop a production that does not harm the environment. Other imperative tasks are the reform of Lithuania's banking and tax system, transition to a system of taxing the annual income from all the sources in accordance with the statements submitted by the taxpayers, and the introduction of the litas.

We consider it important that statute limitation should not be applied to economic crimes committed during the period of the restoration of the Lithuanian state. The return of immovable property and land must be carried out according to the law. We will support the small and medium businessmen. Farmers, agricultural cooperatives and companies must be given low-interest long-term credits and state support in case of natural disasters.

Of course, Lithuania must guarantee a minimal living standard, reform the educational system, and give special attention to health care. Such are the main directions of our program.

Social Democratic Party Election Program

93UN0017A Vilnius ATGIMIMAS in Lithuanian
14 Sep 92 p 11

[Article by Violeta Gaizauskaite: "Lithuanian Social Democratic Party"]

[Text]

- The conference to reestablish the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party took place on 12 August, 1989, in Vilnius, at the auditorium of the presidium of the Academy of Sciences. The conference appeal pointed out that the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party's activity, going back to 1886, had never ceased—it was continued by the LSDP delegates' office abroad, while in occupied Lithuania social democrats were active in the underground.
- The 4th conference of the LSDP was organized in December 1989, in Vilnius. It elected the party leadership (chairman—K. Antanavicius), adopted the party Statutes and Program. A supplemented party program was confirmed in LSDP's 15th congress (14-15 May, 1990), and an "Outline of Activities" was adopted.
- The party membership is open, and about 500 LSDP activists have registered for membership. About 80 percent of them are university educated, 15 percent are workers. About 15 percent are former communists, 18 percent are women.
- Party chapters are active in Vilnius, Kaunas, Marijampole, Klaipeda, Jonava, Siauliai, Vilkaviskis, Rokiskis, Taurage, Snieckus. Social democratic groups (up to 10 people) have been established in additional 15 rayons.
- After the conference of restoration, the party briefly published a newspaper SOCIALDEMOKRATAS; the publication of LIETUVOS ZINIOS (started appearing in 1909) was renewed in 1990.

Social Democratic Electoral Guidelines. The second part of the 16th LSDP Congress took place on 5-6 September in Vilnius (the first part was held on 4-5 May of this year). It attracted 139 delegates. The electoral program of the Lithuanian Social Democrat and moderate Christian Democrat bloc, "Toward a Full Democracy," and the slate of party candidates for the elections to the Seimas were confirmed.

The rapporteur, party chairman A. Sakalas, stated that Lithuania is no more the same as it was during the "Baltic Way." The chairman of the Supreme Council contributed to the splintering of the society, corruption began flourishing because of the voluntarism of G. Vagnorius' government. The social democrats are of the opinion that the division of the nation into enemies and friends of independence has lost its meaning after the

plebiscite of 9 February, 1990. LSDP accepts the challenge of the forces of the right and will participate in the elections as an autonomous political force.

If the LSDP representatives were present in the Seimas, they would propose the formation of a coalition government. According to A. Sakalas, coalition is impossible only with people who are color-blind or with satellite political forces. As V. Andriukaitis asserted later in the press conference, if the LSDP had 50 percent of the deputies in the Parliament, they would call for a premature Seimas elections, because at present none of the political forces could take the responsibility for Lithuania's future without the support of the others.

Commenting about the activity of the Supreme Council's Center faction, V. Medvedevas said that it was the social democrats who had demonstrated a true centrism in practice. They will continue to adhere to this principle. The LSDP occupies the position of a left center in the spectrum of Lithuania's political forces.

A comprehensive LSDP electoral program encompasses all the spheres of public life and state order. Essentially, these are the guideposts for the activity of the future government. The main social democratic guideposts are—as stable economy based on a state-regulated market, the alleviation of social conflicts by giving aid to the most poverty-stricken groups of inhabitants and by guaranteeing minimal living standards and social service to all the people of Lithuania.

The chief of the Swedish SDP delegation at the congress, Conny Frederiksson, engaged in an indirect discussion with the critics of the social democratic guideposts. After 43 years in power, this party lost the elections last year to a coalition of four parties of the right (38 and 46 percent of the vote). This defeat is often interpreted as a defeat of the Swedish model and is even linked with the collapse of the USSR. The guest emphasized that the Swedish social democrats had defeated the communists in an open election struggle back in 1920 and since that time the latter have never received more than 5 percent of the vote. The bloc of the right, which won the elections last year, started a total privatization of the social sphere, but a public opinion poll this year has demonstrated that such a policy is unacceptable for the majority of Sweden's citizens. In his opinion, social democracy has a future in the West and in the East. Similar ideas were advanced also by the representative of the British Labor Party, Kate Phillips. In the view of Poland's Adam Bobryk, only social democrats and socialists are able to make it sure that the economic reforms will not be carried out at the expense of the working people.

It is interesting that also in Lithuania, those people who most expect state assistance place their greatest hopes in the social democrats. A Nazarovas, representative of the Political Movement for Social Justice, uniting people who deserve social assistance, asserted that they are planning to back the LSDP candidates in the elections.

Their list includes A. Ruzas, chairman of the Afghanistan war veterans' organization. According to him, these people do not claim any privileges—they merely want that the state would give equal assistance to all the people who need it, irrespective of their political "shadings." It is typical that the LSDP also enjoys the support of the Women's Association, whose representatives are included in the list of the LSDP candidates.

According to the sociologists' data, LSDP may expect 15-18 seats in the Seimas. In August, 21.4 percent were ready to vote for them, while 38 percent were against them. It is believed that as the economic situation deteriorates, this ratio may change in favor of the LSDP. Therefore we may hope that the main rival of the social democrats in the elections will not be the political forces of the right but the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party.

Therefore, the LSDP's success, or the lack of it, will be to a large extent determined by the tactics of the electoral campaign. According to the ratings of the delegates to the LSDP congress, the first ten names in the list of candidates to the Seimas include as many as seven deputies of this Supreme Council. By voting for this list, the voters will also, in part, evaluate their activity in the Supreme Council.

By the way, the LSDP has demonstrated a European outlook to the formation of the electoral slate by entering at the end the name of a well-known person, the minister of health care J. Olekas. While not hoping to be elected but participating in the electoral campaign, he, just as the before-last entry G. Kirvelis, will agitate for the social democratic program. Another sign of the LSDP's political culture was also the fact that the congress avoided any discussion of personalities, because everybody was able to acquaint themselves with the printed biographies of candidates, while their personal characteristics were discussed in the electoral meetings of LSDP chapters and groups.

Poll Assesses Standing of Political Parties

92UN2155B Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian
20 Aug 92 p 9

[Article by Petras Strazdas: "Nothing New in the Front of Elections to the Seimas"]

[Text] Few people doubt that the approaching elections will be essentially different from the past ones at least in several regards, in particular: the differentiation of the political forces, the variety of electoral slogans, the sharpness of the electoral struggle, and the possible political complications. One should also add that the elections will take place in the context of a deepening

economic crisis, which is indicated by these official figures:

In July, as compared with June:	
Industrial production sold	79%
Purchased:	
Cattle and poultry	101%
Milk	88%
Eggs	89%

The real income of a family decreased by 32 percent, as compared with the end of 1991. According to the data of the Ministry of Agriculture, the agriculture will lose about 20 billion rubles.

It seems that all the political forces should focus their electoral programs on economy, social issues and the legal system (the number of crimes in July of this year exceeded that of July 1991 by 11 percent). But a sociological poll of the population, which was conducted by the sociological laboratory of the University of Vilnius, indicates that only 10.8 percent of the voters will pay attention to the electoral programs; 49 percent give priority to the honesty, moral standards and decency of the future deputies; 26.2 percent—to their general competence; and 14.7 percent—to their biographies. This poll shows that programs are going to play a secondary role, which is also confirmed by the fact that about 50 percent of all the voters are ready to vote for political parties. Others will scan the party lists for famous names, for which they will also vote in the single mandate districts. Therefore one may assert that the differences among the electoral programs of the political parties will not be a decisive factor.

However, this does not mean that the voters will ignore the political forces themselves. The fact alone that 15 percent of the people consider themselves leftists, 29 percent—centrists, and the other 29 percent—rightists, indicates that the voters will pick those parties and movements that will squeeze them into the leftist, rightist and centrist Procrustean beds. Scanning the list of 11 parties, 7 political associations and 9 political movements which were registered for the elections, we shall not find the leftist or rightist labels. Therefore, identifying all these organizations as belonging to the left, the right, or the center would be a thankless task, although nobody doubts that the LDDP (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party) is classified as leftist and the Third Sajudis—as rightist.

The popularity ratings of the main political parties during July-August indicate that the parties are attracting greater interest. Perhaps this has to do with the adopted electoral law.

Political organization	Ratings for 1992 Percentage-wise (Vilnius University data)		
	May	August	
		In the Republic	In Kaunas and Vilnius
Democratic Party	3	4.4	2
Christian Democratic Party	3	2.6	2
The Liberal Union	1	2.2	2
LDDP	7	8.4	5
LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party)	2	4.8	8
Third Sajudis	8	11.9	10
The Center Movement	—	3.5	0.2
LLL (The Lithuanian Liberty League)	1	1	1
The Citizens Charter	1	0.5	—
National Progress Movement	—	1.3	0.4
The Nationalist Party	0	1.3	0.4
LAF (The Front of Lithuania's Future)	1	1.6	—
The Greens Party	1	1.7	0

This table indicates that only the Democratic, Social Democratic, LDDP parties and the Third Sajudis have climbed over the indispensable electoral barrier of 4 percent.

Since only about 50 percent of the voters are determined to vote for party slates and one may believe that at least one half of the remaining ones will pick some slate when they will approach the urns, one should think that the Christian Democratic Party and the Center Movement might still collect 4 percent of the votes.

The other parties and organizations will have to seek possible partners in by forming blocs, to intensify the electoral agitation, or ... not to rely on polls.

If we try to forecast the political spectrum of the future Seimas in assuming that the main forces of the right are the Third Sajudis, the Christian Democratic and the Democratic parties, those of the center—the Liberals, the National Progress, the Center Movement and the Social Democrats, and those of the left—the LDDP and the LAF, and if we also consider the fact that only about 50 percent of the voters already know for which slate they are going to vote and that the ratio of forces of the left-center-right forces is 1:2:2, we may assume that the rightists would have 42 percent of the seats in the Parliament, the Center—36 percent, and the left—22 percent. We would arrive at similar figures if we gave a statistical treatment to the results obtained by the sociologists of the radio and television (43-35-22, correspondingly). The almost identical results of two different polls demonstrate the real attitudes of the people.

We should add that 63 percent are determined to take part in the elections, 9.7 percent will not take part, while 27 percent of the potential voters are still waiting to make up their minds. Twenty-six percent will take part

in the elections because they feel it is a civic duty, 25 percent—because we need a new Seimas.

Confidence in state and public institutions has changed but little:

Institution	Trust	
	In May	In August
The Government	48	41
The Supreme Council	41	40
The Courts	28	36
The Police	38	40
State Control	32	31
The Church	78	70

Thirteen percent believe in a better future, 23 percent don't. Forty-five percent are not afraid of unemployment, 56 percent think that they will have a hard time finding a job. Sixty-one percent trusted democracy in May, and 40 percent in August. Twenty-eight percent are convinced that essentially things are changing for the better, 57 percent—for the worse. Ninety percent of those polled envision only an independent Lithuania—this should relax the officials who are seeing all kinds of creeping and other coups.

Thus, in comparison with May, there is nothing essentially new in the front of elections. On the basis of today's moods, no individual political grouping should be able to dominate in the new Seimas and therefore future coalitions are plausible.

The ratio of political forces in the new Seimas may still be influenced by the economic situation, the electoral slogans, the decency of the political struggle, and some political complications.

Democratic Party Conference Sets Election Program*92UN21524 Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian / Sep 92 p 4*

[Article by Gintaras Visockas: "The Parties Are Preparing for the Elections; The Democrats Are Still Thinking"]

[Text] An Extraordinary Convention of the Lithuanian Democratic Party (LDP) took place on Sunday, at the Teachers' Palace in Vilnius.

The party leader Saulius Peceliunas talked about the political situation in Lithuania. He reproached those Lithuanians who keep saying that life now is merely getting worse. S. Peceliunas is convinced that at present we have become incomparably freer, more open and democratic—we have many more possibilities to show what we are worth than earlier, several or a dozen years ago. Today we have all the guarantees that our life will start improving. Earlier such guarantees did not exist. Meanwhile, thinking people can clearly see the real causes of why there are still many difficulties and troubles. It is impossible to accomplish economic, agricultural reforms and complete privatization in a half year's time. Reforms that transform life essentially as a rule last longer—not one and not three years. The important thing is not to slow down the constantly quickening rate of speed.

S. Peceliunas asserted that during such changes, "dark forces" come to the surface. They desire only one thing—to make profits at the expense of the others. It is extremely difficult to isolate such forces, but we must do it.

When LDP was putting together the list of its candidates for the Seimas, it discussed ways of protecting itself from hypocrites. The selection was strict. There is not a single former communist among the candidates of the Democratic Party. The candidates signed pledges that at the party's request they would immediately resign as Sejm deputies. They also answered the question if they had collaborated with the secret services of foreign states. Once elected to the Seimas, members of the LDP should not suddenly become "independent from everybody," as it happened with some of the deputies of the present Supreme Council—said S. Peceliunas.

Valdas Petrauskas acquainted the assembled with the most important theses of the LDP election program. They are: the continuity of the state, the restoration of the presidency, legal prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide against the Lithuanian nation, the prohibition of plundering the national property by the pro-Communist nomenklatura through privatization and public funds, complete and rapid evacuation of the foreign army, payment for the losses inflicted by the Soviet occupation, assistance to small and medium businessmen.

Petra Miskinis regretted the fact that Lithuania is still using a legal system of a foreign state. Laws contradict one another, and so possibilities are created for immoral people to abuse them.

Vytautas Landsbergis asked the members of the LDP not to shut themselves inside their party affairs. There are matters that go beyond the party limits. Lithuania is again facing the crossroads today. Obvious dangers do not exist, but there are possibilities that the nation may lose all of its victories imperceptibly bit by bit. Our statehood may become restricted and damaged not only from the outside but also with our own hands. The eyes of neighbors with huge appetites are still focused on Lithuania. If the forces of the left succeeded in coming power, the neighbors' appetites would doubtlessly increase. A real danger exists that the ascension of the left would mean a change in Lithuania's foreign policy. In V. Landsbergis' view, we may not become a member of the CIS, but we would come closer to the CIS. A large independence would be changed to a greater dependence than now, by justifying that step by saying that... life has suddenly become "better."

The chairman of the Supreme Council is convinced that the situation at present is dangerous since very important decisions or conclusions are made by a mere majority of several votes. And it is even more dangerous if the decisive votes belong to Sakalas, Bernozovas, Paulauskas and Macejaniec. Does Lithuania want to find itself in such a situation?

V. Landsbergis wished that the Democratic Party (and not it alone) would proceed in step with Sajudis. If all the parties that emerged from Sajudis would succeed in marching together, Lithuania would rejoice. The competition among the parties could be started again in other elections—after we had said our farewells to the foreign army.

Sajudis chairman Juozas Tumelis wished the LDP a constructive activity. In his opinion, very much will depend on the Sejm. This Sejm will make a fatal turn. We should not give in to various lures. Our road must be common for a long time yet.

The LDP has not yet decided whether it will take part in the elections alone or together with other forces of the right. It has already selected its own candidates to the Sejm (there are 24 of them). Their candidacies were confirmed during the conference almost unanimously. The chief outline of the electoral program has also been confirmed.

At this time the LDP has more than 500 members. The strongest centers of the party are in Vilnius, Kaunas, Silale, Kelme, Telsiai, Alytus and Klaipeda.

Christian Democrats Prepare for Elections

92UN2152B Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian
1 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Gintaras Miksiunas: "Christian Democrats Will Participate in the Elections With a Separate Slate"]

[Text] One of the most numerous political forces in Lithuania is the Christian Democratic Party. At present it has about 6,000 members and chapters have been established in almost all the cities of Lithuania.

On 29 August, the Christian Democratic Party held an extraordinary pre-election conference in Kaunas. On the agenda were the preparations for the elections, the party statement to the Ministry of Justice on registration and permission to take part in the elections, changes in the statutes. The fundamentals of a new program were adopted.

During the conference, party chairman P. Katilius delivered a political report. A draft program was introduced by A. Saudargas. Supreme Council deputy V. Puplauskas read the draft resolution and statements. The conference confirmed the candidacy of the party representative for the elections.

Prime Minister A. Abisala, who took part in the conference, delivered an address. An analysis of the political situation was presented by Sovietologist Francoise Thom.

Supreme Council deputies J. Beinartas and R. Hofertiene participated as guests.

It was decided that the party would take part in the elections with a separate slate. The list of candidates is still being adjusted.

The party addressed itself to the Presidium of the Supreme Council concerning the changes of some articles of the Electoral Law. In the opinion of the Christian Democrats, the procedure of voting by mail is inappropriate. In another resolution, the Christian Democrats expressed their concern about the course of harvesting: the farmers are complaining that the former kolkhoz chairman, the officials of local self-government and directors of the enterprises do not provide them with technology.

An appeal was adopted asking the chairman of the Lithuanian bishops' conference to make an exception to several priests and to allow them to run for the Seimas.

Leadership Changes in Consultative Seimas

92UN2153B Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian
18 Aug 92 p 1

[Untitled article by Kestutis Jauniskis]

[Text] The fourteenth session of the Consultative Seimas on Saturday, in the Trade Union Culture Palace, started with a scuffle among the associates. The men under the

leadership of the Consultative Seimas chairman A. Kancleris decided not to allow the leader of the Liberty League A. Terleckas, the chairman of the Landholders Association A. Liaugaudas and their associates to enter the auditorium. Not only the former chairman of the Kaunas chapter of the Liberty League, V. Sustauskas, who had been absent for a long time from the Seimas activity, but also quite a few people who had never been Seimas members, and who were issued the credentials at the order of A. Kancleris, came to his assistance.

After a minor fight, all who came to the Seimas session managed to get into the auditorium. They took their seats in an orderly fashion: the supporters of A. Terleckas on the left side of the auditorium, and those of A. Kancleris—on the right. As soon as a representative of one side tried to explain something, the other side would erupt in a loud applause. Therefore the session began a bit late. A. Kancleris called the police armed with sub-machine guns to evict those sitting on the left, but the police was unable to understand who and why should be evicted and left themselves. The "rightists" who, of course, were in the minority, followed the police on the way out.

J. Gelazius, member of the Consultative Seimas, informed those remaining in the auditorium that the Seimas commission had collected enough data proving that A. Kancleris used to be a KGB agent. He gathered the like-minded people around himself and declared himself chairman of the Consultative Seimas. J. Gelazius said.

A. Liaugaudas read a statement of the presidium of the Landholders' Association, which said that A. Kancleris' mandate in the Consultative Seimas is being revoked because of his divisive activity. It was announced that criminal proceedings were started against his followers because they committed violence against the workers of the Kaunas region chapter of the Landholders' Association.

A. Terleckas emphasized that the decisions of the Seimas secretariat were invalid because they were taken without the necessary quorum. For instance, only six members of the Secretariat out of 21 have voted "in favor" of removing A. Terleckas' and J. Gelazius' credentials. In A. Terleckas' view, LIETUVOS AIDAS also acted disrespectfully by publishing such juridically invalid decisions. A. Kancleris has destroyed the Consultative Seimas' authority, A. Terleckas said, and therefore it is not worth to put together our own slate for the elections because nobody will vote for an organization whose chairman was a KGB agent.

Since Consultative Seimas was created by the Liberty League and the Landholders' Association, it was decided that this was a sufficient juridical argument for the takeover of the Seimas' mandate. The new Seimas also united the organizations of political prisoners, deportees and others. J. Gelazius was elected the Seimas' chairman. It was resolved that A. Kancleris' followers

would not be allowed to make use of the Government's 200,000 rubles grant and that Seimas would participate in the elections only according to the majoritarian system.

The same problems were being discussed in the other session of the second Consultative Seimas, which took place later in the Music Academy. The participants were those who had left the earlier session and a large number of novices. J. Gelazius, A. Terleckas, L. Vilkas, E. Raugalas and A. Liaugaudas were expelled as members of the secretariat. Many discussions focused on A. Terleckas' "turn to the left," his change of colors, and his links with the LDDP. The Ministry of Justice will be asked to confirm the superiority of the second Consultative Seimas to the first one.

Youth Political Organization Formed

92UN2153C Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian
20 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by LIETUVOS AIDAS Information: "A New Political Organization"]

[Text] A session of the Youth Club "The Alternative of the Right" took place on Monday in Vilnius. This club was founded in the early summer by a group of Vilnius university and high school students. The name indicates that the club unites young peoples of rightist political persuasion.

In the opinion of the participants at the meeting, not a single youth political organization exists in Lithuania today. There is a political association that calls itself "Young Lithuania," but this organization's activity has been so far invisible. Moreover, the previous actions of the "young Lithuanians" were not very constructive. However, during 1988-1990, "Young Lithuania" was the only counterpoise to the Lithuanian Communist Youth Association [LKJS] of that time.

The Communist youths have changed their signboard and have assumed the name of "The Youth Forum," but they remain an instrument of the Left. This organization's misdeeds in handling of the property of the former LKJS and founding murky commercial companies merits the attention of the prosecutor's office.

The other recently established political youth organizations "the Social Democratic Youth Association" and "The Young Liberals"—are small and leftist. The demonstrations and the mass meetings of the Students' Association have shown that it is an instrument of the forces of the Left. On the whole, Sajudis has not been dealing with the problems of the young people and is not doing it now. Therefore we have always seen all kinds of Medalinskas, Juozaitis and Mrs. Juozairis popping up and trying to drive the young people leftward.

The members of the club reproached Sajudis for paying no attention to the young people. The electoral campaign will require groups of agitators. Therefore, beginning

with September first, the members of the Sajudis Seimas and the representatives of the coalition must visit the universities and organize meetings in various collectives where many youths are active.

Members of "The Alternative of the Right" club regretted the fact that the new Seimas will have no rightist youth representatives. The youth problems will be forgotten.

The club decided that it was time to found a party or an association of the rightist youth. The student corporations established in the universities and the political discussion clubs in the high schools could serve as a foundation.

In the opinion of the assembled, the party or the movement could call itself "Young Wood" or, as the club itself, "The Alternative of the Right." Its activity would correspond to the conservative political principles, a Christian world view, and the demands of the national spirit.

If the attempts to create this organization will be crowned with success, it will not yet run for the Seimas and will be preparing itself for the next elections. In the meantime, it will do constructive work, prepare several draft laws regulating the sphere of young people's life. Laws should be drafted on certain privileges for young people who are engaged in commerce and studying, on additional benefits for young families and on the extension of the term of service in the national defense system to 1.5 years. The state must take care of its future.

The club decided to establish a public initiative group to support the Ministry of National Defense.

In the opinion of the assembled, the future political youth organization should see to it that reliable young people come to work in the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, the Lithuanian customs and the security service. "We must place the security of the state into reliable hands," spoke the members of the club "The Alternative of the Right."

It was agreed that the first conference of the new organization should take place at the end of September.

Lithuanian Environmental Legislation Reviewed

93WN0006C Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English No 30, 17-23 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Angela M. Crooks]

[Text] Last week, on 10 September, the final session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council prior to the parliamentary elections began. It didn't take long for arguments to break out over whether to investigate the mandate of MP Vladimiras Beriozovas, who allegedly collaborated with the KGB in Kaunas in 1948-49 and failed to present this fact in his biography during the 1990 parliamentary elections. The issued failed to gain enough votes to be put on the agenda.

The rest of the session was less tumultuous. Aurimas Taurantas, who is a member of the opposition faction "Nation Progress" was elected Speaker of Parliament.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Aleksandras Abisala presented the government's Economic Policy Memorandum, which outlines measures for economic stabilization.

Overview of Environmental Protection Laws in Lithuania

The value of natural resources was not taken into account under the Soviet planned economy. Instead, the "cost" of a product was determined by the amount of labor used in manufacturing it, and there was no incentive for conservation. Every region of the former Soviet Union now faces environmental problems as a result of the reckless exploitation of nature, and the Baltic states are no exception. Consequently, the new governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are trying to build effective environmental protection mechanisms and have passed various laws regulating the environment.

The "constitution" of ecological laws in Lithuania, adopted on 12 January 1992, is the *Law on Environmental Protection*. This law sets forth the guiding principles of environmental policy, defining the rights and responsibilities of the government, enterprises and individuals. Based on this law, separate resolutions and normative acts have been adopted to regulate the imposition of fines for pollution and to define standards for the quality of the air, water, land, and so forth.

There are three themes which can be found in the law: 1) residents of Lithuania have the right to a safe and healthy environment; 2) the development of society should be in harmony with nature; and 3) laws should preserve the biological diversity of living organisms as well as the food chain which is necessary for sustaining them. Natural resources must be used rationally, and complete and accurate information on the environment must be available.

Ecology is regulated by the Department of Environmental Protection (subordinate to the Supreme Council), the government, and by local authorities.

Part of the state budget is allocated for environmental protection, with outside resources being directed to a special government ecological fund.

Incentives for clean production and penalties for exceeding maximum levels of pollution are outlined by various normative acts and laws.

Enterprises must undergo environmental impact assessments before they can receive permission for operation. Permits are required for building, reconstruction and demolition. The use of natural resources and the disposal of wastes are also regulated by permits.

The production or transport of hazardous chemical substances is permitted only upon government inspection and approval. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are prohibited on the territory of Lithuania.

The Law on Environmental Protection defines conditions for declaring an ecological disaster zone and provides civil defense measures in the event of a man-made or natural catastrophe. If an ecological disaster results from economic activity, the guilty party must remove the sources of damage, eliminate negative consequences, take all necessary measures to restore order, and inform the population, the Latvian government, the Ministry of Health, and the Environmental Protection Committee.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Inflation Continues To Rise in Baltics

93UN0046A Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 2-8 Oct 92 p 7

[Commentary by Peter Morris: "Kroon Crowned Inflation King"]

[Text] Estonia's inflation rate of 17.6 per cent a month in August outpaced both Latvia's (10 per cent) and Lithuania's (14 per cent), two countries without convertible currencies.

But inflation rates in all three countries have not diverged widely enough to show one country's monetary policies to be worse than another's.

All three nations have abandoned the Russian rouble. But only Estonia, which tied its currency, the kroon, to the German mark, can be said to have truly left the rouble zone.

The Latvian rouble and the Lithuanian talonas, both transition currencies, have plummeted alongside the woeful currency of their former occupier.

The talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania on October 1, the last day it was officially pegged at one to the Russian rouble. Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, however, other currencies will circulate freely.

The Latvian rouble has been without direction due to the inability of the government and the central bank to agree on monetary policy. Left without direction the currency simply followed its momentum: straight down.

The kroon has so far managed to defy speculators who insist it must be devalued. Bank of Estonia President Siim Kallas maintains no possibility of devaluation exists, pointing out that every single kroon in circulation is backed up by foreign exchange.

In any case, only the new parliament, the Riigikogu, has the power to devalue the currency.

Yet, in spite of these widely different currency reform strategies, relatively similar inflation rates have dogged

the Baltic States. In July and August together, inflation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was 47, 36 and 45 per cent respectively.

When the kroon was introduced in June, it was hoped that inflation could be brought down to 2 per cent a month by the end of the year. Most bank officials admit that this no longer appears possible.

The classical explanation for the inflation now ravaging the Baltic economies is simply that too much paper is chasing too few goods.

In Estonia, for example, far more foreign currency was exchanged for kroons than expected: 200 million kroons (US\$16.5 million) worth in the first eight weeks of money reform.

Also, reformers there overlooked state salaries earned before the June 20 introduction of the currency that were paid after money reform, according to one Bank of Estonia official.

The excess money in the Baltic States coincides with a sharp decline in production, which lowers the supply and raises the prices of local goods.

Every time a wage hike is not accompanied by an increase in marketable commodities it adds to inflationary pressure.

Another explanation is that the increase in prices is not really inflation in the Western sense of a ballooning money supply, but merely the result of release from long imposed Soviet trade and price restraints. Today many expensive goods are coming into the country, cheaper goods are being exported, and price limits have been removed. Prices naturally soar like a buoy would if released after being held 10 feet under water. Once prices reach the top they should stabilise.

In Lithuania, for example, prices paid for imports of energy reached world market levels in August 1992. Lithuanian authorities envisage that once the economy passes through this "oil shock" the rate of inflation will decline to 10 per cent a month.

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